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Abstract 
 
Marine ecosystem loss and degradation are a worldwide phenomenon. Ineffective management 
has allowed land-based pollution, overharvesting, competing uses, and excess coastal 
development to proliferate in many places. A variety of management innovations have been 
developed and promoted to improve social and ecological outcomes. Co-management is one 
promising innovation that entails shared management authority between resource users or 
communities and a central government. Although co-management has shown great promise in 
improving natural resources management in many settings, governments and communities often 
face challenges during shifts from a command and control regulatory approach to a collaborative 
one. Hawai‘i is one geography where governance transitions to co-management in coral reef 
fisheries has been limited, despite the presence of highly engaged communities, a legacy of 
customary marine tenure with a legal pathway that has existed for over 20 years, and significant 
support from non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This dissertation research traces how 
fisheries management and marine tenure have changed from Hawaiian Kingdom Era through 
present day, including how co-management emerged at the community level in Hawai‘i and the 
barriers faced during planning and implementation. This dissertation research also examines 
some different ways communities have partnered with the State of Hawai‘i outside of formal co-
management relationships, and concludes by critically examining the role of leadership 
throughout these governance transitions. The results reveal the importance of historical context 
in shaping institutional design; which events precipitate self-organization and collective action at 
the community level; how the distributions of costs and benefits at different stages of the policy 
cycle can affect incentives to engage in co-management; how fragmented authority complicates 
integrated co-management; and the salience of collective leadership in co-management settings. 
The findings from this dissertation have implications for fisheries co-management specifically, 
and more generally, collaborative environmental planning and management in a variety of 
settings worldwide. 
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Preface 
 
This dissertation was inspired by both intellectual curiosity and an opportunity to contribute to 
co-management transitions in Hawai‘i. As a doctoral environmental planning student, I wanted 
to make a theoretical contribution, but I was also interested in finding a project that could 
contribute in some way to the people and resources in Hawai‘i.  
 
My personal interest in co-management was inspired by the work of Elinor Ostrom. In 2009, 
Ostrom was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for her work on common pool 
resources management. Her research challenged widely held beliefs that common pool resources 
could only be managed through government coercion or private property rights. Through case 
studies, she demonstrated that collective action was a viable option in hundreds of global 
commons and changed the way people thought about commons governance. I first read her work 
in a course on community-based natural resource management taught by Kem Lowry and Krisna 
Suryanata in Spring 2010. Suddenly I was excited to read and learn more about common pool 
resources governance, institutional analysis, and transaction costs. I read much of her writing and 
that or her colleagues. I eagerly began looking for ways to apply her research to make a scholarly 
and also, a practical contribution to coral reef fisheries management in Hawai‘i.  
 
Inspired by the community-based management course, I began to learn more about different 
community planning initiatives underway across the archipelago. I learned about the tremendous 
customary, indigenous knowledge and practices held within many Hawai‘i communities. It made 
perfect sense to me that Hawai‘i communities and the state should partner together through co-
management to improve coral reef fisheries. After four years of fieldwork and scouring the 
academic literature for solutions, I have learned that co-management transitions do not come 
easily, nor do they happen overnight. When I first began this research in 2011, Hā‘ena 
(Hawai‘i’s only active community-based subsistence fishing area) had already submitted their 
rules to the Attorney General for review. The rules did not become active until August 2015, 
over four years later. During that time, I made the transition from a novice haole doctoral student 
to a more enlightened (but still haole) doctoral student with a better understanding of Hawaiian 
history and culture.  
 
xvi	
Throughout my time in Hawai‘i, I have always struggled with being an outsider. As a haole from 
the mainland (continental) United States, I often question whether I belong in Hawai‘i and if I 
am the right person to conduct this type of research. However, there have been experiences 
throughout my dissertation process that have altered my perspective, one being an unforgettable 
weekend of service on the island of Kaua‘i. In early October 2014, I camped with the Hā‘ena 
community in a section of the Hā‘ena State Park. There, the local group Hui Maka‘āinana o 
Makana has been working to restore the ā‘ina (land) and lo‘i kalo (taro patches) to supply food 
for local residents. They have a small covered structure where local residents gather together to 
meet, eat, share cultural practices, and develop restoration plans for the area. While camping that 
weekend, I washed dishes, and listened intently to learn firsthand what the Hā‘ena effort meant 
to the local community and other communities across Hawai‘i. I also helped some of Hā‘ena’s 
ancestral residents prepare public testimony in advance of a big public meeting in Hanalei to 
discuss their proposed substance fishing area. The community members were very passionate, 
but many were not the type of folks that felt comfortable with standing up and sharing their 
thoughts in front of the entire community. With enough practice and encouragement from their 
peers and others involved, folks eventually became comfortable with their messages. When it 
came time to deliver oral testimony, some entire families stood up at the podium together. 
Groups of eight or ten grandparents, aunties, uncles, sons, daughters, and grandchildren stood up, 
in front of the Hanalei Elementary School cafeteria, taking turns sharing their words. A few folks 
came to tears sharing stories about family members that had passed on and what that area meant 
to their family. It was truly amazing to see these folks share stories about their deep connections 
to Hā‘ena with a couple hundred folks they see every day around town, on the beach, and in the 
grocery store. Delivering that oral testimony in a very public setting was something they were 
not accustomed to, but it resonated with everyone present, including the government 
representatives from marine resource management agencies.  
 
After the public meeting, where over 99% of testimony collected was in favor of establishing a 
community-based subsistence fishing area in Hā‘ena, we retreated back to the campsite to 
celebrate under the stars at Hā‘ena State Park. There, Hā‘ena residents and others that had 
worked with the community sang, played guitar and ukulele, ate some delicious food, and 
commemorated the successful meeting. The kanikapila (informal jam sessions) involved folks 
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from their twenties to others well into their eighties. The celebration stretched late into the night. 
Later, in the clear, still, muggy night sky on Kaua‘i’s northwest coast, a po makole (a night 
rainbow) appeared, beaming magnificently over the pali (cliff). Night rainbows or moonbows are 
extremely rare. I had never seen or heard of such a thing before this night, and I can honestly say 
that I have never seen such a beautiful sight as that po makole. I believe that the successful 
public meeting – and that po makole we witnessed that night – was a culmination of the work 
that the Hā‘ena community had put in over the ten years it took to transition Hā‘ena to culturally-
based rules and a co-management partnership with the State of Hawai‘i. During that time, many 
kūpuna (elders) that were involved from the beginning of the process had passed away and I 
would like to think that the po makole appeared on that night because Hā‘ena ancestors were 
pleased with the community’s efforts. There in Hā‘ena with my very small involvement in 
preparing for that meeting, I finally felt like I belonged. I finally felt like I was able to give 
something back. With this dissertation, it is my hope that I have contributed in some way to a 
better understanding and easing of co-management transitions for other communities across 
Hawai‘i nei (beloved Hawai‘i). 
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Chapter 1. 
From Planning to Practice: Towards Co-management of Hawai‘i Coral Reef Fisheries 
 
1.1 EVOLVING OCEAN GOVERNANCE 
For much of human history, the oceans of the world were considered so vast that no level of 
harvesting could ever exhaust its resources:  
 
For every one admits that a great many persons hunt on the land or fish in a river, the 
forest is easily exhausted of wild animals and the river of fish, but such a contingency is 
impossible in the case of the sea (Grotius, 1916).  
 
Centuries of human impacts and collapsed fisheries have shown this to be untrue. Vast 
anthropogenic impacts on marine ecosystems throughout much of the world has been attributed 
to overharvesting of marine resources, global markets and trade, development, and climate 
change (Cinner, McClanahan, et al., 2012; Cinner, Graham, Huchery, & MacNeil, 2013; Halpern 
et al., 2008; Maire et al., 2016). Self-interested overharvesting or a lack of effective governing 
institutions in many areas has resulted in what has been called the tragedy of the commons. The 
tragedy of the commons occurs when people harvest common resources in their own self-interest 
rather than at levels for the collective good of all, resulting in serial depletion (Gordon, 1954). 
The solution to the tragedy of the commons was once thought to be limited to just two solutions: 
government coercion, or enclosure and allocation of property rights (Hardin, 1968). However, 
Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues showed the multitude of ways resource users could 
communicate and cooperate to avert the tragedy of the commons through collective action (E. 
Ostrom, 2005).  
 
Despite the multitude of governance arrangements available, including collective action, 
ineffective management threatens the ecosystem goods, services, and values that coastal 
communities rely upon across the world. These goods and services include fisheries resources 
that feed an estimated one billion people, storm protection functions provided by coastal 
ecosystems, and socio-cultural services for coastal communities (Barbier et al., 2008). Much of 
this ineffective management is related to a lack of state-level capacity to manage resources 
effectively (Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997); regulations that do not adequately consider local context, 
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historical patterns and norms of use (Cleaver, 2002), a lack of recognition of the capability of 
resource users or communities to sustainably manage resources on their own (E. Ostrom, 1990), 
or not devolving property rights to resource users to sufficiently confer stewardship incentives 
(Grafton, Squires, & Fox, 2000).  
 
1.2 TOWARDS CO-MANAGEMENT  
 
For centuries, indigenous communities across the world employed traditional ecological 
knowledge to devise place-based sociocultural institutions (sometimes referred to as traditional 
management, customary management, or customary marine tenure) to manage resources 
collectively (Berkes, 1999; E. Ostrom, 1990; Zerner, 1994). Traditional knowledge and 
management has been renewed in many places, particularly across the Pacific (Johannes, 2002). 
Although traditional knowledge and management are in place in many rural areas around the 
world, in recent years there has been a movement to integrate traditional knowledge and 
customary management practices with western-based scientific approaches (Kittinger, Cinner, 
Aswani, & White, 2015). This integration often occurs through a management partnership 
between local resource users or communities and the state, termed ‘co-management.’ 
 
Co-management and other hybrid governance arrangements have emerged to resolve some of the 
deficiencies that have manifested in bureaucracy-based governance arrangements (Borrini-
Feyerabend, Farvar, Nguinguiri, & Ndangang, 2000; Jentoft, 1989; Pinkerton, 1989). These new 
collaborative governance arrangements combine aspects of community-based management, such 
as self-organization and collective action, generally to create a management partnership with the 
government (Berkes, 2009). Co-management can take many forms and may include market-
based approaches, including the sale or lease of harvest rights; co-operative management; access 
controls; and adaptive management (Basurto et al., 2012; McCay et al., 2014; Olsson, Folke, & 
Berkes, 2004; Yandle, 2003). Diagnosing exactly how authority is shared within a co-
management institutional arrangement can be difficult. A property rights-based approach can be 
useful because it can articulate and defend which rights are retained or shared in a co-
management institutional arrangement (LeCornu et al., in preparation; Schlager & Ostrom, 1992, 
1999; Yandle & Imperial, 2009). Co-management may also manifest as a strategy to uphold 
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traditional forms of community-based management (Vaughan, Thompson, & Ayers, 2016; 
Vaughan & Caldwell, 2015).  
 
Given its promise, much research has examined transitions to co-management (Cinner, Daw, et 
al., 2012). The success of these transitions may vary greatly in different settings. Likewise, the 
existing governance arrangement may vary prior to co-management transitions. Existing 
arrangements may be situated within a centralized bureaucracy, at the community level via 
community-based management, in an open-access situation (a lack of management or enforced 
property rights) or other hybrid approaches. When successful, these transitions have sometimes 
been characterized as transformations (Westley et al., 2011). Resilience scholars describe this 
transformability in complex systems as the ability to change states and cast aside the previous 
system (Folke et al., 2010). These transformations can be categorized by the degree of 
coordination and the origin of available resources. In other words, whether they are internal or 
external to the group engaged in the transformation (Berkhout, Smith, & Stirling, 2004). 
Persistent transformations are described as ‘robust’ (Anderies, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2004). Recent 
publications have used these concepts to detail governance transformations to co-management in 
a variety of settings (Armitage, Marschke, & van Tuyen, 2011; Folke, Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg, 
2005; Gelcich et al., 2010).  
 
Although co-management is a promising solution to many common pool resource management 
problems, there are several issues that complicate governance transitions or transformations 
(Olsson, Folke, & Hughes, 2008). Consensus-building challenges, income inequality, community 
heterogeneity, and group size may complicate self-organization, consensus-building, or 
collective action at the community level (Cinner, Sutton, & Bond, 2007). Likewise, governments 
may not be willing or prepared to cede authority or truly collaborate with communities or 
resource users (Pinkerton, 1999). Institutional or structural barriers can inhibit co-management, 
(Levine & Richmond, 2014) as can public planning processes that can be captured by special 
interests (Turner & Weninger, 2005; Wilson & McCay, 1998). As a result, many governance 
transitions to co-management have stalled or have taken at least a decade to take hold and build 
stability and resilience (Gelcich et al., 2010; Gelcich, Edwards-Jones, Kaiser, & Castilla, 2006).  
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When implemented however, co-management is thought to lead to a variety of social and 
ecological benefits, including opportunities for knowledge-sharing and learning among diverse 
groups, improved regulatory compliance, greater community engagement, reduced transaction 
costs, and improved resource outcomes (Acheson, 2003; Armitage, Berkes, Dale, Kocho-
Schellenberg, & Patton, 2011; Armitage et al., 2009; Jentoft, 2005). Despite its promise, co-
management, like any governance regime, does not always achieve positive outcomes. Scholars 
have identified the following less than desirable outcomes: conflict (Castro & Nielsen, 2001); 
overharvesting by communities responsible for stewardship or agency capture (Singleton, 2000); 
elite community members capture of resource benefits (MacNeil & Cinner, 2013); asymmetric 
power relations between communities or resource users and the government (Nadasdy, 2003a); 
and diverse stakeholder groups that complicate planning processes (Levine & Richmond, 2014). 
Implementation can be further compounded in developed nations by complex regulatory regimes 
and overarching legal mandates that can hinder devolution of rights at the local level 
(Finkbeiner, Ayers, Kittinger, & Crowder, 2015; Kittinger, Ayers, & Prahler, 2012).  
 
The disparate outcomes found across governance transitions in different contexts have led to 
comparative research into which factors lead to stable, effective co-management regimes 
(Cinner, McClanahan, et al., 2012a; Gutierrez, Hilborn, & Defeo, 2011; Pomeroy, Katon, & 
Harkes, 2001). Many social factors have been linked with successful co-management. Among 
these factors are institutions that address historical and contextual conditions (Cinner, 
McClanahan, et al., 2012a, p. 5219); self-organization (Basurto et al., 2012; E. Ostrom, 2009); 
leadership and incentives (Gutierrez et al., 2011; E. Ostrom, 2009; Pomeroy et al., 2001) and 
governing institutions (E. Ostrom, 1990). Although other social and ecological factors have been 
shown to have an influence on co-management outcomes, including proximity to markets 
(Cinner et al., 2013) and dependence on resources (Cinner, McClanahan, et al., 2012; Gutierrez 
et al., 2011), there is less understanding about the role of history in determining or constraining 
co-management institutions; how co-management emerges at the community level, including the 
role of self-organization and leadership; how communities respond to barriers; and governance 
transitions that occur within a state-nested or polycentric governance system.  
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The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate and better understand the practical and 
theoretical issues associated with co-management governance transitions in Hawai‘i. The 
principal research questions are: 
 
1. How have the rules hierarchy and property rights for small-scale fisheries in Hawai‘i 
changed over time, and, given the historical change in these institutions, what limitations 
and opportunities exist for incorporating rights-based approaches in co-management? 
2. How does co-management emerge at the community-level in Hawai‘i? 
3. What are the barriers to implementation when communities attempt to change institutions 
from a centralized bureaucracy? 
4. What types of co-management partnership opportunities exist for communities outside of 
the defined co-management pathway? 
5. What is the role of leadership in co-management planning and implementation? 
 
1.3 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH  
 
This dissertation utilizes an in-depth, mixed method case study approach to examine institutional 
change leading towards co-management governance of coral reef fisheries in the Hawaiian 
Islands. Mixed method research approaches often combine qualitative and quantitative data to 
complement, provide additional support for, or triangulate research findings (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 2003). Mixed method research approaches may also collect multiple types of data or 
combine theoretical frameworks to enhance the understanding of phenomena being investigated 
(Creswell & Clark, 2007). Embedded case studies entail the creation of sub-units within a case 
study approach to capture the complexity that exists within a single case or examine sub-cases at 
a finer detailed scale (Yin, 2009). By employing a mixed method approach that combines 
multiple theoretical frameworks, including institutional analysis, common pool resources theory, 
social-ecological systems and resilience frameworks, and planning theory, this research 
considers the complex interplay that occurs as resource users within multiple communities across 
Hawai‘i collaborate to change the institutions that govern coral reef fisheries. 
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1.3.1 Data collection methods 
This research utilizes a mixed method approach, and in some cases different methods were used 
in different chapters. Table 1.1 describes the different data sources and how they were collected 
in each chapter.  
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Table 1.1. Dissertation data sources, methods, and data analysis separated by chapter 
Chapter Methods Data sources Data analysis  
Chapter 2: Who has 
the right to manage? 
Distribution of 
property rights affects 
equity and power 
dynamics in co-
management 
Institutional analysis Archival data sources 
IAD framework to 
analyze rules 
hierarchy; Property 
rights framework to 
examine which rights 
components are held 
or shared. 
Chapter 3: Emergence 
of co-management 
governance for 
Hawai‘i coral reef 
fisheries 
Mixed methods 
Semi-structured 
interviews; archival 
data sources, 
including: public and 
legislative testimony, 
government 
documents and 
evaluations, 
community resource 
plans and rules  
Grounded theory 
approach: Qualitative 
data analysis; content 
analysis; legal and 
policy analysis; 
content analysis 
Chapter 4: Making the 
Transition to Co-
Management 
Governance 
Arrangements in 
Hawai‘i: A 
Framework for 
Understanding 
Transaction and 
Transformation Costs 
Mixed methods 
Semi-structured 
interviews; archival 
data sources, 
including: 
government 
documents and 
evaluations, 
community resource 
plans and rules.  
Grounded theory 
approach: Qualitative 
data analysis; IAD 
framework to examine 
transaction and 
transformation costs  
Chapter 5: Many 
paths, one 
destination: 
developing community 
guidance in state-
centric co-
management 
Mixed methods 
Semi-structured 
interviews, archival 
data sources, 
including: Hawai‘i 
revised statutes, 
administrative rules, 
and management 
plans. 
Qualitative data 
analysis; legal and 
policy analysis; 
institutional analysis. 
Chapter 6: 
Reexamining 
leadership in fisheries 
co-management 
Qualitative approach Semi-structured interviews 
Qualitative data 
analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
	8 
1.4 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
This dissertation is grounded in theories of common-pool resources, institutional analysis, social-
ecological systems, resilience, and sustainability science. Although this integrative, 
transdisciplinary research draws upon theories from several academic disciplines, institutional 
analysis and common-pool resource theory are primarily employed to analyze and evaluate the 
complex interaction of biophysical conditions, community composition, rules, social 
interactions, and resource outcomes.  
 
1.4.1 Common-Pool Resources and Institutional Analysis 
Common-pool resources (CPRs) such as fisheries, forests, and water present a challenge to 
managers because exclusion is difficult and resource units are rivalrous; each unit harvested is 
one less left for others in a social-ecological system. In instances without strong government 
institutions or enforced property rights, CPR systems can be exhausted unless collective choice 
institutions exclude free riders and regulate extraction through collective action. Institutions can 
be defined as mutually understood, enforced prescriptions used by humans to determine required, 
permissible, and prohibited actions at multiple scales and levels of organization and society 
(North, 1990; E. Ostrom, 2005; V. Ostrom, 1980). Societies across the world depend on 
institutions governing CPRs such as fisheries, forests, and water for sustenance or survival. 
Consequently, many scholars have examined how successful CPR regimes self-organized, 
evolved, and endured over time (E. Ostrom, 1990; Acheson, 1988). Institutional analysis entails 
the “decomposition of institutional contexts into their component parts as a prelude to 
understanding how these parts affect each other and how institutions shape outcomes” 
(McGinnis, 2011, p. 170). Institutional analysis can examine the role that exogenous variables 
such as rules, biophysical conditions, and community attributes have in affecting actors, 
decisions, interactions, and outcomes (Imperial & Yandle, 2005). Institutional analysis can also 
assess the tradeoffs between various institutional arrangements by considering the full range of 
transaction and transformation costs and evaluating the overall performance of a set of rules or 
policy (E. Ostrom, Schroeder, & Wynne, 1993). Applying institutional analysis to the study of 
diverse rule systems, cultures, behaviors, and environmental settings can help explain the 
pathways, trajectories, and resilience of social-ecological systems. Similarly, institutional 
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analysis provides a common language and terminology that scholars can employ to facilitate 
theory building and scientific knowledge (McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014). In this research, 
institutional analysis can describe and classify hierarchical rules at different levels of choice, 
property rights, and institutional barriers, as well as community-level variables such as local 
leadership, that are correlated with self-organization and collective action – community-level 
precursors to institutional change and co-management transitions in Hawai‘i (Basurto & Ostrom, 
2009; E. Ostrom et al., 1993; Polski & Ostrom, 1999).  
 
1.4.2 Social-ecological systems  
A wider understanding that human agency is a key part of ecosystem trajectories and the 
application of complexity theory to the study of social and ecological phenomena has motivated 
scholars to create a revised theoretical view of how humans interact with the environment. The 
unruly complexity of “wicked” global environmental problems and emerging theoretical research 
drove many scholars in the field of ecology to discard equilibrium theory and begin viewing 
ecosystems as complex adaptive systems (Levin, 1998) that are characterized by emergent 
properties and multiple stable states, some of which may be undesirable (Holling, 1973). Since 
human society and the environment are exceedingly complicated and intertwined, the term 
‘social-ecological systems’ or ‘linked social-ecological systems’ is used to describe the coupling 
of human-environment relationships (Berkes, Folke, & Colding, 2000). The linked and 
dependent nature of society and the environment has brought together traditionally disparate 
academic disciplines to mediate complex, intertwined social-ecological problems such as 
biodiversity loss, overfishing, and global climate change (Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 2003). As 
complex systems theory became more accepted and embraced across academic disciplines, 
Elinor Ostrom (2007) developed a social-ecological systems framework that characterized 
variables commonly associated with self-organization and successful governance regimes along 
with resource systems, resource units, interactions, and outcomes. This framework has been 
employed by scholars from diverse disciplines to analyze the complexity implicit to linked 
social-ecological systems, ease coding of key factors, and facilitate theory development. A 
revised version of this framework highlighting specific variables related to self-organization and 
shared authority (E. Ostrom, 2009) was employed in this research proposal. A focus on 
contextual factors including the political environment as well as factors affecting shared 
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authority such as self-organization and local leadership instead of design principles alone is 
necessary to build resilience in social ecological systems (Armitage, 2005).  
 
Although many studies have demonstrated the factors associated with self-organization, such as 
Ostrom (1990), there is less understanding about the process and key events that preclude self-
organization. Understanding of these events can potentially diagnose when conditions may be 
present for self-organization to occur, a precursor to collective action in many settings. Self-
organization and collective action are important because they are antecedents for co-management 
governance at the community level. The integrative nature of social-ecological systems theory 
can assist in understanding the connections between natural resources such as fisheries, the 
communities that depend on them, and the institutions that govern them.  
 
1.4.3 Resilience and sustainability science.  
Social-ecological systems theory has been embraced by social and natural scientists, often with 
resilience as a key measure of success. Resilience refers to a system’s capacity to: a) endure 
shocks or disturbances and sustain its structure; b) self-organize; and, c) build capacity to learn 
and adapt (Berkes, Colding, & Folke, 2003); (Adger, Hughes, Folke, Carpenter, & Rockstrom, 
2005). These three measures refer to a system’s functional resilience, capacity for self-
organization, and adaptive capacity, respectively. Sustainability science investigates the complex 
interactions between human and natural systems at multiple scales (e.g. local, regional, global), 
and provides a transdisciplinary, integrative structure to frame problems. Resilience theory has 
been applied to many academic disciplines, although recent research on coastal hazards (Adger 
et al., 2005), fisheries co-management policy (Gelcich et al., 2006), and adaptive co-management 
of social-ecological systems (Olsson, Folke, & Berkes, 2004) are relevant to this dissertation.  
 
Resilient governance systems are characterized by leadership, incentives at higher levels, 
participation and deliberation, polycentric and multilayered institutions, and just and accountable 
authorities (Olsson, Folke, & Berkes, 2004); (Lebel et al., 2006). Resilient social-ecological 
governance increases adaptive capacity to respond to complexity while reducing vulnerability 
and avoiding phase shifts (Nelson, Adger, & Brown, 2007). For example, a phase shift for a 
coral reef ecosystem may entail a change from a coral-dominated ecosystem to an undesirable 
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system state dominated by macro-algae (corallimorpharia), soft corals, sponges, or sea urchins 
(Norström, Nyström, Lokrantz, & Folke, 2009). A phase shift in a social system could signify 
increased stress, vulnerability, and forced adaptation to changes in the natural environment, e.g. 
exodus due to sea-level rise, and climate change adaptation in low-lying Pacific Islands (Adger, 
2000). In a resilient social-ecological governance system, three evaluative components: 
livelihoods (e.g. decreased poverty, increased food security), ecological sustainability (e.g. 
increased biomass, biodiversity, or increases in key species), and planning processes 
(collaborative activities and social learning) must be assessed (Plummer & Armitage, 2007). 
Resilient social-ecological governance will depend on institutions to mediate the interplay 
between planning, management, monitoring, and evaluation of social and ecological systems.  
 
Resilience and complex systems provide much of the theoretical basis for governance 
transformations and the emergence of co-management in Hawai‘i, as well as the barriers to 
implementation. Specifically, resilience theory informs the analysis of co-management 
transitions and transformations by examining the planning processes associated with resilient 
governance arrangements and analyzing the process of emergence (Geels & Schot, 2007; 
Plummer & Armitage, 2007). In resilience scholarship, attention is often paid to where system 
changes originate in addition to the source of the resources used to help initiate the transition. 
Much resilience scholarship also highlights the importance of leadership in these transformations 
(Olsson et al., 2006, 2008). Some resilience literature characterizes leadership in terms of 
institutional entrepreneurs or change agents that lead system transformations (Rosen & Olsson, 
2013; Westley et al., 2011; Westley et al., 2013). Resilience and sustainability science provide 
much of the theoretical framing for the emergence of co-management and the leadership chapters 
in this dissertation.  
 
1.4.4 Integrating disparate theoretical approaches 
Although this research combines social science methodologies and theory from diverse fields of 
study such as common pool resources and institutional analysis, social-ecological systems, and 
resilience and sustainability science, these fields do not often consider other literatures that may 
help explain opaque theoretical areas, such as the process of self-organization, or which 
leadership dimensions are critical for governance transitions. For instance, communicative 
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action, deliberative democracy, or other dialogue-based planning approaches are not integrated 
into common-pool resource theory, nor do they consider power relations or the flaws inherent to 
public planning processes (Forester, 1982; Foucault, 1982; Fung, 2004; Habermas, 1984; Innes 
& Booher, 1999; Lowry, Adler, & Milner, 1997). The new institutional economics literature 
recognizes that institutions and incentives affect human behavior but they cannot account for all 
the ways people benefit from resources (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). Likewise, many studies declare 
the importance of leadership without carefully considering the context, qualities or dimensions of 
leadership that are practiced (Evans et al., 2015). 
 
However, integrative theory combining social and ecological approaches has vastly improved. 
The social-ecological systems (SES) framework considers interactions between governing 
systems, natural resources, resource units, users, and outcomes (Epstein, Vogt, Mincey, Cox, & 
Fischer, 2013; E. Ostrom, 2009). Many scholars utilize the SES framework in case study 
research, which facilitates coding for future meta-analyses that can test, refine, and improve 
theory. The SES framework contains over 50 variables important for sustainability of social-
ecological systems (McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014). These variables are separated into governance 
systems, resource units, actors, interactions and outcomes occurring within focal action 
situations, and related ecosystems. Although collecting data on all of these variables in a case 
study – or any research – would be ideal, it is beyond the scope of this research and most studies. 
Instead, since this research is focused on co-management governance transitions, data collection 
is focused on a small set of variables from the actors (A) and governance system (GS) subsets of 
the SES framework. The actors subset contains variables that are correlated with self-
organization: A3: History or past experiences; A4: Location; A5: Leadership or 
entrepreneurship; A6: Norms (trust-reciprocity)/social capital; and A8: Importance of resource 
(dependence) (McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014). This research will also collect data on variables 
related to governance systems (GS), in particular, GS1: Government organizations; GS2: 
Nongovernment organizations; GS4: Property-Rights Systems; GS5: Operational-choice rules; 
and GS6: Collective-choice rules. These variables have been refined through hundreds of case 
studies around the world and are appropriate given the context of this case study. 
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1.5 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS 
Many traditional and contemporary Pacific Island societies were and continue to be highly 
dependent on marine resources, which has led to the development of sophisticated institutions to 
govern fishing effort (Berkes, 1999). However, centuries of social, political, and environmental 
change have eroded the resilience of traditional marine tenure systems across the Pacific 
(Johannes, 1978). Hawai‘i, the most isolated population center in the world, is one of two U.S. 
states with tropical coral reefs, and is the only one with a unique legacy of marine tenure. Before 
western contact, as part of a complex sociocultural and religious system, marine resources were 
managed by konohiki, (land administrators appointed by local ali‘i or chiefs). Konohiki worked 
to gather input from local fishers and maka‘āinana (land tenants) to develop place-based rules 
that governed resources sustainably for large populations of Native Hawaiians (Kirch, 2010). 
Westerners brought religion, disease and population decline, changing economic systems, and 
trade. Along with this, annexation by the United States, contributed to the loss of traditional land 
and marine tenure in Hawai‘i (Kirch, 2010). Since then, Hawai‘i’s population and social fabric 
have changed dramatically, but many of its people continue to fish for sociocultural, economic, 
and subsistence reasons (Glazier, 2006). Recently compiled datasets indicate that 90% of 
Hawai‘i’s coral reef fisheries are subsistence-oriented (McCoy, Friedlander, and Kittinger 
unpublished data) which dampens market effects and commercial incentives to exploit marine 
resources (Cinner et al., 2013; Maire et al., 2016). Although markets have not exhibited a direct 
negative effect on coral reef fisheries, overfishing is still occurring across the main Hawaiian 
Islands (Friedlander, Brown, & Monaco, 2007, Friedlander & DeMartini, 2002), which 
demonstrates the cumulative impact that non-commercial activities can have on marine 
ecosystems and the ineffectiveness of centralized management over the past several decades.  
 
A renewal of traditional ecological knowledge and governing institutions has occurred over the 
past three decades in Hawai‘i (Friedlander et al., 2000); (Poepoe, Bartram, & Friedlander, 2003) 
and across the globe (Berkes, Colding, & Folke, 2000). This knowledge renewal is in place at 
Mo‘omomi on the Hawaiian island of Moloka‘i (Poepoe et al., 2003) and is currently underway 
in several other locations across the Hawaiian islands. Merging traditional or place-based and 
modern, scientific knowledge systems has improved co-management outcomes in other 
geographies (Moller, Berkes, Lyver, & Kislalioglu, 2004). Although some Hawai‘i communities 
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may exercise management authority over their adjacent marine resources in an informal, de facto 
context, as many as two dozen communities are interested in legally sanctioned co-management 
relationships with the state of Hawai‘i (Higuchi, 2008). While the barriers to integrating 
traditional knowledge into state law have been examined by other scholars in this geography 
(Vaughan et al., 2016; Vaughan & Caldwell, 2015), there is less understanding of the role of 
history as a basis for integration of traditional knowledge into contemporary management 
systems. These issues will be examined in detail throughout this dissertation, but specifically in 
chapter 2.  
 
1.6 CO-MANAGEMENT IN HAWAI‘I  
A variety of factors have impacted coral reef ecosystems in Hawai‘i such as climate change, 
development, and introduction of invasive species. Yet centralized management in Hawai‘i has 
largely been ineffective at managing coral reef fisheries since Hawai‘i became the 50th U.S. state 
in 1959 (Kittinger et al., 2011). Although many factors have impacted coral reef ecosystems, 
overfishing has seriously impacted coral reef fisheries (Friedlander & DeMartini, 2002b; 
Friedlander et al., 2007). Coral reef fisheries declines can in part be attributed to a lack of 
enforcement and an environmental management agency that is chronically underfunded in 
relation to other U.S. states (Dator, Hamnett, Nordberg, & Pintz, 1999; Jokiel, Rodgers, Walsh, 
Polhemus, & Wilhelm, 2011).  
 
The ineffectiveness of centralized fisheries management in Hawai‘i, a set of highly engaged 
communities, and a renewal of traditional management practices have prompted many 
communities to pursue institutional change towards co-management (Higuchi, 2008). One co-
management approach communities have pursued is community-based subsistence fishing areas 
(CBSFAs). CBSFAs allow communities to work with the State of Hawai‘i Division of Aquatic 
Resources (DAR) to craft fishing regulations that are based on “the customary and traditional 
Native Hawaiian uses of renewable ocean resources for direct personal or family consumption or 
sharing” (Higuchi, 2008, p. 218). The Hawai’i State Legislature passed the enabling legislation 
for CBSFAs in 1994. Although this co-management pathway has been present for over two 
decades, there have been just two actively co-managed CBSFAs established: a pilot project at 
Mo‘omomi on the island of Moloka‘i that lasted just two years in the 1990s; and Hā‘ena, Kaua‘i, 
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where rules were approved in August 2015. These communities’ co-management processes will 
be examined in more detail throughout this dissertation. 
 
Although co-managed areas (CBSFAs) have not been widely implemented across Hawai‘i, 
several other different marine management designations already exist that also allow 
communities to develop rules and partner with the state in a manner that is similar to co-
management. These management designations include, but are not limited to: Fishery 
Management Areas (FMAs); Marine Life Conservation Districts (MLCDs) – often described as 
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs); Fishery Replenishment Areas (FRAs); and the Natural Area 
Reserve System (NARS). These areas are not widely considered to be co-management 
institutional arrangements, but communities across Hawai‘i have partnered with the State of 
Hawai‘i in some different and engaging ways, including developing place-based regulations, 
monitoring marine resources, conducting outreach and engagement, and reporting rules 
violations to law enforcement. A set of highly engaged communities, combined with an uneven 
track record of co-management implementation, make Hawai‘i a compelling case study to 
examine this variation in institutional change.  
 
1.7 ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
Each of the chapters includes an introduction that defines the topic, its significance, and 
supporting literature. A background section typically follows the introduction to provide some 
historical context. Since the methods vary for each of the five chapters, a separate, detailed 
methods section accompanies chapters 2-6. Each of these chapters contains a results section 
provided without interpretation, and a discussion section where the implications of the findings 
are considered. The discussion section in each chapter identifies practical and theoretical 
implications related to the findings. Most of the chapters also include a short conclusion in which 
the broader implications of specific issues related to co-management planning and governance 
are considered.  
 
Chapter 2 addresses the question: How have the rules hierarchy and property rights for small-
scale fisheries in Hawai‘i changed over time; and given the historical change in these 
institutions, what limitations and opportunities exist for incorporating rights-based approaches in 
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co-management? It uses institutional analysis of archival data sources to document the changes 
in administrative structure and property rights in coral reef fisheries governance regimes over 
two centuries of change in the Hawaiian Islands. Three time periods and governance regimes are 
considered: the Hawaiian Kingdom and marine tenure from 1810-1893; contemporary 
centralized management in Hawai‘i (under which more than 99% of coastal and marine areas are 
managed) from 1959 (statehood) to present day; and contemporary co-management in Hawai‘i 
from 1994 (when the enabling legislation was passed) to 2016. The institutional analysis 
uncovers a surprising amount of administrative complexity governing small-scale fisheries in 
Hawai‘i across all three time periods and governance regimes. Property rights were devolved to 
the local level in the Hawaiian Kingdom, but are only nominally shared contemporarily in co-
management through management rights.  
 
Chapter 3 considers the question: How does co-management emerge at the community level in 
Hawai‘i? It investigates the emergence of co-management in Hawai‘i via an embedded case 
study approach that highlights examples from three Hawai‘i communities officially designated as 
co-management areas since 1994: Mo‘omomi, Moloka‘i; Miloli‘i, Hawai‘i; and Hā‘ena, Kaua‘i. 
This chapter employs a mixed method approach that combines 19 semi-structured key 
respondent interviews with a policy analysis of the co-management rulemaking process, a 
content analysis of legislative and public testimony for the three areas, along with evaluation of 
other archival data sources such as management plans and a government-conducted study of a 
co-management area. The findings uncover a linked set of drivers and social responses that 
informed the creation of a planning process model of community-level co-management 
emergence.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the question: what are the barriers to implementation when communities 
attempt to transition to co-management from a centralized bureaucracy? This chapter uses a 
sequential mixed method research approach, initially beginning with 19 semi-structured key 
respondent interviews that are analyzed using qualitative coding techniques. Next, an 
institutional analysis of transaction and transformation costs associated with the co-management 
transition is used to determine which costs occurred at each stage of the policy process, from 
planning through evaluation. This informed the development of a framework for examining the 
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transaction and transformation costs associated with co-management governance transitions from 
planning to policy design, through policy implementation and evaluation. The costs figure 
identifies which costs may occur at different times, and this study identifies which partners bear 
which costs at different stages of the policy process. 
 
Chapter 5 considers the question: What types of co-management partnership opportunities exist 
for communities outside of the defined co-management pathway? This chapter assesses the 
feasibility of alternative marine management approaches across Hawai‘i. A mixed method 
research approach is used that begins with a legal and institutional analysis on four alternative 
marine management designations that communities have used in a manner analogous to co-
management. Fieldwork was also conducted in six communities state that have partnered with 
the State of Hawai‘i to use four different marine management designations other than 
community-based subsistence fishing areas (CBSFAs). Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with a total 23 individuals from these communities and these data were transcribed, 
thematically coded, and analyzed. Lastly, an institutional analysis was performed on the rules in 
place for each of the six management areas along with an assessment using Ostrom’s design 
principles for enduring common pool resource governance regimes. Results revealed that many 
community members recognize the integrative and linked nature of threats to coral reef social-
ecological systems. Analysis of existing marine management statutes and fragmented authorities 
demonstrates difficulty of pursuing integrative co-management. The findings from the property 
rights analysis were similar to Chapter 2 in that few property rights components were devolved 
to communities. Like Chapter 4, the design principles analysis revealed that community-level 
initiatives to increase local level rights are challenged by outside groups and the government. 
When this finding is viewed in tandem with Chapter 4, it becomes more clear that transaction 
costs are one of the biggest barriers to Hawai‘i co-management transitions.  
 
Chapter 6 addresses the question: What is the role of leadership in co-management planning and 
implementation? This chapter employs a qualitative approach to the role of leadership in co-
management transitions and institutional change. Semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with 41 individuals involved with co-management transitions over four years. The interview data 
is analyzed to determine which leadership dimensions were identified as important leadership 
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components in co-management transitions. These data were also coded based upon various types 
of leadership that emerged from the interview responses. Among the leadership dimensions that 
respondents were asked about, the findings provide strong support for leaders that initiate 
collective choice processes and moderate support for each of the other dimensions. Coding of 
responses by leadership types provides strong evidence that a collective leadership approach – 
one that emphasizes process skills – may be the most effective type of leadership in the context 
of co-management governance transitions. These findings point to the need to develop 
collaborative planning skills for co-management transitions such as meeting facilitation, 
negotiation, and conflict resolution. 
 
Chapter 7 outlines the major findings of this dissertation research and considers how the major 
findings relate back to existing theories of common pool resources and institutional analysis, 
social-ecological systems theory, and resilience and sustainability science. This research 
combines multiple approaches to better characterize governance transitions to co-management, 
particularly co-management systems that are nested within an existing bureaucracy or a 
polycentric system of governance. Lastly, this chapter considers the practical implications of the 
findings for co-management planning and implementation in Hawai‘i and elsewhere.   
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Chapter 2.  
Who has the right to manage? Distribution of property rights affects equity and power 
dynamics in co-management 
 
 
This chapter uses institutional analysis to examine changes over time in hierarchical decision 
making structures and property rights components governing Hawai‘i coral reef fisheries. An 
analysis of diverse historical and archival data uncovered a surprising level of administrative 
complexity present under historical marine tenure. In contemporary co-management, few rights 
are devolved to contemporary communities looking to manage subsistence fisheries. The chapter 
concludes by considering some solutions to address deficiencies in contemporary centralized 
management and co-management.  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Marine fisheries provide an estimated 17% of human dietary protein globally but account for as 
much as 70% in coastal and island areas (FAO, 2015). Despite the importance of marine 
fisheries for food, protein, and micronutrients, global fisheries catches peaked in the mid-1990s 
and have been in decline ever since (Pauly & Zeller, 2016). Small-scale fisheries are increasingly 
recognized for their contribution to global catch and their contribution to livelihoods 
(Chuenpagdee, 2011; Kurien & Willmann, 2009). Locally sourced seafood is particularly 
important in Pacific islands, due to its social and cultural importance, and because food systems 
there are increasingly stressed by changes in land and marine tenure, urbanization, rising food 
costs, and high import prices (McGregor, Bourke, Manley, Tubuna, & Deo, 2009).  
 
Rights based approaches to management are increasingly sought as a solution in global fisheries 
management (Costello, Gaines, & Lynham, 2008), and are now being applied to small-scale 
fisheries. The donor community recently invested up $65 million to promote and implement 
rights based approaches across the globe (Rust, 2013). Rights based approaches in small-scale 
fisheries vary widely in terms of policy instruments and may include catch shares, territorial user 
rights for fishing (TURFs), individual transferable quotas (ITQs), fisheries concessions, 
cooperatives, and co-management and may involve limited entry, defined spatial rights, or 
dedicated resource allocations (LeCornu et al., In preparation). These different rights based 
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approaches may also be thought of as managed access to a fishery (Foley, 2012). In terms of 
property rights components, rights based approaches entail placing organizational or 
distributional rights into the hands of fishers (Yandle & Imperial, 2009).  
 
Among rights based approaches, co-management has gained significant traction worldwide as 
one of the most promising solutions to resource decline, regulatory compliance, and feasibility 
(Gutierrez et al., 2011). Co-management encompasses a wide array of approaches, but typically 
includes shared management authority among user groups or communities and governmental 
agencies (Berkes, 2010, Sen and Nielsen, 1996). In practice, shared management authority can 
take many different forms and co-management institutional arrangements may exhibit significant 
diversity in the distributions of specific property rights among co-managing groups (Yandle, 
2008). Property rights components in fisheries may include access (the right to enter a resource 
area), withdrawal (the right to harvest resource units), exclusion (the right to exclude others from 
entering a resource area), management (the right to make rules regarding access, withdrawal, and 
exclusion), and alienation (the right to sell, lease, or transfer any of the above rights) (Schlager 
& Ostrom, 1992). Devolution of these various property rights components to the local level may 
vary geographically based upon a country’s legal system. Scholars can assess rights regimes 
through institutional analysis, which can be used to diagram and assess how institutions at 
different levels affect individual-level incentives and decision-making, social-ecological systems 
interactions, program implementation, and outcomes. Institutions are defined as  “humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North 1990, 3) and may include formal rules 
such as laws or rules-in-use that govern a resource area such as a coral reef ecosystem 
(McGinnis, 2011, p. 175). Rules-in-use may include informal norms or a shared and understood 
code of conduct among fishermen and fisherwomen that outline where, when, and how to harvest 
marine resources. 
 
Despite the promise of co-management, there are high transaction costs associated with 
transitioning from a governance arrangement where government holds most of the property 
rights in a centralized bureaucracy, to an approach where rights are shared with communities 
(see Chapter 4). Other issues with the design and implementation of rights based approaches in 
co-management include a lack of equity in collective choice decision making processes (Yandle, 
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2003), unequal power relations (Nadasdy, 2003a; Taiepa et al., 1997), a disregard for different 
worldviews or refusal to accept different data types (Diver, 2012), rent seeking by stakeholders 
(Imperial & Yandle, 2005), and elite capture of benefits (MacNeil and Cinner, 2013). 
 
As more fisheries systems transition to co-management arrangements, there is a need to assess 
the key factors that are related to social and ecological success, as well as the key factors 
associated with deleterious outcomes (Cinner et al., 2012; Ostrom, 2009; Yandle & Imperial, 
2009). As diagnostic tools, institutional analysis and a property rights lens can provide a 
common framework to describe, analyze, and compare fisheries co-management institutions 
(Imperial and Yandle, 2005, McGinnis, 2011). In addition, a historical examination of changes in 
property rights over time may be valuable to trace turning points (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009) 
and trajectories or pathways (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995). These analyses can facilitate a 
greater understanding of the constraints and dynamics associated with the design of present and 
future governance regimes (Howlett & Rayner, 2006).  
 
Here, institutional analysis and a property rights lens are used to analyze Hawai‘i’s unique 
history of marine tenure, its transition to centralized management, and its recent experience with 
co-management. This research is guided by the following two research questions: 1) How have 
the rules hierarchy and property rights for small-scale fisheries in Hawai‘i changed over time; 
and 2) Given the historical change in these institutions, what limitations and opportunities exist 
for incorporating rights-based approaches in co-management? This chapter is structured as 
follows: first, a detailed history of events that shape institutional changes in Hawai‘i small-scale 
fisheries is presented. Next, administrative and property rights differences between two time 
periods are analyzed: the Hawaiian Kingdom (1810-1893) and under contemporary centralized 
management (1982-present). Then, co-management in Hawai‘i (1994-present) is analyzed. The 
chapter concludes with the implications of the findings for the design of rights based governance 
arrangements in Hawai‘i and elsewhere. 
 
This research uses a case study approach from the Hawaiian Islands, which offer a unique case to 
examine how changes in property rights over time continue to affect policy design and rights 
based approaches in small-scale fisheries. Hawai‘i has a history of marine tenure that was eroded 
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over two centuries as a result of western brought disease, religion, trade, changing economies, 
and annexation by the U.S. (Kirch, 2010). Today, Hawai‘i is subject to a set of overlapping state 
and federal regulations that protect public access rights and a regulatory structure that ensures 
rules apply equally to all citizens. Although Hawai‘i is now a multicultural society, fishing and 
gathering remain vital social and cultural activities that provide food for many people across the 
state. Recent scholarship found that 90% of coastal fisheries across the main Hawaiian Islands 
are subsistence-oriented (McCoy, Friedlander, and Kittinger, unpublished data), which limits the 
effect of market integration and proximity as drivers of depletion in many global fisheries 
(Cinner et al., 2013, Maire et al., 2016). Despite the seemingly low impact of commercially-
oriented fishing activities in Hawai‘i, overfishing has seriously impacted coral reef fisheries 
(Friedlander, Brown, & Monaco, 2007, Friedlander & DeMartini, 2002), highlighting the impact 
of recreational, customary or traditional fishing practices, and more efficient fishing 
technologies. A lack of clearly defined rights and a less than robust monitoring and enforcement 
regime have resulted in de facto open access property rights arrangement for most Hawai‘i coral 
reef fisheries (Finkbeiner et al., 2015). In response to ineffective centralized management, 
declining coastal resources and increasing conflict, Hawai‘i created a legal pathway for co-
management in 1994 (Ayers and Kittinger, 2014, Matsuoka, 1994). Through this pathway, 
communities can partner with the State of Hawai‘i to create place-based rules for ‘‘subsistence’’ 
purposes, defined as ‘‘the customary and traditional Native Hawaiian uses of renewable ocean 
resources for direct personal or family consumption or sharing’’ (Higuchi, 2008) to manage 
small-scale coral reef fisheries. Despite this institutional pathway created for co-management, 
implementation has consisted of one pilot project at Mo‘omomi and Kawa‘aloa Bays on 
Moloka‘i in the mid-1990s and one permanent co-management area at Hā‘ena, Kaua‘i. The 
Hā‘ena co-management area on Kaua‘i only recently became active after nearly ten years of 
planning in late 2015 (Vaughan & Caldwell, 2015). Although rules for the Hā‘ena, Kaua‘i co-
managed area were based on customary norms and practices, they still allow anyone to enter and 
fish the area (Vaughan et al., 2016).  
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2.2 METHODS 
 
This research employs a comparative case study approach to examine changes in property rights 
and administrative decision making over three different time periods and governance regimes in 
Hawai‘i coral reef fisheries. The three time periods and governance regimes being compared 
include: 1) historical marine tenure during the period of Hawaiian self-governance (1810-1893); 
2) contemporary centralized or bureaucracy-based management (from 1982-present); and, 3) co-
management governance (from 1994-present). A comparative case study approach was chosen 
for this study because: 1) the analysis was conducted retroactively; 2) the efficacy of the 
governance regimes are difficult to definitively disentangle from other confounding causal 
mechanisms; 3) multiple data sources and accounts were examined and combined; and 4) the 
purpose was to examine, build, and refine theoretical constructs and not to generalize to 
populations or make predictions (Agranoff & Radin, 1991). Multiple data sources and analytical 
tools were used to examine changes in property rights and administrative decision making (see 
Table 2.1).  
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Table 2.1. Data types, sources, citations, examples, and analytical tools used to examine changes 
in property rights and administrative decision making over three time periods and governance 
regimes in Hawai‘i coral reef fisheries. 
Data type Data source Citation Data analysis 
Archival or 
Historical 
Indigenous 
Hawaiian Mo‘olelo 
(stories or histories) 
Malo (1951); 
Institutional 
analysis 
Oral history Maly & Maly (2003); Titcomb (1972); 
Archaeological and 
historical 
anthropological 
studies 
Kirch (2010); Kirch (2007); 
Kirch & Sahlins (1994); 
Marine historical 
ecology 
Kittinger et al., (2011) 
Hawaiian historical 
research 
Beamer (2014); Gonschor 
& Beamer (2014) 
Published 
literature 
Published 
manuscript 
Friedlander et al., (2013); 
Kittinger et al 2011; Legal analysis 
Technical 
report 
Policy briefing Kittinger et al (2012) Policy analysis 
Legislative report Kosaki (1954); Institutional 
analysis 
Legal 
analysis or 
reference 
Legal handbook 
Forman & Serrano (2012); 
Mackenzie (1991); Van 
Dyke (2008) 
Legal analysis; 
Institutional 
analysis; 
 
Data sources gathered and analyzed for this research included archival and historical accounts of 
historical marine tenure regimes collected by indigenous Hawaiian scholars (Malo, 1951); oral 
histories collected from knowledgeable kūpuna (elders) (Maly & Maly, 2003; Titcomb, 1972); 
archaeological and historical anthropological studies (Kirch, 2010); marine historical ecological 
analysis (Kittinger et al., 2011); and Hawaiian historical research (Beamer, 2014; Gonschor & 
Beamer, 2014). To examine what is possible under the United States and Hawaiian laws, this 
research drew upon a legal analysis of native Hawaiian resource rights (Forman and Serrano, 
2012, MacKenzie, 1991, Van Dyke, 2008); a policy analysis of contemporary fisheries policy 
instruments in Hawai‘i (Kittinger et al., 2012); and rules and management plans for the only two 
co-management areas that have been actively managed over the past 20 years in Hawai‘i (Hui 
Makainana o Makana, 2011; Hui Malama O Moomomi, 1995). To increase the accuracy of 
research findings, published historical accounts of tenure and property rights arrangements were 
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crosschecked against each other. The findings were further shared with noted scholars in this 
area for expert review in order to increase their robustness.  
 
These data sources were analyzed using the Institutional Analysis and Design (IAD) Framework 
(McGinnis, 2011) and a property rights framework (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). The IAD 
Framework is an analytical tool that can be used to examine how institutions (rules) and other 
variables influence decision making at multiple levels. This research uses the IAD Framework 
primarily to examine the decision making authority present at different multiple levels: meta-
constitutional level, constitutional level, collective choice level, and at the operational level. The 
IAD framework can be useful to examine fisheries governance arrangements and other commons 
situations due to emphasis on contextual factors, interactions that occur at different levels, and 
evaluative criteria (Imperial & Yandle, 2005). This research also utilizes a property rights 
framework developed by Schlager & Ostrom (1992) to examine which entity shares or retains 
five property rights components, including access, withdrawal, exclusion, management, and 
alienation. This property rights framework has been used in other fisheries settings to uncover 
and compare governance arrangement (LeCornu et al., In preparation, Schlager and Ostrom, 
1999, Yandle and Imperial, 2009). Although the IAD Framework and a property rights lens may 
not be useful in examining all resource interactions – such as how users may benefit from 
resources (Ribot & Peluso, 2003) or when resource users exhibit a high discount rate (Bromley, 
1991) – they can be used to diagram, analyze, and elucidate the diversity of institutional 
arrangements present in the context of marine tenure and governance regimes.  
 
2.3 BACKGROUND 
 
2.3.1 Marine tenure in pre-contact Hawai‘i 
Hawai‘i is one of the last places on earth to be colonized by humans, as part of the expansion of 
eastern Polynesia around AD 1100-1250 (Wilmshurst, Hunt, Lipo, & Anderson, 2011). Although 
historical ecological evidence points to exploitation of coral reef resources after first contact, 
coral reef resources exhibited recovery after AD 1400, likely due to stewardship and 
intensification of land-based food production (Kittinger et al., 2011). Resource recovery 
coincided with substantial increases in island populations. This period is associated with the rise 
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of a complex hierarchical system of land and marine tenure known colloquially as the ahupua‘a 
system (Beamer, 2014, p. 34). Ahupua‘a can be defined as a “culturally appropriate, ecologically 
aligned, and place specific unit with access to diverse resources” (Gonschor & Beamer, 2014, p. 
7171). The ahupua‘a system separated islands into moku (districts), which were further divided 
into ahupua‘a. This hierarchical land division was devised by ali‘i (chiefs) on multiple islands 
around AD 1400 to manage irrigation, agriculture, and augment resource production (Beamer, 
2014; Kirch, 2010). Ho‘okupu or tribute from hoa‘āina (ahupuaʻa tenants) sustained the aha ali‘i 
(council of chiefs or central government) (Beamer, 2014; Gonschor & Beamer, 2014). Konohiki 
(land agents or resource managers) were chosen by ali‘i ‘ai ahupua‘a (an ahupua‘a level chief) 
to administer and distribute key fisheries and water resources within an ahupua‘a for the 
hoa‘āina (ahupua‘a residents) (Kirch, 1990; McGregor, 1996). Ahupuaʻa fisheries were “certain 
areas of the sea, from the reefs and, where there happen to be no reefs, from the distance of one 
geographic mile seaward to the beach at low watermark…” (Kosaki, 1954, p. 3). The konohiki 
and the hoa‘āina maintained exclusive rights to ahupuaʻa fisheries (local level small-scale 
fisheries) (Ibid). 
 
Increased social stratification also arose around AD 1400 that separated social classes via the 
kapu (forbidden or taboo) system (see Table 2.2). The kapu system included structured social 
and religious rituals that organized ancient Hawai‘i, dictated gender relations, governed resource 
extraction at the species level, prescribed food consumption and cooking practices; and defined 
social interactions between societal classes (Friedlander, Shackeroff, & Kittinger, 2013; Kirch, 
2010). Sanctions for being caught breaking kapu were severe and often deadly. Although there is 
no way to know for certain the impact of the kapu system, resources in the Hawaiian Islands 
were self-sustaining despite pre-contact population levels estimated to be at least 200,000-
400,000 native Hawaiians and perhaps as high as 1,000,0001 (Kirch, 2007).  
  
                                                
1	Archaeological evidence indicate a pre-contact population of 200-400,000 but oral accounts 
suggest a much higher population approaching one million (Stannard, 1989). The unresolved 
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Table 2.2 Timeline of major historical events that influenced property rights in Hawai‘i 
Date Event 
1450-
1500 
Hierarchical sociopolitical and ecologically-based land divisions emerged in response to 
population growth, often attributed to the chief Mā‘ilikūkahi on the island of O‘ahu, 
with similar hierarchical divisions noted on the island of Maui under Kaka‘alaneo. 
Agricultural and industrial innovation is also noted under Manokalanipō on Kaua‘i. 
1650 Kapu (forbidden or restricted) system emerged to protect mana (spiritual power or 
authority), manage resources; regulate food consumption and cooking; and delineate 
gender and social classes in Hawai‘i within the maka‘āinana (commoners) and the ali‘i 
(chiefly) class. Maka‘āinana were expected to provide regular ho‘okupu (tribute) via 
fish and agricultural products in exchange for working and living on the land. Rules 
violations were often punishable by death.  
1778 First western (European) contact made by Captain James Cook in Waimea Kaua‘i, 
bringing disease, western technology (including armaments), and opening the Hawaiian 
islands to Pacific colonial economies. 
1810 The Kingdom of Hawai‘i is established when Kamehameha I unifies the Hawaiian 
Kingdom for the first time, becoming the first mō‘ī (supreme ruler) for all of Hawai‘i. 
1819 Calvinist Missionaries arrive. Kamehameha I dies; his son Liholiho (Kamehameha II) 
shares the throne with Kamehameha I’s favorite wife Ka‘aumanu; the kapu system is 
abolished. 
1823 Literacy spreads rapidly across Hawai‘i 
1839 Kamehameha III ushered in Hawai‘i’s first written laws to regulate taxation; codify 
property rights of the different social classes by organizing ancient relationships 
between maka‘āinana, konohiki (resource administrators or land agents), and ali‘i 
classes. Laws decried that the land and fisheries were jointly owned by three classes: 
the mō‘ī, ali‘i, and maka‘āinana. These laws created a new system of government by 
melding European notions of property with ancient Hawaiian relationships with land. 
Hawai‘i is severely affected by depopulation from western-brought disease. 
1840 Hawai‘i’s first constitution is written, codifying and refining traditional rights. The 
constitution affirmed vested land and marine tenure in the Hawaiian Kingdom. 
1848 The Great Māhele divided all lands in the Hawaiian Kingdom, which separated land 
and divided fee simple titles to land among the ali‘i and konohiki, the government, and 
the mō‘ī (the crown lands). Foreigners could purchase government lands, ushering in a 
new era of private property, foreign land ownership, development, and a market-based 
economy. Land titles were still subject to the rights of maka‘āinana. Claims were 
required to secure ancestral lands, however many ‘ōiwi (native Hawaiians) did not 
participate in the registration process and their fishing rights were dispossessed. 
1850 The Kuleana Act allowed maka‘āinana to purchase fee simple title to land, further 
formalized ancient resource rights, relationships between ‘ōiwi and the ‘āina (land) and 
access to the benefits of resources. The act also allowed for a large government by 
developing new revenue streams through taxation and protected national interests. The 
Kuleana Act effectively institutionalized ahupua‘a-level resource rights into law.  
1887 Under threat of force, King David Kalākaua signed the Bayonet constitution, making 
voting rights contingent on property ownership. 
1893 The Hawaiian Kingdom is overthrown by a group of American businessmen with the 
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backing of the U.S. military. 
1900 The Organic Act terminates ‘konohiki fisheries’ unless they were registered within two 
years; 300-400 konohiki fisheries are registered across the Hawaiian Islands; 248 were 
not registered, and the government condemned 37 others. Subsequently, a series of U.S. 
court cases uphold the concept of ‘vested’ fisheries rights, subject to evolving hoa‘āina 
(ahupua‘a tenant) rights. 
1927 The Division of Fish and Game is established for the Hawai‘i Territory, ushering in the 
beginnings of centralized or bureaucracy-based management 
1940s-
1950s 
Documentation of landowners still excluding outsiders from their ahupua‘a fisheries on 
O‘ahu and Kaua‘i 
1959 Hawai‘i become the 50th U.S. state, seemingly severing locally held fishery rights.  
1976 Hawaiian cultural renaissance; punctuated by the first Hokulea voyage: a celestially 
navigated traditional Polynesian voyaging canoe successfully sails to Tahiti and back; 
renewed interest in Hawaiian language, culture, music, and mo‘olelo (stories and oral 
traditions). The Protect Kaho‘olawe ‘Ohana files suit against the U.S. Navy to prevent 
bombing on the Island of Kaho‘olawe. 
1978 Hawai‘i’s first constitutional convention reaffirms some Native Hawaiian rights  
1982 The Division of Fish and Game is reorganized, The Division of Aquatic Resources 
becomes the state agency charged with managing fisheries. 
1994 Enabling legislation for co-management (Community-based Subsistence Fishing Areas, 
CBSFAs) is passed by the Hawai‘i state legislature; Native Hawaiian community efforts 
were instrumental.   
1995-
1999 
Pilot CBSFA (co-management) project occurs at Mo‘omomi on the island of Moloka‘i; 
the co-managed area is allowed to sunset without renewal 
2005 Miloli‘i on Hawai‘i Island becomes the first permanent, legislatively-designated 
CBSFA in Hawai‘i 
2006 Hā‘ena on Kaua‘i becomes the second permanent, legislatively-designated CBSFA in 
Hawai‘i 
2015 Hā‘ena rules based upon traditional practices are approved; becomes the first active co-
managed area since Mo‘omomi in 1994.  
 
2.3.2 Marine tenure in the Hawaiian Kingdom 
King Kamehameha I united the Hawaiian Islands under one ruler for the first time in AD 1810 
and established the Hawaiian Kingdom. Shortly after his death in AD 1819, the kapu system was 
abolished, and in 1820, arriving protestant missionaries set up schools which rapidly increased 
literacy but significantly altered the social fabric of Hawai‘i. Along with his advisors, 
Kamehameha III penned Hawai‘i’s first written laws in 1839, which codified ancient 
relationships with the ‘āina (land and sea). The laws delineated property rights of the different 
social classes by organizing ancient relationships between maka‘āinana, konohiki (local-level 
resource appropriators), and ali‘i classes. These laws proclaimed that three classes jointly owned 
the land and fisheries: the mō‘ī, ali‘i, and maka‘āinana. The 1839 laws and Hawai‘i’s first 
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constitution in 1840 created a new system of government by combining European notions of 
property with ancient Hawaiian relationships with the land and sea.  
 
Under the 1839 laws, the 1840 constitution, and other subsequent revisions, some fish were 
reserved specifically for the ali‘i class. These fish were designated as kapu (restricted) by the 
ali‘i ‘ai appointed konohiki. Konohiki at the ahupua‘a level were selected for their exceptional 
resource knowledge and were entrusted with resource management decisions at the local level. In 
exchange for their important caretaking, konohiki were given either one third of the local fishery 
catch or exclusive harvest rights for one fish species (Beamer, 2014; Higuchi, 2008). As political 
appointees, konohiki were expected to ensure resource productivity and could be removed if 
poor management decisions led to famine or decreased harvests. Konohiki could also be affected 
by political changes such as the death or removal of a higher-level ali‘i. Further highlighting 
administrative complexity, other historical accounts reference coordination across multiple 
ahupua‘a within the same moku (Kirch & Sahlins, 1994).  
 
The 1848 Great Māhele divided all lands in the Hawaiian Kingdom, which separated land and 
divided fee simple land titles among the ali‘i and konohiki, the government, and the mō‘ī, whose 
lands are often described as the crown lands (Van Dyke, 2008). Foreigners could purchase 
government lands, ushering in a new era of private property, plantations, and development, and 
the introduction of a market-based economy. However, titles were still subject to maka‘āinana 
rights, and claims were required to secure ancestral lands, but many ‘ōiwi or kanaka maoli 
(native Hawaiians) did not participate in the registration process, and thus their fishing rights 
were dispossessed. The 1850 Kuleana Act allowed maka‘āinana to purchase fee simple title to 
land, further classified ancient resource rights, such as relationships between ‘ōiwi and the ‘āina, 
and access to the benefits of resources. The Kuleana Act further institutionalized ahupua‘a-level 
resource rights into law.  
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2.3.3 Overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom and annexation 
Under threat of violence, a group of advisors and cabinet members forced King David Kalākaua 
to sign the Bayonet constitution in 1887, which stripped the monarch of many of his powers, and 
also made voting rights contingent on property ownership. Following Kalākaua’s death in 1891, 
Kalākaua’s sister Queen Lydia Liliuokalani attempted to restore power to the monarchy. In 
response, a small group of influential foreigners and American plantation owners illegally 
overthrew the Hawaiian Kingdom. The overthrow was backed by the U.S. military (Chock, 
1995). Following the overthrow, the Organic Act (1900) declared Hawai‘i to be a U.S. territory 
and as a consequence, condemned “private” or community level rights to nearshore fisheries 
unless they were vested and registered (Kosaki 1954). The vesting process allowed landowners 
at the ahupua‘a level to register their fisheries to retain their fishery rights. Although past 
evidence suggested 101 out of 400 of these ahupua‘a fisheries were registered by 35 different 
owners (Higuchi, 2008), recent scholarship suggests 300-400 konohiki fisheries were registered 
across the archipelago (Akutagawa, In preparation).  
 
2.3.4 Hawaiian Territory and statehood 
Local level property rights were also weakened during territorial governance (Kosaki, 1954) 
until they were seemingly nullified in 1959 during Statehood (Friedlander et al, 2013). Still, local 
level fishing rights persisted in some areas into the 1940s and 1950s (Cramer, 2010), and perhaps 
even until 1970 in some areas. Although most “konohiki fisheries” were condemned and 
purchased by the Hawaiian Territorial government, new details are emerging that the actual 
number of konohiki fisheries is much higher than previously reported by Kosaki (1954) 
(Akutagawa, n.d.; Murakami & Tanaka, 2015). In some areas, such as the North Shore of Kaua‘i, 
respected de facto local-level rights were maintained for several decades after Statehood 
condemned them (Vaughan & Ayers, 2016).  
 
2.3.5 The Hawaiian renaissance and the emergence of co-management governance 
Several landmark historical events occurred in Hawai‘i in the 1970s that were embedded within a 
larger renaissance of native Hawaiian language, culture, dance, and traditional voyaging and 
navigation (Lewis, 1987). A constitutional convention in 1978 established the Hawaiian 
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language as an additional official language for Hawai‘i for the first time since the Hawaiian 
Kingdom. The convention also recognized that the State of Hawai‘i must:  
 
…protect all rights, customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and 
religious purposes and possessed by ahupua'a tenants who are descendants of native 
Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778, subject to the rights of the 
State to regulate such rights (Hawai‘i Constitution Article XII § 7, 1978).  
 
The 1978 constitutional convention was the basis for enabling legislation that authorized co-
management nearly 20 years later. Declining marine resources and conflict in the early 1990s 
precipitated community-level efforts to return to place-based, native Hawaiian resource practices 
that were once effective in Hawai‘i (Poepoe et al., 2003). Community efforts to renew Hawaiian 
resource management practices and local-level property rights led to passage of enabling 
legislation for co-management in 1994 (Ayers & Kittinger, 2014). This legislation allows 
communities across the Hawai‘i to partner with the state to create rules for their adjacent marine 
areas based upon the 1978 Constitution. Although the Hawai‘i co-management pathway has 
existed since 1994, there is just one active co-management area in the state due to a variety of 
institutional constraints that complicate implementation (Ayers et al., In review; Vaughan & 
Caldwell, 2015).  
 
 
2.4 RESULTS 
 
Below, the findings of an institutional analysis of two time periods and three governance regimes 
are presented: historical marine tenure present during the Hawaiian Kingdom (described below 
as historical marine tenure), with contemporary centralized or bureaucracy-based management, 
and contemporary co-management in Hawai‘i. First, the hierarchy of decision making (Table 
2.3) is compared, followed by an analysis of the property rights components under the two 
governance arrangements (Table 2.4).  
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2.4.1 Hierarchy and authority for rules 
Hierarchical administrative decision making in the Institutional Analysis and Design Framework 
is divided into four levels: meta constitutional, constitutional, collective choice, and operational. 
Meta constitutional represents the highest level of institutions that guide and constrain how 
decisions are made at the constitutional level. The constitutional level prescribes how decisions 
may be made at the collective choice level. Collective choice is most often thought of as 
collective decision making to decide upon operational level rules such as fishing regulations. 
Most research describes collective choice occurring within community-based management at the 
local level. Conversely, this research reveals that collective choice decision making over 
operational rules, particularly in co-management, may not occur at the local level.  
 
Although it may appear that the historical marine tenure system, contemporary centralized 
management, and co-management are arranged in a classic bureaucracy, the historical marine 
tenure system exhibits polycentric institutional structure characterized by multiple overlapping 
centers of authority. Historical accounts suggest that decision-making was sometimes 
coordinated at the regional (moku) level, while other times it was devolved to the local level 
(ahupua‘a-level). Although administrative decisions were sometimes coordinated at higher 
political levels, operational decisions were made locally without direct supervision. Local level 
autonomy was made effective by the wealth of local-level resource knowledge. Master fishers 
worked with enabled local managers (konohiki) to create adaptive rules that maximized resource 
productivity. Depending on the scope of rules (for both centralized management and co-
management under contemporary governance arrangements), they must still be approved at 
multiple levels of state government, and thus both governance arrangements are embedded 
within a classic bureaucratic administrative structure.  
 
A. Meta Constitutional 
The meta constitutional level holds the authority to develop constitutional level rules or the 
highest level rules that structure rules interactions at all lower levels. The highest level of 
authority was found to be present in the historical marine tenure system, contemporary 
centralized management, and the current co-management system. Under historical marine tenure, 
the Mō‘ī (absolute monarch) presided over the meta constitutional level (Beamer, 2014). Today 
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however, the U.S. government and the U.S. Constitution represents the umbrella framework and 
institutional structure under which all other levels of government operate in contemporary 
centralized management and co-management. The fourteenth amendment of the U.S. 
constitution, the equal protection clause, guarantees that U.S. laws apply equally to everyone. 
This can be problematic for the design of rights based management and operational level rules 
that seek to privilege local users or exclude outside groups. Rulemaking at lower levels must take 
this into account when attempting to limit access.  
 
B. Constitutional 
The ali‘i nui (island high chief) held the authority to preside over the constitutional level for the 
Hawaiian Kingdom. In their role as high chief, the ali‘i nui attended political and administrative 
meetings with the aha ali‘i (council of chiefs) and took directives from the Mō‘ī. Today, the 
executive branch of the Hawai‘i state government, headed by a democratically elected governor, 
represents the constitutional level for contemporary centralized management and co-
management. The Hawai‘i state constitution authorizes the executive branch of the state 
government to manage resources as well as protect and regulate traditional practices and 
resources importance for native Hawaiian subsistence, culture or religion.  
 
C. Collective Choice 
In the historical system, the ali‘i ‘ai moku (district level chief) retained authority over the 
collective choice in the historical marine tenure system, sometimes coordinating lower ahupua‘a-
level decision-making. In the current co-management system, the governor-appointed, seven 
member Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) represents the collective choice level in 
contemporary centralized management and co-management. The BLNR must approve any 
changes in operational level rules, subject to final approval by the governor.  
 
D. Operational 
The ali‘i ‘ai ahupua‘a appointed local-level konokihi (resource appropriators) that worked 
together with master fishers and residents living in the area to devise operational level rules. In 
contemporary centralized management, rulemaking authority is ceded to the Division of Aquatic 
Resources (DAR), with final approval by the appointed Board of Land and Natural Resources 
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and the Hawai‘i State Governor. Under co-management, formal operational level rulemaking 
authority is shared between community members and the Division of Aquatic Resources, and is 
enforced by the Division of Conservation and Resource Enforcement (state level marine resource 
management and enforcement agencies).  
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Table 2.3. Nested rules hierarchy and authority for small-scale fisheries in the Hawaiian 
Kingdom (1810-1892), Contemporary Centralized Management (1982-present), and 
Contemporary Co-management (1994-present)  
 Level of 
Analysis/Arena of 
Choice 
Governance Arrangement 
Historical 
Marine Tenure  
Centralized 
Management 
Co-management 
Decision 
making 
authority 
within each 
Arena of 
Choice 
Meta-
Constitutional 
individual actions 
that directly affect 
rules that affect 
Constitutional 
situations 
Mō‘i Ruling 
Monarch 
(Absolute 
Monarchy 
(1810-1840; 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 1840-
1892)† 
Federal Government/U.S. 
Constitution/Federal Statutes 
Constitutional 
individual actions 
that directly affect 
rules that affect 
Collective-choice 
situations 
Ali‘i (Ruling 
Chief on each 
island) Aha ali‘i 
(council of 
chiefs) 
State of Hawai‘i/Hawai‘i State 
Constitution 
Collective Choice  
actions that affect 
rules that affect 
Operational 
Situations 
Ali‘i ‘ai moku 
(Ruling Chiefs 
in each district), 
made decisions 
in consultation 
with the Ali‘i ‘ai 
ahupua‘a 
(Ruling chief of 
lesser rank at the 
ahupua‘a level) 
and the Konohiki 
(agent or land 
manager) 
Board of Land & Natural Resources; 
State of Hawai‘i Resource Management 
Agency (DLNR) 
Operational  
rules-in-use that 
affect everyday 
user decisions 
Ali‘i ‘ai 
ahupua‘a 
appointed a 
Konohiki the 
authority to 
appropriate 
resources and 
devise rules in 
concert with 
expert fishers 
and hoa‘āina 
(ahupua‘a 
tenants)  
DAR/DOCARE Rulemaking authority 
shared between users 
and resource 
management agencies 
(DAR/DOCARE) 
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†This period followed a period of initial settlement, the ‘Ohana network, which exhibited little 
social stratification and then the territorial hierarchy, in which greater social stratification was 
evidenced by the presence of an ali‘i class, the ahupua‘a system and the appointment of konohiki 
(Beamer, 2014). 
 
2.4.2 Property Rights Components 
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) define five property rights components that are integral to the 
analysis of natural resource governance arrangements: access, withdrawal, exclusion, 
management, and alienation. Possession of these rights under historical marine tenure, 
contemporary centralized management and co-management is presented in Table 2.4. A 
description of each of the rights in each governance arrangement is provided below. 
 
A. Access and Withdrawal 
Under historical marine tenure, both ahupua‘a tenants and local resource managers held the right 
to enter resource areas and harvest resource units. Under centralized management, the Public 
Trust Doctrine and the Hawai‘i state constitution ensures that coastal and marine access may not 
be restricted, subject to certain rules and regulations. In most areas, anyone may enter coastal and 
marine areas and fish, except for areas where fishing activity is prohibited by all users. Likewise, 
in contemporary co-management, rights to exclude are not currently recognized, so there is no de 
jure managed access to resources. As a result, anyone may enter a resource area and harvest 
resource units subject to existing resource rules and regulations. Access and withdrawal rights 
are subject to operational level rules under both governance arrangements in both time periods. 
 
B. Exclusion 
Under historical marine tenure, local resource managers enforced palena (boundaries) at the 
ahupua‘a level; ahupua‘a tenants from other ahupua‘a required permission from the konohiki to 
enter and harvest. Hoa‘āina retained rights within ili (sub-areas of an ahupua‘a). In both 
contemporary centralized management and co-management, no one can be legally excluded from 
resource areas except under state coercion.  
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C. Management 
Management rights entails the rights and responsibilities associated with making decisions 
regarding access, withdrawal, exclusion, and alienation. Konohiki retained management rights in 
historical marine tenure, but their rulemaking rights required consultation with master fishers and 
ahupua‘a tenants. Moreover, their management rights were subject to changes in the Hawaiian 
Kingdom political landscape and political change at higher levels of authority. The Division of 
Aquatic Resources holds management rights in contemporary centralized management, subject 
to approval by the Board of Land and Natural Resources. Community members share some 
management rights to co-develop operational level rules (fishing regulations) with the Division 
of Aquatic Resources in contemporary co-management.  
 
D. Alienation 
Some alienation occurred under historical marine tenure during the mid-late 1800s as the 
Hawaiian Kingdom transitioned to a market economy. For example, some konohiki leased or 
sold their rights to certain species to commercial fisheries for economic gain while still 
practicing subsistence fishing (Kirch, 2010; Kittinger, 2010a). Today, the State of Hawai‘i may 
sell or lease any of the property rights components subject to the State and Federal constitutions. 
However, ceded lands, sometimes referred to as the ‘crown lands’ may limit the state’s alienation 
rights. Ceded lands were the lands once owned by the Hawaiian Mō‘ī that today are treated as a 
collective property right shared by all Native Hawaiians (Van Dyke, 2008). Currently, the sale, 
transfer or lease of the crown lands is subject to a two-thirds vote by both the State of Hawai‘i 
House of Representatives and the Senate (Van Dyke, 2010).  
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Table 2.4. A comparison of Historical Customary Marine Tenure and Co-management 
Institutional Arrangements in Hawai‘i [property rights] adapted from Schlager & Ostrom (1992) 
Property right 
component 
Historical Marine Tenure Centralized 
management 
Co-management 
Access  
(right to enter a 
resource area) 
Hoa‘āina and konohiki 
only 
Anyone, subject to regulations that apply 
equally 
Withdrawal 
(right to withdraw 
or harvest resource 
units) 
Hoa‘āina subject to 
konohiki rules and 
ho‘okupu provided to 
ali‘a ai ahupua‘a 
Anyone – subject 
to resource rules 
and regulations 
Anyone – subject to 
rules based upon 
customary practices 
Exclusion  
(right to exclude 
others from 
entering a resource 
area or harvesting 
resource units) 
Konohiki enforced palena 
(boundaries) at the 
ahupua‘a level; hoa‘āina 
from other ahupua‘a 
needed permission to 
enter and harvest.  
No one can be excluded unless rules specify 
that everyone is excluded. 
Management 
(right to make 
operational rules 
and enforce 
sanctions)  
Konohiki, in consultation 
with kilo i‘a (master 
fishermen or fish spotters) 
and hoa‘āina, subject to 
appointment by ali‘i ‘ai 
ahupua‘a (ahupua‘a level 
chief) 
The DAR develops 
rules, subject to 
attorney general 
approval, public 
input, majority 
approval by the 
BLNR, and 
approval by the 
Governor of 
Hawai‘i. 
Rules devised at the 
community level in 
consultation with the 
DAR, subject to 
approval by the attorney 
general, public input, 
majority approval by the 
Board of Land and 
Natural Resources 
(BLNR), and the 
Governor. 
Alienation 
(right to sell or 
lease any of the 
above rights) 
Some alienation occurred 
in the late 1800s during 
the transition to a market 
economy as some 
konohikis leased or sold 
their rights to certain 
species to commercial 
fisheries for economic 
gain while still practicing 
subsistence fishing.  
Only the State of Hawai‘i can sell or lease any 
of the above rights, except ceded lands, which 
are subject to collective rights of Native 
Hawaiians. Their sale or lease requires 
approval by both houses of the Hawai‘i state 
legislature. 
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2.5 DISCUSSION 
 
Hierarchal decision making, fisheries property rights, and the design of institutional 
arrangements for resource management have changed substantially over the last 200 years in 
Hawai‘i. If broken, many rules once punishable by death now merely levy a small fine if the 
accuser is caught, brought to court, and proven guilty. Resources have declined substantially 
from historical levels in Hawai‘i, particularly in contemporary times, leading to the emergence of 
a new governance arrangement – co-management – that includes some aspects of local-level 
management once present under the historical marine tenure system. However, analysis of 
hierarchical authority and property rights components under historical marine tenure in Hawaiian 
Kingdom, contemporary centralized management, and co-management raise several issues 
relevant to the general design of rights based management regimes. These issues include: the 
devolution of property rights at the local level; matching administrative and social-ecological 
complexity; the importance of historical context and narratives in shaping solutions; and the 
legitimacy of governance arrangements. These issues are considered for the remainder of this 
section.  
 
2.5.1 Devolution of property rights at the local level 
Studies of fisheries management failures across the globe found that many management 
problems can be successfully remedied through devolution of rights to users that confer 
stewardship incentives (Costello et al., 2008). However, there can be unintended consequences 
associated with rights based approaches, including elite capture of benefits (Cinner, 
McClanahan, et al., 2012b) and consolidation of rights causing loss of employment and a way of 
life for fishers and associated industries (Rust, 2013). Thus, regulators must pay careful attention 
during the institutional design process of rights based management to account for these and other 
unfortunate consequences. If not, institutions and incentives may be misaligned. Yet in co-
management, too often rights are not devolved to communities or user groups (Pinkerton, 1999; 
Pomeroy et al., 2001). Further, the fisheries described in this chapter are primarily subsistence-
based and not commercial. Nevertheless, data on contemporary co-management presented in this 
case confirms that rights have not been devolved to local resource users. Under contemporary 
co-management in Hawai‘i, communities supposedly sharing management authority are allowed 
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to create rules for their area, but other rights such as access and withdrawal, exclusion, and 
alienation are not conferred to the local level – which may fail to adequately confer stewardship 
incentives to communities and may hinder the success of the rights based approach (Grafton et 
al., 2006). Communities therefore only can exert rights to manage, primarily through the process 
of advancing site-based rules for adoption by the state, which is subject to a labyrinthine 
approval process involving multiple bureaucratic approvals and public hearings (Ayers and 
Kittinger 2014). This process can take multiple years to complete (Vaughan & Caldwell, 2015).  
 
Viewed holistically, co-management in Hawai‘i has thus far been implemented on a piecemeal 
basis, and despite the presence of enabling legislation, co-management represents just one rarely 
used option in a diverse portfolio of management strategies. Outside of Hawai‘i, other countries 
have ushered in large-scale change swiftly and definitively. Marine management in Chile was 
changed almost overnight via the Chilean Fishing and Aquaculture Law, which mandated co-
management in 1991. There, the 1991 law ushered in statewide change in property rights by 
devolving exclusive benthic harvesting rights to local fishers. The near collapse of a Chilean 
Abalone (Concholepas concholepas) (loco) and the success of a small experiment to devolve 
exclusive harvest rights to local users drove passage of the law. Although some difficulties were 
associated with the abrupt transition from the traditional management system (Gelcich et al., 
2006), there is evidence of positive social and ecological outcomes as a result of co-management 
governance in Chile and the law is generally considered a success (Gelcich et al., 2010; Gelcich, 
Kaiser, Castilla, & Edwards-Jones, 2008). If co-management in Hawai‘i is ever going to be 
implemented on a scale beyond a few small and isolated areas or demonstration projects, more 
rights must be devolved to communities. To devolve more rights, perhaps a different set of 
constitutional rules akin to Chile’s 1991 law may be necessary to facilitate wider 
implementation. New constitutional rules could mandate co-management in specific cases, 
further codify and recognize rights to Native Hawaiians, or cede governmental authority back to 
the Hawaiian people.  
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2.5.2 Matching administrative and social-ecological complexity 
Rights-based approaches to management may take many forms and it would be foolish to limit 
the diversity of policy instruments available to resource appropriators. However, rights-based 
approaches – including co-management – may not be successful without an administrative 
structure that is commensurate with the complexity of the social-ecological system it governs (E. 
Ostrom, 1998). State-level spending on natural resources in Hawai‘i is among the lowest in the 
nation, averaging 1-4% of overall state budgets from 1997-2013 (Teneva, Unpublished data). A 
consequence of this lack of natural resource spending is a lack of institutionalized enforcement 
and a de facto open access property rights arrangement for most small-scale fisheries in Hawai‘i 
(Finkbeiner et al., 2015). Declines in biomass and apex predators across the main Hawaiian 
Islands have been observed in open access areas (Friedlander & DeMartini, 2002a). One 
explanation for low spending and a lack of enforcement is that there is no license program for 
non-commercial fishing activity. A fishing license program typically raises revenue for 
enforcement, education, and collects valuable data for management. Conflict is another 
consequence of low spending on natural resources and enforcement. Up to 90% of coral reef fish 
caught in Hawai‘i are consumed or shared by fishers (Kittinger & Friedlander, unpublished 
dataset) – which demonstrates a dependence on the ocean for sustenance. A 1994 study used to 
justify co-management found that nearly two-thirds of residents of Moloka‘i island regularly 
fished, and more than one third engaged in ocean gathering activities gathering limu (seaweed) 
and opihi, an intertidal limpet – both culturally important local foods; and fishing and hunting 
activities provided over one-third of food for island residents (Matsuoka et al., 1994). Given the 
dependence on resources on Moloka‘i and their corresponding decline, it is not surprising that 
conflict and even violence has erupted between Moloka‘i residents and visiting fishermen from 
neighboring islands over increasingly scarce resources (Guth, 1999). Likewise, it is not 
surprising that Moloka‘i residents would seek to strengthen local property rights to avert the 
tragedy of the commons.  
 
In order to manage these conflicts, a robust administrative structure, including a community 
presence, should match the complexity of the social-ecological system. This could entail sharing 
authority with communities and/or increasing management funding to augment planning staff, 
data collection, monitoring, and enforcement efforts, which are vital governance components. 
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However, community-level enforcement remains a challenge, as efforts to deputize community 
members have met administrative and legal resistance. Legally, community members are not 
allowed to enforce resource rules, which is considered a key element of community-based 
governance (E. Ostrom, 1990). At this time, community members must report incidents to the 
state-level Division of Conservation and Resource Enforcement (DOCARE), the enforcement 
arm of the Department of Land & Natural Resources. As a Division, DOCARE is woefully 
understaffed. For example, on the island of Kaua‘i, there are just nine DOCARE officers to 
patrol from mauka to makai (from the mountains out to three miles in the ocean). A greater 
commitment to compliance and enforcement must be a part of any administrative changes in 
Hawai‘i. 
 
2.5.3 The importance of historical context in shaping current solutions 
Although this research presents historical marine tenure in the context of a different time period 
in Hawaiian history, Hawai‘i’s legacy of marine tenure still lives in Hawai‘i through mo‘olelo, 
historical accounts, and native Hawaiian resource management practices (Maly & Maly, 2003). 
Memories of the recent past have not been lost and many traditions continue to live on in some 
areas of Hawai‘i (McGregor, 2007). Management failures and declining resources are often 
attributed to the arrival of western conceptions of management (bureaucratic administration and 
centralization) and a departure from native Hawaiian practices, values, and ways of knowing 
(Ayers & Kittinger, 2014). Thus, when solutions are considered for problems facing 
contemporary resource systems in Hawai‘i, many of these historical narratives or ‘artifacts’ 
resurface (V. Ostrom, 1980).  
 
Although institutional analysis of historical marine tenure, contemporary centralized 
management, and co-management reveal some similarities in terms of administrative complexity, 
there are vast differences in terms of efficiency, accountability, and resource outcomes. Some 
Hawai‘i communities frame the emergence of co-management as a small component within a 
larger political movement toward restoring native Hawaiian sovereignty or a renewal of Native 
Hawaiian values and relationships with the natural world (Vaughan et al., 2016, Vaughan and 
Caldwell, 2015). Twenty or more communities are currently in various stages of co-management 
planning across Hawai‘i (Higuchi, 2008, Levine and Richmond, 2014), which indicates some 
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dissatisfaction with the current management regime, the larger political system, and a desire to 
reintegrate aspects of historical marine tenure into contemporary management.  
 
Part of the dissatisfaction with the contemporary centralized management may be a product of 
not paying adequate attention to historical and cultural context in designing the fisheries 
management regime. Development scholars have widely documented institutional failures in a 
multitude of global cases that stem from solutions imposed by external forces that do not 
adequately consider local knowledge, customs, and context (Boettke et al 2008, Scott, 1999). 
Although evidence reveals declines in resource productivity from ancient Hawai‘i to present day 
(Kittinger et al., 2011), there is a prevailing notion among many Hawaiian communities that 
aspects of marine tenure can be still be effective. For example, place-based rules based upon 
customary practices and values. Also, there are no laws that prohibit local monitoring and 
educational programs (Vaughan et al., 2016). However, attempts to initiate institutional change 
in Hawai‘i have largely been stymied by significant transaction and transformation costs (Ayers 
et al., In review). Co-management transitions have taken significant time and resources – ten 
years or longer – in other areas of the world (Gelcich et al., 2010; Yandle, 2003), which may also 
indicate the difficulty of changing behavioral patterns, the ‘stickiness’ of institutions, or the 
reluctance of governments to cede authority.  
 
Critical institutionalist scholars have characterized the messy process of institutional change as 
‘institutional bricolage’ whereby “people…assemble or reshape institutional arrangements, 
drawing on whatever materials and resources are available…Institutional components from 
different origins are continuously reused, reworked, or refashioned to perform new functions” 
(Cleaver & De Koning, 2015, p. 5). Institutional bricolage is a dynamic, negotiated process 
shaped by social relations, power, agency, and structural constraints (Cleaver, 2002; Hall, 
Cleaver, Franks, & Maganga, 2014). The messy, nonlinear, political process of institutional 
bricolage may be a better frame through which to understand some of the contextual factors that 
as of yet, have slowed institutional change in Hawai‘i coral reef fisheries. As a concept, 
institutional bricolage can help illustrate the importance of historical context and narratives 
surrounding institutional analysis and design of policy solutions. It is too soon to tell if the 
twenty or more communities across Hawai‘i interested in renewing aspects of marine tenure will 
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be able to overcome sticky institutions or path dependency (sensu Baumgartner & Jones, 2009) 
currently holding much of the authority and rights to resources in Hawai‘i. 
 
2.5.4 Legitimacy of governance arrangements 
Jentoft (2000a, p. 145) explained the positive relationship between legitimacy and authority: 
“Autonomy (or the lack of such) is an essence of power as such it needs legitimation. The lesser 
the autonomy, the greater the legitimation problem.” Although the historical marine tenure 
system may have been implemented under a constitutional monarchy, in many ways it may be 
viewed as more legitimate than contemporary co-management in fisheries since more 
management authority was devolved to lower levels where local expertise could be integrated 
into management. In the Hawaiian Kingdom, chiefs and resource managers were not selected for 
leadership positions through a democratic voting process, yet the success and tenure of ali‘i and 
konohiki depended on their ability to manage resources effectively and distribute harvests 
equitably and fairly throughout an ahupua‘a. To ensure accountability, the Hawaiian Kingdom 
decentralized decision-making to local resource managers that consulted with and placed great 
value on information gathered from expert fishermen (Vaughan & Ayers, 2016). Even though 
ali‘i and konohiki held a great amount of authority, their position of power was tenuous; they 
could be removed – or even killed – if their decisions were deemed unfair or led to resource 
decline (Beamer, 2014; Kirch, 2007; Van Dyke, 2008).  
 
In contrast, as the institutional analysis showed, very little management authority is devolved to 
communities in Hawai‘i co-management. Communities rely upon highly protected government 
civil servants that can only be fired for cause, and on resource regulations that are largely 
unenforced due to low agency budgets. Further, the administrative rulemaking process in 
Hawai‘i ensures four or five opportunities for public input (Kittinger et al., 2012), but in many 
ways reinforces or amplifies existing power relations. For instance, public meetings are almost 
always held at agency offices located in the urban core of Honolulu. Due to the high cost of 
living in Hawai‘i, many community members advocating for co-management often work several 
jobs to make ends meet or may be retired and living on fixed incomes. These factors make travel 
and time off to attend meetings and provide in-person testimony prohibitively expensive and 
difficult. Conversely, entrenched commercial or other organized interests opposed to co-
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management may employ trained communications staff and legal counsel to lead strategy, 
threaten litigation, or contest community claims. This has been found true in other public 
fisheries arenas, where more nuanced rhetoric and argumentation in public processes was found 
to be effective at influencing the policy sphere (Wilson & McCay, 1998).  
 
If management is not considered legitimate by fishers, they may find ways to break the rules or 
seek ways to speak out and try to change them (Jentoft, 2000a). The test of legitimacy is whether 
participants support the process or merely the outcome. In other words, if participants feel that 
their voices are heard then they can live with an unfavorable outcome (Jentoft, 2000a). There is 
much evidence that existing participatory and decision making structures are ineffective in 
Hawai‘i. Recent research in this system has found that the participatory rulemaking process is 
one of the biggest barriers to co-management in Hawai‘i (Ayers et al., In review, Levine and 
Richmond, 2014, Vaughan and Caldwell, 2015). The legitimacy challenge facing the state of 
Hawai‘i is to develop participatory spaces where constructive deliberation is not dominated by 
power relations, particularly since Hawai‘i has a multicultural population, a diversity of cultures 
and worldviews that can complicate agreements and policymaking (Foucault, 1982, Fung and 
Wright, 2003, Umemoto, 2001). 
 
Although it is no easy task, deliberative democracy approaches offer a suite of participatory 
design alternatives that may increase legitimacy, equity, and even enhance outcomes. No two 
public policies, management regimes, or social-ecological systems are equal, so why employ a 
one-size fits all participatory strategy? Varying participant involvement, the type of input and 
decision making allowed, and the extent of their influence on the outcome may help ensure the 
most fair and efficient outcome can occur (Fung, 2006). For example, if a rural community is 
pursuing a co-management area, a tourism or commercial fishing business situated on another 
island may not be considered to be a stakeholder and thus could be prohibited from participating 
in the public input process. Prohibiting non-local input would likely require constitutional 
changes. However promising, deliberative democracy is not a silver bullet. Decision making 
regarding who is allowed to participate, provide input, and influence outcomes may be biased, 
leading to some of the same legitimacy problems that plague other participatory processes 
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(Parkinson, 2003). Deliberative democracy, like democracy, is messy. Yet it may offer some 
effective strategies that can be tailored to enhance specific co-management planning situations.  
 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
Rights-based approaches to small-scale fisheries management such as co-management are 
increasingly gaining traction around the world. This research has demonstrated that 
administrative complexity has remained largely constant over time in Hawai‘i, but property 
rights have changed dramatically in Hawai‘i coral reef fisheries. Rights once devolved to local 
resource managers are currently held by the central government of the State of Hawai‘i, which 
devolves relatively little management authority to local communities. History and path 
dependency may currently hold a firm grip on fisheries management institutions in Hawai‘i, 
particularly constraining possibilities for rights based approaches to co-management. However, 
this research presented some ideas that can be applied both locally in Hawai‘i and globally that 
are facing similar rights based implementation challenges. This analysis has also shown how the 
Institutional Analysis and Design framework can pinpoint where alternative pathways may be 
available through changes at specific decision making arenas; that administrative complexity 
may be necessary to address social-ecological complexity; the role that history and context play 
an important role in effective institutional design; and how innovative participatory strategies 
adopted from municipal governance can lead to increasingly legitimate, effective participation in 
co-management planning. Deliberative democracy approaches hold much promise for the 
practitioners, planners, and communities embedded in seemingly thorny, complex path 
dependent situations, or nascent co-management planning endeavors. More participatory 
research utilizing deliberative democracy strategies may be the key to shortening the incubation 
time for rights based approaches and co-management, which often takes a decade or longer to 
mature (Gelcich et al., 2010). Regardless of whether participatory and decision making strategies 
outlined by deliberative democracy scholarship are formalized, targeted stakeholder engagement 
and negotiation may reduce disputes and conflict that can occur later on in co-management 
processes. If the current trend of rights based approaches in small-scale fisheries continues, these 
strategies may offer a path forward towards more effective and legitimate governance transitions.  
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Chapter 3. 
Emergence of Co-management Governance for Hawai‘i Coral Reefs 
 
Chapter 2 traced how hierarchical decision-making structures and property rights from Hawaiian 
Kingdom times through to present day have affected Hawai‘i coral reef social-ecological 
systems. Co-management, via community-based subsistence fishing areas, was one of the 
governance regimes analyzed. Chapter 2 showed that the rights devolved to communities in co-
management were limited to some management authority to develop operational rules for marine 
areas adjacent to communities. Analyzing property rights components and administrative 
structure may explain some of the current limitations inherent to Hawai‘i co-management. 
However, chapter 2 did not examine the creation story behind community-based subsistence 
fishing areas. This chapter will focus on that process, employing a grounded theory approach to 
develop a simple typology of drivers and the social responses that enabled co-management to 
emerge from the community level in Hawai‘i. Later on, the chapter pivots to some of the 
theoretical issues related to emergence theory and community-level co-management planning 
processes. The chapter concludes by considering key issues related to co-management planning 
and implementation.  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Failures in natural resource management that take top-down, centralized governance approaches 
have inspired considerable research on ways to involve communities and resource users in co-
management. Co-management can take many forms, but generally involves shared management 
authority and responsibility between resource users or community groups at the local level and 
governmental agencies (Berkes 2010). Co-management can be conceptualized as a spectrum of 
institutional arrangements and bundling of property rights in which management responsibilities 
are shared between local-level resource user communities and state-level institutions (Yandle 
2008). Some investigators have characterized co-management as an adaptive, iterative learning 
process where all involved parties share costs and benefits, rather than a strategy or management 
tool (Pomeroy & Rivera-Guieb 2006).  
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Recent scholarship on co-management has focused on small-scale fisheries, which have become 
increasingly recognized as globally significant in food security, livelihoods, and fisheries 
landings (Berkes et al. 2001, Chuenpagdee et al. 2006, Costello et al. 2012). Early research on 
co-management of small-scale fisheries focused primarily on descriptive assessments of these 
approaches (e.g., McGoodwin 1980, Jentoft 1989, Pinkerton 1989), while more recently, 
researchers have turned their attention to identifying the factors associated with different social 
and ecological outcomes, primarily through comparative approaches (e.g., Gutiérrez et al. 2011, 
Cinner et al. 2012). This growing literature associates co-management with several advantages, 
including increased collaboration and learning among partners, higher compliance with 
regulations, community empowerment, and increased stakeholder buy-in and stewardship 
(Acheson 2003, Jentoft et al. 1998, Jentoft 2005, Gelcich et al. 2010). But co-management can 
also lead to undesirable outcomes such as increased social conflict, elite capture of benefits, and 
perverse incentives for resource overexploitation (Castro and Nielsen 2001, Gelcich et al. 2006, 
Macneil and Cinner 2013; Pomeroy et al. 2007, Singleton 2000). 
 
While considerable and justifiable attention has been paid to these outcomes, there is an 
increased need to understand how co-management arrangements emerge and persist in the face 
of socioeconomic and environmental change. Emergence theory describes many related concepts 
and draws on a diversity of disciplinary fields (de Haan 2006). Accordingly, the concept of 
emergence has a diverse set of meanings, theories, and frameworks. In its simplest terms, 
emergence describes a process by which much system complexity may result from a small set of 
enabling conditions and constraints or rules (Holland 1999). The most fundamental attribute of 
which are the observation of some non-linear system behavior, usually described as a function of 
complexity, evolution, and interaction of several factors (Rotmans et al. 2001, de Haan 2006). 
Scholars have employed several analytical approaches to better understand and map the 
emergence process, including theoretical and conceptual models (Margoluis & Salafsky 1998; 
Salafsky et al 2002), agent-based computational modeling (Holland 1999, Epstein 1999), the 
emergence and diffusion of new ideas (Rogers 2003), the policy process (Sabatier 1999), and 
institutional analysis at different levels (McGinnis 2011).  
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In environmental governance literature, emergence has been used to describe the development of 
new institutional arrangements (e.g., Basurto et al 2012), and the ability of such arrangements to 
persist is referred to as ‘robustness’ (Anderies et al. 2003; 2004). This literature also 
characterizes the transitions between governance regimes in terms of transformations, with 
emerging empirical evidence on the factors key to these transformations (Olsson et al. 2006, 
Gelcich et al. 2010, Westley et al. 2011,). In resilience scholarship, transformability is used to 
describe the capacity of a complex system (e.g. social, economic or ecological) to transform into 
a new system, leaving the old system behind (Folke et al 2010). Emergent transformation is 
conceived as a bottom-up transition pathway characterized by less coordinated, externally driven 
regime change (Berkhout, Smith, Stirling 2004; Westley et al 2011). Emergent transformations 
can be operationalized in terms of actors, interactions, and events (Geels & Schot 2007).  
 
In relation to governance systems, recent research on co-management has focused on emergence 
of new governance arrangements and the key factors associated with these transformations 
(Gelcich et al 2010, Basurto et al 2012, Cudney-Bueno & Basurto 2009). These examples from 
recent literature demonstrate the growing interest in this field, particularly as this scholarship 
relates to policy development and conservation actions on the ground. With a few exceptions 
(e.g., the Maine Lobster fishery in the US – Acheson 1988; Acheson 2003; fishery management 
in New Zealand – Yandle 2003; Yandle 2008; McGinnis 2012; the Pacific Northwest fisheries – 
Singleton, 2000), most of this literature derives from research in the developing world. As such, 
less is known about emergence of co-management in developed world contexts. Further, little 
attention has been given to the important processes of integrating community-based and state-
level planning into robust co-management governance.  
 
Here, the emergence of co-management for natural resource governance is examined, using a 
case study approach from coral reef fisheries in the Hawaiian Islands. As a case study, Hawai‘i 
possesses some unique characteristics that provide opportunities for novel insights. Hawai‘i 
straddles the developed-developing dichotomy in terms of its ethnic and cultural diversity, the 
intersection between western-based and legally recognized traditional management institutions, 
and economic development that varies from high density urban to isolated, rural agrarian areas. 
In Hawai‘i, fishing and gathering remain a central aspect of communities due to their 
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sociocultural significance and for food security, yet centralized approaches to managing fisheries 
resources and habitats have proven largely unsuccessful, prompting calls for increased 
engagement of local fishers and communities in management. Although Hawai‘i has been part of 
the United States since 1959, the islands have a legacy of traditional management based on its 
Polynesian cultural heritage. Marine resources were historically governed through a 
sophisticated watershed-based tenure system (the ahupua‘a system) (Kaneshiro et al. 2005; 
Kittinger et al 2011). The past success of this system and the failures of bureaucracy-based 
management since statehood are often used as justification for a return to traditional management 
in areas across the state. In response to calls for more local autonomy in management of coral 
reefs, one alternative that has gained traction in Hawai‘i is community-based subsistence fishing 
areas (CBSFAs) (Levine & Richmond, 2014). CBSFAs are spatial management measures that 
allow communities to propose rules to manage nearshore areas for “subsistence” purposes, 
defined as “the customary and traditional Native Hawaiian uses of renewable ocean resources for 
direct personal or family consumption or sharing” (Higuchi 2008; Richmond 2013). CBSFAs 
allow for the development of co-management partnerships between state resource management 
agencies and community groups. Below, the ‘creation story’ behind this co-management 
arrangement is documented and the emergence process of this co-management governance 
system is evaluated, drawing on a robust policy analysis, archival data sources, and a set of key 
respondent interviews. The findings are related to broader theories on emergence of governance 
arrangements for social-ecological systems and conclude by describing ways that the findings 
can directly inform policy and planning in practice. 
 
3.2 METHODS 
 
This research employed a mixed method approach. I conducted a series of in-depth interviews 
and an analysis of archival documents, plans and legislative testimony. Archival data sources 
included legislation, testimony, management plans, government evaluations, publications and 
reports. Testimony submitted for the enabling legislation and the three successfully legislated 
CBSFAs (in the communities of Mo‘omomi, Miloli‘i, and Hā‘ena) were also gathered from the 
Hawai‘i State Archives. A content analysis noting patterns or themes was performed on 44 
pieces of submitted testimony heard during Senate or House committee hearings for bills that 
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eventually became one of the State’s three legislated co-management areas. In some cases, 
citizens or stakeholder groups submitted testimony multiple times, but their testimony was only 
counted once in the analysis since most, if not all of the testimony submitted multiple times went 
unchanged. These data were used to supplement and confirm data gathered from key respondent 
interviews. I also draw on a rigorous legal and institutional analysis of the State of Hawai‘i 
administrative rulemaking process previously conducted (Kittinger et al 2012).  
 
3.2.1 Sampling approach 
Individuals selected for in-depth, semi-structured interviews were identified based upon a series 
of informal conversations occurring between May 2010 and March, 2012. A purposive sampling 
approach was employed among identified individuals to preferentially interview respondents 
who were highly knowledgeable about fisheries co-management in Hawai‘i. Purposive sampling 
is a type of sampling in which “particular settings, persons, or events are deliberately selected for 
the important information they can provide that cannot be gotten as well from other choices” 
(Maxwell 1997, 235). This sampling typology is commonly employed in studies seeking to 
characterize specific dimensions of a set of issues, and is a valid method for achieving 
representativeness or comparability among a broad set of cases or topics (Patton 2002; Teddlie & 
Yu 2007).  
 
In total, 19 interviews were conducted with individuals from government, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), communities, and academic institutions between March and December 
2012. Table 3.1 displays a count of interviewees by sector. Although interview respondents are 
identified by the sector in which they work, due to the embedded nature of planning practice the 
lines are often blurred between academics, NGO employees and community members in this 
resource system (small-scale, coral reef fisheries). Interviewees included planners, 
administrators, managers, tenured faculty, community members, and private consultants with 
significant experience working on co-management in Hawai‘i. “Snowball,” or chain referral 
sampling (Creswell 2007) was employed to ensure that 19 semi-structured interviews resulted in 
sufficient theoretical saturation (Bernard 2012). Although care was taken to ensure that multiple 
perspectives were gathered in this process, no additional interviews were scheduled or conducted 
once new data gathered from individuals e.g. themes, theories, proposed causal mechanisms, 
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began to mirror data already gathered. The decision to limit interviews (N=19) was based on a 
self-assessment of data saturation, i.e. I began collecting similar responses from respondents. 
Based on other similar research, this self-assessment was deemed sufficient to explain the 
complexity of co-management emergence in this system and is consistent with qualitative and 
mixed method research designs (Patton 2002; Curry et al 2009; Gruby & Basurto 2013).  
 
Table 3.1. Total number of interviewees by sector. 
Interviewee Sector (count) 
State Government (6) 
NGO/Foundation (5) 
Community (3) 
Federal Government (2) 
Academia (2) 
Consulting (1) 
 
3.2.2 Data analysis 
Interviews typically lasted around one hour and respondents were ensured that all data would be 
reported anonymously or in the aggregate. A total of 18 out of 19 interviews were audio recorded 
and transcribed. Post transcription data analysis followed a grounded theory approach to uncover 
co-management emergence (Miles & Huberman 1994; Bernard & Ryan 2009). A deductive, 
iterative process of open or axial coding was used to identify patterns, themes and subthemes in 
the interview data. This data analysis was facilitated with NVivo 9 Qualitative Data Analysis 
Software. Nascent themes describing co-management emergence were grouped into topical 
areas, then later into major categories. Although counts of key respondents identifying major 
categories are presented to give a general idea of convergence within key interview respondents, 
they do not represent archetypal results of a quantitative survey approach nor are they 
generalizable in any way. Interview findings were combined with data gathered from the policy 
and institutional analysis and a content analysis of legislative testimony to inform the 
development of a temporal or causal chain of drivers and responses for co-management 
emergence. The drivers and responses were evaluated within the context of a planning 
framework at the community level. The proposed causal chain was then shared back with 
interview respondents for additional comment and review.  
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3.3 RESULTS 
 
3.3.1 Key factors in emergence 
I identified five major themes related to the process of emergence: resource depletion, conflict, 
self-organization, consensus-building, and collective action. These themes were based upon data 
from interview results, legislative testimony, a careful retracing of historical events, and a review 
of secondary data sources and archival documents. The five themes were separated into two 
categories in an attempt to disentangle the emergence process: drivers for emergence of co-
management governance and the social responses from various stakeholder groups in Hawai‘i 
seeking to organize and implement co-management. A descriptive narrative of the enabling 
conditions and policy environment, enabling legislation, and pilot project that allowed the co-
management governance system to arise is also presented. A timeline of key events was also 
created from the analysis of interviews, legislative testimony, and archival data. The timeline 
(Table 3.2) presents key events that occurred in Hawai‘i over the past 20 years that impacted the 
trajectory and emergence of co-management governance.  
 
3.3.2 Drivers for emergence 
Drivers for emergence were identified through iterative, deductive coding process of qualitative 
interview data and archival sources such as legislative testimony, drawing on established 
definitions in the literature to differentiate these concepts (Table 3.4). I consider these drivers 
and their sub-components below, supplemented with examples and additional coding data 
presented in Table 3.4. Exemplar quotes from key respondents describing each of the drivers of 
emergence are presented in Table 3A1.  
 
3.3.3 Resource depletion 
The enabling legislation and co-management framework for Hawai‘i coral reefs emerged 
following an extended period of resource depletion. Over half of all interview respondents 
mentioned resource depletion as a key driver affecting the emergence of co-management. Within 
the broad category of resource depletion, interviewees specifically cited overharvesting of 
marine resources, development or tourism impacts, and ineffective management practices (See 
Table 3.4, Table 3A1). Resource depletion was also independently mentioned in 43% of all 
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legislative testimony as justification for a governance shift to co-management. These 
observations by key respondents are corroborated by research in these fishery systems, which 
have documented long-term declines in key resources and reef health over the past century 
(Friedlander et al. 2008; Kittinger et al. 2011).  
 
3.3.4 Conflict 
Conflict was described by 5 out of 18 respondents as a key driver that led to the enabling 
conditions for emergence of co-management. Within the larger category of conflict, respondents 
described increased competition over resources as causing disputes or conflict, outsiders entering 
areas previously accessed only by nearby communities, and communities taking site-based 
actions to prevent poaching. According to these respondents, conflict followed a period of 
resource decline and increased competition over scarcer resources. Although just 5/18 
respondents described conflict as a key driver, conflict was also independently mentioned in 25% 
of all legislative testimony (11 out of a total of 44 independent sources submitted for three 
different co-management areas: Mo‘omomi, Miloli‘i, and Hā‘ena) submitted by community 
members, stakeholder groups, or government as justification for a governance transformation 
from bureaucracy-based management to co-management.  
 
Narratives derived from testimony, interviews, and other archival sources often detailed how 
conflict over resources in Hawai‘i occurred when technological advances (e.g., newer more 
efficient gears, GPS, the use of refrigeration) and population growth led to an influx of new 
fishers entering previously inaccessible or remote fishing areas (Guth, 1999). These new fishers 
began competing with existing fishing communities over increasingly scarce marine resources. 
Since monitoring and enforcement at the state level was minimal or non-existent, there was no 
threat of sanctions for those breaking resource rules. Resource depletion escalated some disputes 
into protracted conflict over rights to marine resources. In some cases communities took 
enforcement into their own hands or sought other means to change and improve the regulatory 
regime. Community-level enforcement actions described by interview respondents included 
unlawful access controls, which included varying levels of intimidation, and some illicit actions 
to protect their marine resources (See Table 3.4, Table 3A1).  
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3.3.5 Enabling conditions and policy environment 
Resource depletion and conflict created the enabling conditions for the emergence of a new 
governance system. These drivers played out on the rural island of Moloka‘i, just 51.49 km from 
the urbanized island of O‘ahu. In 1990, U.S. Census Bureau reported that just 7,333 residents 
were living on the small island of Moloka‘i (comprising just 68,000 hectares). Many Moloka‘i 
residents, particularly Native Hawaiians residing in the Ho‘olehua Hawaiian Homestead 
community fronting Mo‘omomi Bay on the island’s northwest coastline, had grown frustrated by 
outsiders traveling from other islands such as O‘ahu harvesting resources on which they 
depended on for food and sustenance. The community of Mo‘omomi fishers formed a hui or 
group (Hui Mālama o Mo‘omomi) and began lobbying state government for greater protection 
and management autonomy over the marine resources they depended on.  
 
Interview data and policy analysis revealed that the efforts of local community members from 
the rural Mo‘omomi community on the island of Moloka‘i were key to the emergence of co-
management in Hawai‘i. For several years, Moloka‘i community members raised public 
awareness about their dependence on fishing for subsistence and their successes employing 
traditional management methods (Friedlander et al 2002; Poepoe et al 2003). In 1993, as a result 
of these efforts, Governor John Waihe‘e commissioned a Task Force to examine the extent to 
which subsistence activities contribute to food security on Moloka‘i, the barriers making 
subsistence activities more difficult, and “to recommend policies or programs to improve the 
situation” (Matsuoka et al 1994; Matusoka et al 1998). With state data reporting an 
unemployment rate of 20% – nearly three times the unemployment rate reported on the other 
Hawaiian islands (Hawai‘i DBEDT, 1987) – the subsistence study confirmed that Moloka‘i 
households were indeed heavily dependent on land and ocean resources. Subsistence activities 
such as hunting, fishing and gathering accounted for 28% of food for the average Moloka‘i 
resident, with a quarter of all those sampled reporting that over 50% of their food was derived 
from subsistence (Matusoka et al 1998). 
 
As a result of these findings, the Governor’s Subsistence Task Force recommended that 
community-based management be implemented in areas such as Mo‘omomi Bay along the 
island’s Northwest coast. Hui Mālama o Mo‘omomi advocated the importance of subsistence 
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and changing fishing regulations to protect marine resources. Over several years, the 43 
members of Hui Mālama o Mo‘omomi lobbied the state for an increased community role in 
management, arguing that a community educational program, a fusion of customary practices 
and contemporary management would be efficient, cost-effective, and offer an improvement 
over current management (Hui Mālama o Mo‘omomi, 1995). 
 
3.3.6 Enabling legislation  
In response to the recommendation made by the Governor’s Subsistence Task Force and 
sustained lobbying efforts made by the Hui Mālama o Mo‘omomi community organization, the 
Office of Hawaiian Affairs, and The Department of Hawaiian Homelands, Act 271 was passed 
by the Hawai‘i Legislature late in the 1994 legislative session. The legislation gave the State of 
Hawai‘i’s Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) the power to: (1) designate 
CBSFAs and carry out fishery management strategies for other areas across Hawai‘i via the 
Hawai‘i’s administrative rule-making process (see Kittinger et al. 2012 for a detailed legal 
analysis); and, (2) establish a two-year pilot project for Mo‘omomi and Kawa‘aloa Bays on the 
island of Moloka‘i. Passing the legislation enabled communities across Hawai‘i to apply to 
become community-based subsistence areas, paving the way for future co-management efforts. 
Act 271 required communities pursuing a CBSFA designation to: include the name of the 
organization or group applying, including their charter, a list of the group’s members, a 
description of the proposed location and boundaries, why the designation is needed and how it 
may impact current public uses, a management plan including rules for the area, monitoring and 
evaluation processes, and funding and enforcement mechanisms. Proposals submitted by 
communities “shall meet community based subsistence needs and judicious fishery conservation 
and management practices” (Session Laws of Hawai‘i Act 271, 1994).  
 
3.3.7 Pilot project 
In response to the legislation, Hui Mālama o Mo‘omomi worked with the Division of Aquatic 
Resources (DAR) to follow the newly developed guidelines for a two-year pilot project, drawing 
on traditional ecological knowledge and practices (Friedlander et al. 2002, Poepoe et al. 2003). 
Although the Hui Mālama o Mo‘omomi originally intended for the project to include a much 
larger swath of coast and extend 3704 m seaward from the coastline, the pilot project 
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encompassed just two neighboring bays, Kawa‘aloa and Mo‘omomi, totaling approximately 36.4 
hectares of ocean area. Community-developed rules for the project utilized spatial measures 
which defined permitted and prohibited fishing activities in seaward and shoreward zones, gear 
restrictions, and a permitting system to govern fishing effort. Access was managed by the DAR, 
which issued free permits requiring monthly catch reports. In addition, the community sought to 
train community volunteers to monitor fishing and gathering activities and educate novice 
fishers.  
 
As part of the pilot project, DAR biologists were tasked with assessing the impact of the 
community-devised rules and were required to submit a status report to the legislature 18 months 
into the project. During those 18 months, DAR biologists performed three surveys of fishery and 
benthic resources along Kawa‘aloa and Mo‘omomi Bays. In their status report to the legislature, 
the DAR determined that additional time and surveys were needed to assess the impacts of the 
Pilot Project but recommended that the project be continued due to community interest (Hawai‘i 
DLNR, 1996). Despite significant community interest, the project was allowed to sunset at the 
end of the two-year term without conveying a permanent co-management designation by the 
DLNR. The DLNR were uncomfortable with new, expanded boundaries proposed by the 
Mo‘omomi community, who were in turn were frustrated with the state’s lack of cooperation and 
inaction. At that time, both parties agreed to step away from the partnership for the time being. In 
2016, Mo‘omomi revived its co-management proposal. Its draft rules and management plan are 
currently under review with the DLNR. 
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Table 3.2. Timeline of key events in the emergence of co-management for fisheries in the 
Hawaiian Islands. 
Date Event 
Early 
1990s 
Resource depletion, increasing disputes and conflict over resources across 
the state, particularly (Moloka‘i, East Maui) 
1994 Enabling legislation passed; Community efforts were instrumental 
1995-1997 
Co-management pilot project at Mo‘omomi & Kawa‘aloa Bays on 
Moloka‘i  
Lost Fish Coalition lobbies for stronger regulations on West Hawai‘i 
aquarium fishing industry 
1997- Pilot project not renewed; Mo‘omomi develops a Traditional Resource Management Moon Calendar based on customary practices 
1998 Act 306 Establishing West Hawai‘i Regional Fishery Management Area 
2001 
Research paper authored on community-based management in Hawai‘i: 
People and the Sea: A review of expert opinion of what it will take to 
enhance the conservation of marine resources in the main Hawaiian 
Islands. The report was funded by the Hawai‘i Community Foundation and 
was influential in driving donor-based support for co-management 
planning in Hawai‘i.  
2001 The Nature Conservancy (TNC) establishes a Hawai‘i Marine Program  
2002-2003 Castle Foundation funds first community-based capacity-building efforts in Hawai‘i 
2004 
Community Conservation Network (CCN) begins its Hawai‘i program 
E Alu Pū (Managing Better Together) begins under TNC and is 
subsequently moved to CCN (and later to the Hawai‘i Community 
Stewardship Network, now Kuaʻāina Ulu ʻAuamo [KUA]) 
2005 Miloli‘i CBSFA established by Hawai‘i Legislature 
2006 Hā‘ena CBSFA established by Hawai‘i Legislature 
2008 Bills advanced by Ho‘okena, Honaunau; Entire Island of Moloka‘i; Ni‘ihau; East Maui; None were passed into law 
2009 Lāna‘i community-based management legislation proposed; does not pass 
2010 Conservation International begins their Hawai‘i Fish Trust program 
2012-2013 Castle Foundation Funds Co-Management (CBSFA) Planner Position, funds co-management workshop in Honolulu 
 
 
3.4 SOCIAL RESPONSES FOR CO-MANAGEMENT PLANNING 
 
In response to perceived resource decline and or conflict, communities across Hawai‘i began to 
self-organize, forming community organizations to educate their communities, monitor their 
resources, and organize to build consensus around potential solutions. For example, the Kaua‘i 
community of Hā‘ena formed the Hui Maka‘āinānā o Makana in 1998 in response to increased 
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tourism and recreational impacts at Hā‘ena State Park. Hui Maka‘āinānā o Makana worked with 
the State Park managers and other entities to increase local involvement in Hā‘ena coastal area 
management. Part of the Hui’s ahupua‘a (mountain-to-sea) focus included the management of 
nearshore fisheries and coral reefs. The results of the Hui’s mobilizing within their community 
ultimately resulted in one of only two permanently designated CBSFAs (co-management areas) 
in the state. The state-sanctioned CBSFA designation was a result of years of community-led 
beach surveys to estimate catch per unit effort and document existing social and ecological 
baselines (Vaughan 2012). In addition to documenting resource baselines, community members 
also submitted testimony and lobbied state lawmakers. Community-level lobbying efforts 
originating in Hā‘ena, Kaua‘i were instrumental in establishing the Hā‘ena co-management area. 
 
Analysis of archival data sources and 19 semi-structured interviews uncovered three general 
social responses important for co-management planning that followed the emergence drivers. 
The social responses were identified using the same iterative, deductive coding process of 
qualitative interview data and archival sources used to pinpoint the emergence drivers (see Table 
3.3). These social responses include self-organization, consensus-building and collective action, 
which are presented in Table 3.3, together with examples and additional coding data. Exemplar 
quotes for each of the social responses are presented in Table 3A1.  
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Table 3.3. Definitions of key terms in the co-management causal chain analysis. Definitions are 
derived from the academic literature (see supporting citations), with adaptation for the Hawai‘i 
case study. 
 Definition Supporting 
Citations 
Drivers 
Resource 
Depletion 
Decreased ecosystem health and reduced 
catch, often from anthropogenic drivers 
such as increased fishing effort, pollution, 
introduction of invasive species, and other 
threats 
Friedlander et 
al 2008; 
Kittinger et al 
2012 
Conflict 
Protracted disputes among fishers; 
sometimes between ethnic communities or 
recent immigrants; often resulted in 
vandalism or violence 
Bennett et al 
2001; 
Pomeroy et al 
2007 
Social 
Responses 
Enabling 
Conditions 
Conditions allowing communities and 
states to successfully implement and 
complete a planning process or plan 
Fox et al 2013 
Self-
Organization 
Community members or user groups form a 
community organization and develop 
collective choice arrangements for decision 
making 
Ostrom 2000; 
Schlager 2004 
Consensus-
building 
Activities undertaken by a self-organized 
community to build support and achieve 
some level of consensus toward actionable 
objectives 
Innes & 
Booher 1999; 
Collective 
Action 
Collectively agreed upon interventions and 
cooperative behavior undertaken by a self-
organized community to address fisheries 
depletion and ecosystem degradation 
Olson 1965, 
Ostrom 1990;  
 
 
3.4.1 Self-organization 
Community self-organization was listed by 11 of 18 interviewees as a key social response related 
to the emergence of co-management. Self-organization was divided into several sub-themes or 
underlying factors described by respondents as contributing to community-level self-
organization. Specifically, respondents described the importance of leadership at the community 
level, a community’s dependence on resources, community members that possess a diverse 
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combination of skill sets, extraordinary community effort and commitment, and NGO 
involvement as critical factors relating to organizational development (See Table 3.3, Table 
3A1).  
 
3.4.2 Consensus-building 
Consensus-building activities were identified by 8 of 18 respondents as a necessary condition for 
the emergence of co-management. Although less than half of the respondents explicitly 
mentioned consensus-building as necessary, other scholars in this system (e.g. Vaughan & 
Caldwell, unpublished data) described its critical importance in developing community-based 
institutions. Interview respondents often cited Miloli‘i as an example of a community that has yet 
to achieve consensus towards collective action. The Miloli‘i community had already self-
organized by forming Pa‘a Pono Miloli‘i in 1980 to improve the quality of life of area residents. 
Many years later, several Miloli‘i residents and Pa‘a Pono Miloli‘i members responded to 
increased fishing pressure from outsiders by lobbying and testifying in support of a bill to 
permanently designate their adjacent marine areas as a CBSFA. In 2005, six years after the 
Mo‘omomi/Kawa‘aloa co-management area was allowed to sunset, Act 232 designated Miloli‘i 
as the first permanent CBSFA in Hawai‘i. However, during a public scoping meeting to discuss a 
draft rules package after designation it became apparent that consensus had not yet been reached 
over rules for the area. Community support was divided over a proposal that would ban 
commercial fishing in Miloli‘i’s adjacent marine waters. At the end of the meeting, the Miloli‘i 
community decided not to support the rules package. Since the contentious public meeting 
Miloli‘i retains its CBSFA designation but has yet to submit another rules package to the state. 
 
Within the larger consensus-building category, respondents described the following aspects to be 
critical: building a strong community organization, overreliance on one person/leader can be 
detrimental to building consensus, and building consensus is easier in smaller, more homogenous 
communities (See Table 3.3, Table 3A1). In the case of Miloli‘i, respondents reported that 
overreliance on one community member was detrimental to community consensus-building.  
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3.4.3 Collective action 
Collective action for co-management planning involves collectively agreed upon interventions 
and cooperative behavior undertaken by a self-organized community to address fisheries 
depletion and ecosystem degradation (Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990). In Hā‘ena, self-organization 
and consensus-building activities such as community meetings resulted in fruitful collective 
action: Hā‘ena submitted the first management plan by a Hawai‘i community for a CBSFA (co-
management area) in nearly fifteen years. The draft rules include gear restrictions that are 
grounded in traditional practices specific to Hā‘ena while not excluding any outsiders from 
fishing the area. CBSFA rulemaking is particularly challenging since Hawai‘i State law 
mandates that resource rules must apply equally to all users, limiting place-based rulemaking 
authority (Ostrom 1990). However, the Hā‘ena community was able to work within this legal 
constraint and devise draft rules that intend to restore traditional and customary practices specific 
to that area.  
 
In interviews, collective action was the most frequently cited social response (15/18) leading to 
the emergence of co-management in Hawai‘i. Under the larger umbrella of collective action, 
respondents described communities seeking specific resource management solutions such as 
access controls, in addition to governance reform (See Table 3.3, Table 3A1). An example of 
successful collective action included lobbying activities undertaken by community organizations 
like Hā‘ena’s Hui Maka‘āinana o Makana at the state legislature leading to the passage of a 
permanent co-management area, along with agreeing upon and submitting a rules package to the 
DLNR governing agency.  
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Table 3.4. Drivers affecting the emergence of co-management in Hawai‘i coral reefs, identified 
among key respondent interview (N=18). 
Driver 
- subcategories  
Total and percentage of 
respondents referencing 
theme 
Resource Depletion 
- Overharvesting resources  
- Development/tourism impacts 
- Current management ineffective 
10/18 
Conflict 
- Communities using violence to prevent poaching 
- Increased competition for resources caused disputes or 
conflict 
- Roving bandits 
5/18 
Self-Organization 
- Leadership 
- Community dependence on resources 
- Diverse combination of skills in the community 
- Extraordinary community effort and commitment 
- NGO involvement 
11/18 
Consensus-building 
- Building a community organization is key 
- Leadership not a necessary condition; overreliance on 
one person can be detrimental 
- Small, homogenous communities easier 
8/18 
Collective Action 
- Communities seeking resource management solutions 
- Access controls 
- For governance reform 
15/18 
 
 
3.5 DISCUSSION 
 
Co-management has increasingly become a focus in scholarship on natural resource 
management, with the first scholarship on fisheries dating back more than 25 years (McGoodwin 
1980, Jentoft 1989, Pinkerton 1989). Its success and potential have been widely touted as a 
solution to fishery management problems across the world (Gutierrez et al 2011; Cinner et al. 
2012). However, little is known about how co-management governance emerges and transitions 
in developed nations that have a long history of centralized, top-down management. Decades of 
centralized fisheries management and a recent revival of traditional practices make Hawai‘i an 
intriguing geography to examine the trajectory of co-management emergence in a developed 
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world context. Further, the intersection of customary practices and top-down conventional 
management make this case study an interesting proving ground for how co-management 
governance may arise and perform. Below, the findings are discussed in the context of theory on 
institutional emergence and collaborative planning. Then attention is turned towards how this 
theory can help inform the practice of co-management planning and management.  
 
3.5.1 Emergence theory and collaborative planning processes 
In this case study, results of interviews and analysis of archival data suggest that the drivers for 
the emergence of co-management may occur in a temporal sequence or causal chain of events 
that together influence collaborative planning processes. Figure 3.1 describes this process model, 
comprising a linked set of drivers and social responses, which together describe a theory of 
emergence in a collaborative planning framework. The planning process model (Figure 3.1) 
describes a simple relationship between drivers and the attendant social responses in this 
resource system. The model does not accommodate the full complexity of the emergence 
process, but is sufficient in describing the general planning process leading to the emergence of a 
new governance system (co-management in Hawai‘i). This model currently fits all three 
community-based co-management areas in Hawai‘i: Mo‘omomi, Miloli‘i, and Hā‘ena. However, 
as many as 50 distinct communities across Hawai‘i have worked to increase local involvement in 
marine resource management, and many of them have pursued legislation (Figure 3.3) to codify 
co-management areas with varying levels of completion and success. At this point it is unclear 
exactly why varying levels of success in establishing co-management areas have been observed 
across Hawai‘i. This is a subject of ongoing research by scholars in this system. A 
comprehensive examination of the drivers, social responses, and barriers communities faced 
along the way would strengthen confidence of the planning process model in this system and its 
potential application to other geographies.  
 
A. Co-management and emergence  
Although the drivers may be somewhat specific to this resource system, the social responses 
have attributes that are consistent with existing literature on the social processes that mediate 
transition pathways and ‘emergent transformation’ (Berkhout, Smith, Stirling 2004; Geels and 
Schot 2007). In this system, co-management resulted from social responses that were initiated by 
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actors in the resource system and arose as new discourses largely external to the dominant, top-
down governance system. Local actors created space for co-management as an innovative 
alternative to the existing governance discourse, but were met with several challenges. 
Identifying the specific challenges faced by communities in Hawai‘i can be found in Chapter 4. 
However, it is worth noting that co-management was emerging more broadly in the Pacific 
region in the early 1990s, and these geopolitical processes may have aided this solution in 
gaining traction in this case system (Baland & Platteau 1996; Johannes 2002). These results 
indicate that local actors played a key role in diffusing co-management as a viable alternative 
and innovative approach; however, it remains difficult to disentangle the extent to which this 
transformation pathway was mediated via local actors versus discourses and initiatives operating 
at the regional scale.  
 
B. Drivers and enabling conditions 
The role of resource depletion and conflict in driving institutional change towards co-
management and away from ineffective centralized management have been well-documented by 
scholars in many resource systems and geographies across the globe (Castro & Nielsen, 2001; 
Pomeroy et al 2007; Berkes 2009). These findings are consistent with these previous studies, 
where marine resource decline was a major driver, increasing the prevalence of disputes over 
resources and rights to fish certain areas. These disputes escalated into conflict, particularly in 
areas where residents were highly dependent on marine resources for subsistence. Conflict can 
also arise – as it did in this system – from increased fishery mobility, as fishers seeking marine 
resources outside their own areas or home islands may increase competition for resources 
(sometimes referred to as ‘roving bandits,’ sensu Berkes 2006). The linked processes of 
depletion and conflict were the primary drivers that helped create the enabling conditions and 
window of opportunity (e.g. Kingdon 1995; Olsson et al 2006) for a new co-management 
governance system.  
 
Co-management was engaged as a viable, alternative pathway over increased state enforcement 
or other strategies because of a variety of reasons, including pervasive budget cuts due to 
stagnant Hawai‘i economy, a renewal of traditional and customary stewardship practices across 
Hawai‘i and the perception by some that these customary forms of government were more 
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effective than existing top-down management (Friedlander et al 2000; Poepoe et al 2003), 
resource dependence in many rural areas, and a government open to testing out a new 
management arrangement. These issues elevated the narrative about co-management to a higher 
political level, which in turn resulted in a specific fact-finding assessment (Governor-
commissioned Task Force, Table 3.2). In response, communities affected by these drivers self-
organized to build consensus and advocate for a change in management systems. In this case 
study, community members helped generate political will, which aided the enabling legislation to 
pass, thus creating a pathway to co-management. Legislation was passed based on 
recommendations from the fact-finding assessment and a pilot project was developed and 
implemented (Table 3.2). These enabling conditions set the stage for the emergence of the co-
management governance system.  
 
C. Self-organization 
Theory on institutions for common-pool resources (CPRs) often uses the term self-organization 
interchangeably with self-governance (McGinnis 2011). However, distinctions are often made 
between: 1) resource attributes conducive to cooperation and self-organization, e.g. feasible 
improvement, indicators, predictability and spatial extent (Ostrom 2000); 2) the characteristics of 
the resource appropriators associated with emergent cooperative behavior, e.g. salience, common 
understanding, low discount rate, trust and reciprocity, autonomy, and prior organizational 
experience and local leadership (Schlager 2004; Ostrom 2005; Basurto 2013) – which may or 
may not be community-based in a co-management governance arrangement (Yandle 2003; 
Imperial & Yandle 2005); and, 3) the presence and performance of key ‘design principles’ which 
are believed to influence whether a given common-pool resource institutional arrangement will 
endure over time (e.g. Ostrom 1990; Cox 2010). In analyzing the emergent planning process for 
co-management, this research was primarily concerned with the characteristics of the 
appropriators (see Table 3.3 for definitions and references). In this planning framework, 
community-level self-organization was considered to have occurred when community members 
or user groups form a community organization and developed collective choice arrangements 
affecting the governance of their adjacent marine areas through this organization (e.g., by 
meeting and developing strategies). These two actions set the stage for actors to engage in 
consensus-building and collective action (i.e., implement strategies in a target geography). This 
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proposed sequence of actions is consistent with human behavioral models described by other 
scholars (e.g. Ostrom 1990; North 1990; Table 3.3). It is important to note here that self-
organization does not necessarily imply stability, in fact self-organization may be an iterative 
process and many factors can affect the durability of self-organized systems. For instance, 
internal or outside forces may break down a seemingly cohesive community, forcing them to 
reboot internal planning processes. 
 
D. Consensus building 
Consensus-building activities are undertaken by a self-organized community to build support and 
achieve some level of consensus toward actionable objectives (Table 3.3). Building consensus 
towards a collective course of action and co-management can be a challenge for community-
based initiatives. In this system, the consensus-building process may take many years or even 
decades (Vaughan & Caldwell, unpublished data). For example, following the passage of the 
Hā‘ena CBSFA legislation (Session Laws of Hawai‘i: Act 241, 2006), the Hui Maka‘āinānā o 
Makana community organization spearheaded nearly a decade’s worth of public meetings in 
their area to develop and revise palatable rules to govern five miles of coastline fronting Kaua‘i’s 
North Shore. Yet years of community meetings to collectively develop a rules package were 
necessary to ensure that alternatives were considered and different perspectives were integrated 
(Vaughan 2012). Without sufficient consensus-building, community support for collective 
solutions may be fractious, and may jeopardize the future planning stages if all stakeholders are 
not engaged early in the process.  
 
A lack of widespread success in consensus-building may in part be explained by the ethnic and 
cultural diversity in this system and the multitude of stakeholder and interest groups present with 
conflicting value systems. Interview respondents described how public meetings discussing 
marine resource rules are often dominated by interest groups because of awareness that 
government support for community initiatives “wilts” under the smallest of opposition. Engaging 
multicultural stakeholders and building consensus can be particularly challenging, perhaps 
necessitating creative engagement and guided, deliberative strategies to ensure meaningful 
participation and input (Lowry et al 1997). In addition, western planning processes are not often 
designed to integrate indigenous and multicultural input and may privilege certain worldviews 
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and ways of knowing over others (Sandercock 2004; Porter 2006). Without careful attention to 
participatory, epistemological, and power issues, western-based planning processes in 
postcolonial, multicultural geographies such as Hawai‘i may reinforce existing power relations 
and stifle consensus-building initiatives (Umemoto 2001).  
 
E. Collective action 
Collective action towards any objective is challenging, since it involves cooperative behavior 
and agreeing on a common goal, and because free-riding behavior often occurs (Olsen 1965). 
Community-level collective action in co-management planning can be stymied by a variety of 
factors. Since co-management implies sharing some level of management authority between 
resource users and the state, collective action at the community level without full governmental 
recognition and cooperation may not result in institutional change (Cudney-Bueno and Basurto 
2009). In Hawai‘i, there are two instances – Mo‘omomi and Hā‘ena – where communities self-
organized, built consensus around a management plan and collectively acted to achieve a 
modicum of decision-making over resource rules in their area. Despite the presence of enabling 
legislation and in some cases extraordinary community effort and collective action, co-
management in Hawai‘i has been hindered by a lack of capacity in communities and at the state 
management agency, institutional culture and rigidity at the partner resource management 
agency, and an ambiguous, complicated administrative rulemaking process (Ayers in prep; 
Vaughan 2012; Kittinger et al 2012; Finkbeiner et al in prep). Another issue that may affect 
collective action is dependency on marine resources. Although fishing and gathering remains a 
central aspect of Native Hawaiian culture, most livelihoods in Hawai‘i are not dependent on 
marine resources for survival, since multiple substitutes exist for food and employment. 
Substitutability and the lack of direct dependency for livelihood support may dilute the 
incentives for collective action at the community level in some areas, presenting challenges for 
co-management.  
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Figure 3.1. A planning process model of the drivers and responses associated with emergence of 
co-management governance. Drivers include resource depletion, which causes increased conflict 
among resource user communities. Responses comprise a set of social actions undertaken in 
planning processes at the community level, to engage in co-management, including initial self-
organization, consensus building and finally implementation of collective action. These steps can 
also include iterative feedback loops to cope with socioeconomic and environmental change. 
 
 
 
 
3.5.2 From theory to action: what matters for co-management emergence and 
implementation? 
Understanding the causal linkages between driving factors, attendant social responses, and 
planning processes can help inform future co-management planning efforts. Although the 
enabling legislation was passed nearly two decades ago, Hawai‘i is still early in its transition to 
co-management. Documenting the sequence of events in co-management emergence can enable 
learning across case studies and the development of a coherent theory of governance 
transformations, emergence processes, and collaborative planning. The sequence of these drivers 
and how they affect collaborative planning can determine the level of success in collaborative 
management, as communities and states consider governance transitions towards co-
management. Understanding these processes is important because collaborative planning is often 
a conflict-filled endeavor and particularly so for co-management planning which usually 
involves competing values, discourses, and perceptions of legitimacy for rights to common-pool 
resources. Building conflict management and dispute resolution strategies into complex co-
management planning processes, e.g. establishing trust across organizations, developing a shared 
definition of the problem, defining mutual interests, establishing a balance of power, and 
increasing policy instrument diversity (e.g. Kauneckis & Imperial 2007) could help ensure that 
state-community cooperation is fruitful and increase the potential for successful co-management 
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emergence. Documenting the initial drivers of co-management in other geographies and testing 
the effectiveness of good planning practices in ongoing governance transitions could help resolve 
how emergence theory applies more broadly to the evolution of governance in social-ecological 
systems. The discussion concludes by highlighting some key findings from co-management 
emergence in Hawai‘i that should have bearing on implementation and planning apply in other 
geographies.  
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Figure 3.2. Overview of the policy processes and steps for establishing community-based 
subsistence fisheries areas in Hawai‘i. The process is governed by several existing rules and 
regulations, including the State of Hawai‘i’s Chapter 91 administrative rulemaking process (HRS 
091), including the Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Act (HRS 201M) and Administrative 
Directive 09-01.  DLNR=State of Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources. Modified 
from Kittinger et al. (2012). 
 
 
 
A. Ensure enabling conditions are present 
Since this legislation passed, interest in co-management governance among communities 
throughout the state of Hawai‘i has increased (Figure 3.3). Even with the enabling legislation, 
however, there is not an actively co-managed CBSFA in Hawai‘i, suggesting there are still 
significant barriers to successful implementation (Kittinger et al. 2012). While this area is the 
focus of current research (Ayers, in prep), several factors may serve to explain this 
implementation gap, including the absence of additional enabling conditions identified as 
important in the collaborative planning process for the California Marine Life Protection Act 
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(Fox et al 2013). These include: 1) lack of consistent political support and leadership, 2) 
adequate funding for administrative support, and 3) a vague and difficult co-management 
process. Efforts are currently underway in Hawai‘i to increase funding for administrative support 
and to streamline the planning and administrative rulemaking process. 
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Figure 3.3. The co-management seascape in the Hawaiian Islands, showing diversity in existing 
mechanisms for collaborative management, as well as interest among communities in co-
management. 
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B. The complexity of ‘community’  
It is also important to note that a ‘community’ can be defined in many ways. Communities can 
be spatial, occupational, interest-based, cultural, or ethnic, comprising a small spatial unit, a 
social structure, or shared norms (Agrawal & Gibson 1999; Pollnac et al. 2006). In this case 
system, self-organized ‘communities’ generally include groups of fishers, community leaders, 
and aspirant resource appropriators which access and harvest in a common geographic area. 
However, the definition of community can be a difficult issue in co-management both from the 
perspective of local resource users (who to involve/include) and the state (who to recognize and 
collaborate with at the local level). In this case study system, intergenerational families may have 
moved out of the immediate vicinity of the resource system, but may still access marine and 
other resources as part of their customary and familial practice. Additionally, community is 
included in the enabling legislation but is not defined, which can lead to divergent views on how 
this critical issue is viewed among stakeholders. Not incorporating all interests in the planning 
process resulted in failure of a burgeoning co-management planning process in Miloli‘i, and as a 
result the state suspended efforts to implement a CBSFA plan in that area.  
 
C. Adopting realistic timelines for co-management transitions 
Planning processes that yield high quality agreements can increase the likelihood of rule 
compliance and successful co-management governance, but there is little scholarship in the 
academic literature on how practitioners can develop and implement these processes for marine 
resources. However, creating high quality agreements may initially entail higher transaction and 
transformation costs (Ostrom et al 1993), which can cause undue strain on community users and 
leaders. Transaction and transformation costs associated with governance transitions to co-
management are additional formative criteria not often employed that could be examined by 
future research. It is these costs and the long timelines for building critical capacity in both state 
and community-level institutions that are the focus for much attention among practitioner 
communities, and often go underappreciated by scholars working on co-management systems. 
Further, it illustrates the importance of long-term commitments, both for grantmaking 
organizations and practitioner communities seeking to create lasting change. One illustrative 
example of this is Chile, whose transition to co-management took a decade or longer, while 
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exhibiting periods of instability, even weakening traditional institutions at the community level 
and reducing adaptive capacity before eventually building resilience (Gelcich et al 2006; Gelcich 
et al 2010). Extending realistic timeframes to account for co-management transition and 
maturation is critical considering that many large grantmaking foundations are increasingly 
focusing on small-scale fisheries.  
 
D. Process legitimacy and outcomes 
Further, the focus of most co-management research is summative (outcome-based), examining 
the impacts of institutional change on social and environmental indicators. While this is 
important, there is much to be learned from formative analysis and evaluation of co-management 
planning processes, including intangible but critical factors that affect process, the stages of 
planning processes, stakeholder engagement mechanisms (i.e., when to engage, whom, and 
how), and more (Gruber 1994; Innes & Booher 1999). In other words, although the outcomes of 
co-management may be contingent on a combination of factors, the quality of the underlying 
planning process is a critical determinant for whether a governance shift emerges and is 
sustained over time. Understanding critical elements in the early phases of co-management 
development, such as defining the community, implementing an effective stakeholder 
engagement strategy, compiling stakeholder views, values, and ideas into a cohesive strategy, 
and more all affect social and environmental outcomes. For instance, if one set of users reaches 
agreement on a specific co-management rule governing the take of marine species, but they do 
not gather input from other user groups or work to generate sufficient support for it (e.g. 
Miloli‘i), stakeholders may become disenfranchised and choose not to engage further with the 
planning process, or to break the rules once they are implemented. Consequently, processes 
affect outcomes.  
 
In conclusion, these findings reveal the importance co-management planning processes and 
understanding the ‘creation story’ of governance arrangements, which influence their application 
in specific policy contexts, and by extension, the outcomes of such arrangements. Taking the 
long view of how these governance arrangements are initially conceptualized and then developed 
and implemented can help scholars evaluate the important planning processes that affect success. 
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More importantly, such information can aid practitioners seeking to optimize planning processes 
and affect positive social and environmental outcomes. 
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APPENDIX 3A 
 
Table 3A1. Factors associated with emergence of co-management in Hawai‘i coral reefs (N=18) 
Factor  Exemplar quotes 
Collective 
Action (15) 
“As with many of the community-based initiatives, the community 
developed their own set of proposals and then brought them to the division 
of Aquatic Resources and if I understand it correctly, initially the Division 
of Aquatic Resources wasn’t even interested, didn’t know how to deal with 
it, didn’t know to touch it, had never really been engaged in a community-
based management effort, so it really took a concerted effort by the 
community and a number of other stakeholders to get the legislation 
introduced for the division to try to start to pay attention to the whole 
process.” 
 
“…but I really think in Mo‘omomi it was more about let us do what we 
know is best to do in our place. And trying to find a way to do it legally 
instead of just doing it, you know, their way.”  
 
“Really it was the NGOs, The Lost Fish Coalition; it was you know, these 
community groups who were…Tina Owens that were throwing their arms 
up and grabbing at press, making the press come down and look at…and 
it’s still happening. Maui is now a battleground. It was partly the mortality 
but really it was these community groups stepping forward and actively 
pursuing exposure of the unsustainability of the (aquarium fishing) trade 
and bringing the media. And the media kind of forced the issue. That’s 
when the legislators got on board. Once the media was there and they saw 
the newspaper articles and the TV ads, the television programs, the 
legislature said hey, you know, this’ll get me votes, let’s get in on this. So 
the Lost Fish Coalition was a really important role in pushing the whole 
thing forward. And I think that speaks to the power of collaborative 
management in the sense that it’s not just about government.”  
 
“They police themselves and outsiders. If somebody comes in…I mean you 
know, it’s one thing for Makai Watch, which in a lot of communities is a 
bunch of, you know, umm, you know, I don’t know, people that may not 
even been born or grown up here; a lot of people not from Hawai‘i yelling 
at the local fishermen. That’s a lot different than a local fisherman from this 
place telling you: hey brah, cannot do that here. Maybe they’ll have words 
but guarantee that that guy is going to pay attention.” 
 
“Well a lot of them are motivated by maybe trying to go back to more of a 
traditional ahupua‘a type of approach where the resources are for them and 
not for outsiders. And what really bugs them is when people from outside 
their area come to their area to fish. And a lot of them at least initially want 
is exclusive use.” 
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Self-
organization 
(11) 
“But you need leaders and even though they’re not elected officials really, 
even though they don’t have any official title, they are still, at some level in 
that community, recognized leaders. They need to exist and to make this 
work as the resource agency, you need to figure out who they are, go talk to 
them, and come to some sort of working relationship with them.”  
 
“They’ve realized that they want to take responsibility for their area. And it 
doesn’t have to be specific to marine resource management, we want to 
take care of our area. Could be mauka, could be makai, could be any of 
that, but they’ve formed a community group that then becomes the entity 
with which we work.” 
 
“Because all those things require effort. People can get all up in arms, yeah, 
yeah, let’s do this, let’s do this. But month after month after month after 
month after year, it takes extraordinary commitment and you need to have 
something that keeps it all together and keeps it working.” 
 
“Well it takes a combination of skills. You have to have the people who are 
the traditional fishermen that have the traditional, indigenous knowledge 
but they’re not always the persons who then can then put together the grants 
to have the support to sustain a process like this, or to get the proposals 
written. That’s another skill set that you need to have. People who are 
willing to be involved at that level to contribute. So it just takes a 
combination of skillsets, you know, kind of a partnership to develop it and 
then it’s always good to have the support of the landowners so you can 
have managed access at least for the land side of it.” 
Resource 
depletion (10) 
“The Nā Pali it just overwhelmed resources at the end of the road at Hā‘ena 
State Park and the impacts on the offshore resources, etc, etc. In Hāna – 
which was a newer community in the larger scheme of things – it was 
opihi.” 
 
“I think it’s definitely a recognition, an awareness, or a fear that resources 
are declining. I mean, in Hā‘ena specifically, they were looking at, you 
know, comparing today to the 1960s and seeing what they considered a 
drastic decline in some species. Not necessarily across the board but some 
key species for them as community food fishes. That’s true in Ho‘okena as 
well.” 
 
“The basic premise that the residents felt concerned you know, over there 
fishing areas, their fishing grounds, they didn’t like outsiders coming in, 
fishing, maybe overfishing, to the point where the resource gets depleted 
and they don’t have anything for themselves.” 
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Building 
community 
consensus (8) 
“I think the last thing is you can’t rely on just one or two individuals. You 
absolutely have to make sure that whatever you’re devising as your set of 
management strategies and regulations – if you really want to go all the 
way to regulations – are well-vetted within the community. That’s what 
happened in Miloli‘i. They relied too much on one or two individuals. They 
hadn’t vetted it in the community.” 
 
“When the folks who would otherwise be ignored are able to raise an idea 
or are heard – I mean not listened to, but heard –those smallest voices 
resonate in a management decision making framework. Any voice. Whether 
it be a youth, a young fisherman, a woman, where those voices are often 
marginalized and disenfranchised from decision making, even traditionally 
are heard…by relying too much on our kupuna or our community leaders 
we actually hold back what I believe – in my limited life experience – is 
one of the most potent aspects of co-management.”  
 
“It’s one leader? That won’t work here. That’s a big problem here in fact. 
And that’s a big…it’s been a big limiting factor, a big cause of a lot of 
problems. Like for example, you have [names local fisher] He’s a great 
leader and a great practitioner. But he doesn’t try to be the end-all, be-all in 
that community. He doesn’t try. Maybe in the beginning when he was 
getting everybody going, but he’s got a lot of people that have come on 
board with him. Maybe people won’t enjoy the same status as he does, 
maybe they won’t go around the state talking to communities like he does, 
but there’s a co-management among community members. A co-leadership 
among community members.” 
Conflict (5) 
“..it was definitely things were almost getting dangerous in some of the 
communities where there were reports of people pulling guns on aquarium 
fishing boats. It’s hard to tell whether those were blown out of proportion 
stories or were accurate.” 
 
“I never got in this business to be focusing on conflict but I’m telling you, 
that’s going to drive everything.” 
 
“Nobody can do it all. Community can’t…literally as clichéd as it sounds, it 
takes a village right? It’s a rare thing that the community can do it all by 
themselves. And even then they’ll be constrained by the legal issues you 
know? Theoretically they could just shut everybody out. Miloli‘i did that 
for a little while you know. If somebody tried to fish there, they’d lock the 
gate at the top of the hill and you could not get out basically. That was their 
form of regulating. Same thing in East Maui. There was a time when they 
took matters into their own hands and they were smashing windows, 
slashing tires or fishermen that weren’t from there, or even tourists.” 
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Table 3A2. Categories and results from deductive, iterative coding facilitated by  NVIVO 9 
Qualitative Data Analysis Software. For each code, numbers represent the number of individuals 
that referenced this specific coding category; numbers in parentheses represent the total number 
of references for this coding category. 
 
Emergence factors identified by respondents (N=18) 
• Collective Action 15(37) 
- Increased community interest in resource management 13(25) 
§ Finding legislative solutions 5(6) 
§ Preserving traditional and cultural practices 4(6) 
§ Community wants to take responsibility for their area 4(4) 
§ Advocacy by community groups 2(2) 
§ Strong sense of place 1(2) 
§ Pilot project 1(1) 
§ Retiring legislators 1(1) 
- Access Controls 4(5) 
- Governance reform 2(3) 
- Primarily Native Hawaiian communities 2(2) 
- Simple narrow goals and early successes 2(2) 
• Self-organization 11(35) 
- Leadership 9(16) 
§ Leaders that build coalitions of support 
- Community dependence on resources 4(6) 
- Diverse combination of skills within community 4(5) 
§ Intergenerational learning 1(1) 
- Extraordinary community effort and commitment 4(5) 
§ Assurance that effort will lead to positive outcomes 1(1) 
- Federal support 1(1) 
§ Federally initiated then community-driven 1(1) 
- Must be community-driven 1(1) 
- NGO involvement 4(5) 
§ Growth of marine conservation industry in the NGO sector 2(4) 
§ Investment by the donor community 2(2) 
• Building community consensus 8(10) 
- Community organization more important than a strong leader 2(3) 
- Leadership not a necessary condition for co-management; overreliance on once 
person can be detrimental to the effort 1(2) 
- Small homogenous communities easier 1(1) 
• Conflict 5(9) 
- Communities using violence to prevent poaching 3(4) 
- Increased competition caused conflict 1(1) 
- Roving bandits 1(1) 
• Resource depletion 10(19) 
- Current Management ineffective 3(4) 
- Development, tourism impacts 3(4) 
§ Tourism impacts 1(2) 
	81 
§ Excess commercial development around Kailua-Kona 1(1) 
§ Many believed land-based pollution was the culprit, not fishing effort 1(1) 
- Overharvesting resources 3(5) 
§ Aquarium reef fish collection 2(2) 
§ Depletion or overharvesting of Opihi 1(2) 
§ Overfishing 1(1) 
• Science and education 2(2) 
- Protect resources, educate the next generation 1(1) 
- Science demonstrating depleted fisheries 1(1) 
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Table 3A3. Legislative testimony submitted for Hawai‘i’s three co-management areas (N=44) 
CBSFA Name Stakeholder 
Group 
Justification Mentione
d 
Resource 
depletion
? 
Mentione
d 
conflict? 
Mo‘omomi  Citizen 
1 
Citizen Would lose freedom to dive, 
fish, surf, snorkel; called it 
race-based management. 
N N 
Mo‘omomi  Citizen 
2 
Citizen Thought that the proposal 
should not extend out two 
miles; should include 
baseline and ongoing 
scientific monitoring; the 
proposed subsistence area 
should include all people & 
not just Native Hawaiians; 
Enforcement should be 
carried out by DLNR and 
not a private organization. 
N N 
Mo‘omomi  DLNR 
Chair 
Politically 
Appointed 
Administrato
r 
Supported with a few 
changes: namely to allow 
DLNR to enforce rules; 
acknowledged the 
importance of protecting 
subsistence fishing areas for 
rural, Native Hawaiian 
communities; suggested 
inclusion of existing uses 
and fishing into the bill. 
N N 
Mo‘omomi  Ka 
Lāhui 
Hawai‘i 
Politica
l 
Action 
Commi
ttee 
PAC Subsistence fishing is 
important for cultural 
purposes and also for food. 
Y N 
Mo‘omomi  Citizen 
3 
Citizen Resource depletion; 
conflict; emphasized the 
need for peer enforcement 
and education. 
Y Y 
Mo‘omomi  Citizen 
4 
Citizen Resource depletion; poor 
management; keep food on 
table; increase 
understanding of Native 
Y N 
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Hawaiian practices through 
communication and 
education. 
Mo‘omomi  OHA 
(twice) 
Government Drastic reduction or total 
depletion of marine 
resources; Will help locate 
fishery resources; identify 
competitive forces affecting 
those resources (read, 
conflict); mitigating 
competitive forces; assess 
management strategies, 
enforce rules & regulations, 
funding requirements; 
expand Hawaiian fishing 
rights; Resource depletion; 
deepwater fishing practices, 
environmental impacts and 
international fishing 
covenants have negatively 
impacted traditional fishing 
practices. 
Y Y 
Mo‘omomi  Ali‘i 
Holo 
Kai 
Stakeholder 
group 
Questioned the need to 
extend the boundaries to 
two miles offshore; 
N N 
Mo‘omomi  Citizen 
5 
Citizen Questioned the need for the 
project; also questioned the 
availability of state funds to 
accomplish goals of the 
area, e.g. enforcement. 
N N 
Mo‘omomi  Citizen
s 6-57 
Citizens No reasoning given N N 
Mo‘omomi  Citizen
s 58-60 
Citizens Data from Subsistence Task 
Force Report, e.g. reliance 
on local resources for 
subsistence; resource 
depletion, conflict; 
mismanagement; pollution, 
poor land-use practices; 
Y Y 
Mo‘omomi  Citizen 
61 
Citizen Amendment to establish 
Hāna, Maui as a 
Subsistence Fishing area. 
Y Y 
Mo‘omomi  Hui 
Mālam
a O 
Hāna 
Community 
Group 
Charter to establish Hui 
Mālama O Hāna as a 
Community Organization 
Y Y 
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Mo‘omomi  Hawai‘i 
Fisher
men’s 
Founda
tion 
Stakeholder 
group 
Purpose and scope of the 
bill are not clearly defined; 
would create special and 
restricted use; lack of 
scientific input; 
discrimination/violates civil 
rights; restricts interstate 
trade; irreparable damage to 
charter, commercial, 
recreation, scenic, 
educational and scientific 
uses; undefined goals and 
objectives; doesn’t meet 
criteria for federal funding; 
N N 
Mo‘omomi  Hawaii
an 
Homes 
Commi
ssion 
(four 
times) 
Government 
Agency 
Resource depletion; 
homestead community 
members rely on these 
resources for subsistence; 
bill provide a mechanism 
for the designation and 
management of Native 
Hawaiian fishing areas and 
ensure subsistence fishing 
continues and areas are 
available for use by NHs. 
Y N 
Mo‘omomi  Hui 
Mālam
a O 
Mo‘om
omi 
Community 
Group 
Resource Depletion; 
conflict 
Y Y 
Mo‘omomi  Citizen 
62 
Citizen Interstate commerce; 
privileging one group (NHs) 
over others; mainly legal 
and constitutional questions; 
violates civil rights; other 
factors can account for 
resource depletion; 
regulations will be 
impossible to enforce 
N N 
Mo‘omomi  Citizen Citizen Livelihoods are dependent 
on fishing, this bill would 
jeopardize that; sets 
precedence for other free 
enterprise limitations; 
would grant one group 
(NHs) exclusive rights; 
N N 
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should instead enforce 
existing laws; if enacted the 
bill should be amended to 
grandfather in existing 
fishers that have fished in 
that area and include 
compensation for lost 
income. 
Miloli‘i  Citizen 
1 
Citizen Prevent further resource 
depletion & conflict; 
learning experience; fisher 
input into rulemaking 
process; no additional 
allocation of taxpayer $$$ 
Y Y 
Miloli‘i  DLNR 
Chair 
(twice) 
Government Existing regulations are 
already supported by the 
community; No proof that, 
if enacted, this bill will meet 
subsistence needs 
N N 
Miloli‘i  OHA Government Superior local knowledge, 
education, and enforcement 
can be integrated into 
regulations and 
management; community 
empowerment; 
N N 
Miloli‘i  Pa‘a 
Pono 
Miloli‘i 
(twice) 
Community 
group 
To prevent resource 
depletion seen on other 
islands; Education – 
Miloli‘i can become a 
model for other areas in 
Hawai‘i 
Y N 
Miloli‘i  TNC 
(twice) 
NGO Declining resources; 
Include local knowledge 
and monitoring, involve 
community in the 
management process; 
documenting and sharing 
kupuna knowledge and 
fishing traditions 
Y N 
Hā‘ena  Aqua 
Lung 
Business 
Owner 
Prevents commercial 
vessels not engaged in 
fishing from entering state 
waters adjacent to the 
Hā‘ena ahupua’a. 
N N 
Hā‘ena  Charter 
Captain 
Business 
Owner 
Resource decline; but bill is 
ill-defined and privileges 
Y N 
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one group (Native 
Hawaiians) over all others. 
Hā‘ena  Commu
nity 
Conser
vation 
Networ
k 
NGO Decline in resources; 
Important for subsistence 
purposes; eliminate bad 
fishing practices and 
resource decline from an 
influx of new 
visitors/inhabitants 
(conflict); Native Hawaiians 
possess an intimate 
knowledge of the sea; local 
community members 
devised the bill; will 
demonstrate the 
legislature’s understanding 
of the critical role 
communities play in 
maintaining/restoring 
Hawai‘i’s nearshore 
resources. 
Y Y 
Hā‘ena  Citizen 
1 
Citizen Consultation with culturally 
sensitive, Native Hawaiians 
that possess a deep 
knowledge of the area will 
improve outcomes and 
ensure community support. 
N N 
Hā‘ena  Citizen 
2 
Citizen Needed to do resource 
decline; supported by the 
community, local fishers 
and honors their role in 
regulation/rulemaking, 
establishes a small test area 
to learn from; doesn’t 
restrict all forms of fishing. 
Y N 
Hā‘ena  Citizen 
3 
Citizen Resource decline from an 
influx of fishers from other 
areas & unsustainable 
fishing practices; Hā‘ena 
waters are vital to people 
that live there; restores 
traditional management 
practices; tremendous 
education potential 
Y Y 
Hā‘ena  Citizen 
4 
Citizen Senior fishers represent an 
unbroken chain of 
N N 
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subsistence fishing 
knowledge and practice and 
should be involved in the 
development & enforcement 
of fishing regulations; 
legislation would create an 
inclusive rulemaking 
process 
Hā‘ena  Citizen 
5 
Citizen Provides the community a 
say in decision making 
processes, fishery 
regulations, and activities 
affecting the fishery. 
N N 
Hā‘ena  DLNR 
Chair 
(twice) 
Government 
(politically-
appointed) 
Provide community input 
and protect resources of 
value. 
N N 
Hā‘ena  Hanalei 
Waters
hed Hui 
(twice) 
Community 
group 
Pressures and stresses on 
the resources and people of 
Hā‘ena; the people and 
place are a correct place for 
a CBSFA model; 
boundaries are well-defined; 
creates an inclusive process; 
great opportunity to 
combine traditional and 
western-based science into 
management. 
Y Y 
Hā‘ena  Hawai‘i 
Nearsh
ore 
Fisher
men 
Stakeholder 
organization 
Concerned with privileging 
one group, i.e. private rule 
over public access; worried 
about definition of 
resident/community; 
N N 
Hā‘ena  Holo 
Holo 
Charter
s 
Business 
owner 
Privileges one group over 
the public (special interest 
group), unfairly allows 
residents to regulate non-
fishing activities including 
access to Na Pali Coast 
N N 
Hā‘ena  Kaua‘i 
Sea 
Tours 
General 
Manage
r 
Business 
Owner 
Threatens rights of other 
user groups; concerned 
about its precedence and 
impacts on other 
recreational and commercial 
users across the state. 
N N 
Hā‘ena  Lahaina 
Divers 
Business 
Owner 
The bill is problematic for 
recreational boaters not 
N N 
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fishing. 
Hā‘ena  Maui 
Dive 
Shop 
Business 
Owner 
The bill is problematic for 
recreational boaters not 
fishing. 
N N 
Hā‘ena  Maui 
Frogma
n 
Business 
Owner 
The bill is problematic for 
recreational boaters not 
fishing. 
N N 
Hā‘ena  Maui 
Moloka
‘i Sea 
Cruises 
Business 
Owner 
Would eliminate the 
handful of permitted vessels 
currently operating through 
Hā‘ena unrelated to fish 
take. 
N N 
Hā‘ena  Ocean 
Touris
m 
Coalitio
n 
(twice) 
Stakeholder 
Group 
Would eliminate the 
handful of permitted vessels 
currently operating through 
Hā‘ena unrelated to fish 
takel; would support 
CBSFAs as long as they 
recognize existing DLNR 
permitted marine activities. 
N N 
Hā‘ena  OHA Government 
Agency 
Superior local knowledge, 
education, and enforcement 
can be integrated into 
regulations and 
management; community 
empowerment; 
N N 
Hā‘ena  TNC NGO Resource decline; action 
needs to be taken; Hā‘ena 
can be a model for local 
subsistence fishing and 
management 
Y N 
Hā‘ena  Senator 
Hemmi
ngs 
Elected 
Representati
ve at 
Committee 
Hearing 
Resolve spatial conflicts, 
include traditional 
knowledge into regulation. 
Y Y 
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Chapter 4. 
Making the Transition to Co-management Governance Arrangements in Hawai‘i: A 
Framework for Understanding Transaction and Transformation Costs 
 
Chapter 3 explored the creation story behind community-based subsistence fishing areas and co-
management in Hawai‘i. The chapter concluded by considering some of the practical issues 
related to planning and implementation of co-management, including setting realistic timelines 
for co-management transitions. This chapter focuses primarily on the institutional aspects 
associated with governance transitions from centralized management to co-management. 
Multiple methods are used to investigate the governance transition, including semi-structured 
interviews, policy analysis, and institutional analysis to identify the barriers to co-management 
transitions in Hawai‘i. A transaction and transformation cost framework is also used to analyze 
the costs associated with governance transitions in Hawai‘i. The combination of these analyses 
yields some estimates of the tremendous costs being absorbed by communities and their NGO 
partners. The chapter concludes by offering some viable solutions that can balance the costs of 
co-management transitions, mobilize support for governance transitions, and manage conflict 
between parties involved in public processes.  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Globally, fisheries provide a significant supply of food to almost one-third of the world’s 
population and marine fisheries employ over 260 million people (Teh et al. 2014). Despite their 
importance, many fisheries are ineffectively managed. For example, the FAO estimated that in 
2011, 61.3% of major marine fish stocks were fully fished and an estimated 28.8% were 
overfished at a biologically unsustainable level (FAO, 2015, p. 7). Other estimates found that 7-
13% of all stocks are collapsed and 15% are overexploited (Branch et al. 2011), which leaves 
little room for increases in catch despite a growing world population.  
 
A variety of management approaches govern these fisheries including centralized or 
bureaucracy-based management, privatization or devolution of property rights, market-based 
management, community-based management, co-management, and other hybrid approaches 
(Yandle & Dewees, 2008; Yandle & Imperial, 2009). Of particular interest in this study are the 
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collaborative governance strategies referred to as co-management (Armitage et al. 2009). Co-
management involves sharing management authority between the government and communities 
or user groups (Berkes, 2010). It also involves an iterative learning process with shared costs and 
benefits within the governance system (Pomeroy & Rivera-Guieb, 2006). Co-management also 
offers the potential to tailor rules to local conditions, increase regulatory compliance, improve 
collaboration, and lead to greater stakeholder engagement and empowerment (Acheson 2003; 
Jentoft et al. 1998).  
 
However, the design and implementation of effective co-management systems involves some 
significant institutional barriers, particularly when it involves making a transition from a system 
where regulatory control is centralized in a traditional bureaucracy. The literature identifies a 
range of barriers including:  community-level resource overexploitation, agency capture by 
communities, or co-option of local autonomy (Singleton, 2000); community failure (McCay & 
Jentoft, 1998); community or user group size (Cinner et al., 2007); social conflict (Castro & 
Nielsen, 2001); the equity of collective choice processes (Yandle, 2003); unequal distribution of 
benefits (Cinner, McClanahan, et al., 2012a); government desire to control data, privatization 
policies or regulatory capture (Pinkerton 1999); uneven power relations (Nadasdy, 2003b; Taiepa 
et al., 1997); marginalization of different worldviews (Diver, 2012); cultural and ethnic diversity 
of stakeholders (Levine & Richmond, 2014); or when rights are not devolved to users (Wade, 
1994). Building co-management regimes in the developed world can be particularly challenging, 
due to: conflicting legal mandates and overlapping regulatory structures (Crowder et al., 2006); 
legal systems that stymie devolution of rights or local autonomy (Finkbeiner et al., 2015); rent-
seeking behavior (Imperial & Yandle, 2005); and lengthy public planning processes (Vaughan & 
Caldwell, 2015). Many of these barriers are further compounded when stakeholders have 
multiple opportunities to influence policymaking.  
 
Institutional analysis is a useful tool to examine how institutions at multiple levels affect social-
ecological interactions and program implementation. Institutions are defined as “humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990, p. 1) and include both dejure 
rules (rules of law) and defacto rules (shared norms or rules in use). In institutional analysis, 
many implementation barriers are the product of the configuration of transaction and 
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transformation costs and how they are distributed within the governance system. Transaction 
costs include the expenses associated with gathering information, holding meetings, and 
processes related to negotiation, deliberation, and decision-making. Transaction costs are 
sometimes separated conceptually between planning (ex ante costs) and governance activities (ex 
post costs). Ex ante transaction costs associated with planning for natural resource co-
management often include information gathering about key social-ecological, governance 
system, and stakeholder attributes (E. Ostrom, 2009). However, transaction costs may also 
include protecting, monitoring, and enforcing agreements (North, 1990). Redistributing property 
rights components, operationalizing negotiated agreements, and implementing new regimes are 
sometimes referred to as ex post transaction costs. These ex post transaction costs may also be 
thought of as transformation costs. Transformation costs are often synonymous with production 
costs (the costs of turning inputs into outputs) but also implementation costs associated with 
changing citizen preferences, developing new revenue streams, performance monitoring, 
regulating patterns of use, enforcing compliance with revenue streams, and procuring inputs 
(Ostrom et al. 1993).  
 
Several scholars have used a case study approach to identify barriers to fisheries co-management 
(Levine & Richmond, 2014; Pinkerton, 1999; Pomeroy et al., 2001; Prystupa, 1998) and a 
transaction costs approach has been employed to empirically examine the frictions of 
participatory and collaborative governance arrangements in fisheries (Kuperan, Abdullah, 
Pomeroy, Genio, & Salamanca, 2008; Turner & Weninger, 2005). This research differs from 
other case studies in that it examines the key social and organizational barriers that occur during 
governance transformations. One objective of this study is to use a case study analysis to identify 
and categorize the institutional barriers encountered in making the transformation to co-
management governance systems. Identifying these transaction and transformation costs will 
help community leaders, government officials, and resource managers to change the 
configuration of these costs and benefits to better facilitate the transition to co-management 
systems.   
 
The study focuses on the attempt to transition to co-management governance systems in three 
fishing communities across the Hawaiian archipelago: Hā‘ena on the island of Kaua‘i, 
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Mo‘omomi on the island of Moloka‘i, and Miloli‘i on Hawai‘i Island. The case analysis was 
guided by three research questions: 1) What are the barriers to the transition to a co-management 
governance system in Hawai‘i? 2) What are the transaction and transformation costs associated 
with the transition to co-management systems; and how are these costs distributed within the 
system? 3) What are the implications for planning and management? 
 
 
4.2 BACKGROUND 
 
Hawai‘i, though part of the United States, maintains a unique legacy of customary management. 
Prior to western contact, resource management decisions were made at the local level by 
knowledgeable konohiki (land agents) of the local ali‘i (chief) in consultation with expert fishers 
and maka‘ainana (land tenants). Sophisticated tenure arrangements managed resources for a 
highly populated and politically complex society in pre-contact times (Kirch, 2010). Although 
marine resources are depleted well below historical levels (Kittinger et al., 2011), fishing and 
gathering remain socially and culturally significant, while providing an important component of 
food security for many Hawai‘i residents (Kittinger, Teneva, et al., 2015; Vaughan & Vitousek, 
2013). Since centralized management approaches have proven ineffective at preventing resource 
depletion and decreasing conflict, there is increasing support in many communities to return to 
culturally based regulations and local-level management (Ayers & Kittinger, 2014). Community-
based subsistence fishing areas (CBSFAs) are one state-level management designation that has 
gained traction within Native Hawaiian fishing communities. CBSFAs allow communities to 
partner with the Hawai‘i Division of Aquatic Resources (DAR), within the Department of Land 
and Natural Resources (DLNR), to devise rules based upon “the customary and traditional 
Native Hawaiian uses of renewable ocean resources for direct personal or family consumption or 
sharing” (Higuchi, 2008, p. 218). The legal pathway to create CBSFAs was created in 1994. 
While two dozen Hawai‘i communities have expressed interest over the past 20 years in crafting 
CBSFAs, only a single two-year pilot project at Mo‘omomi in Moloka‘i was actively involved in 
co-management until August 2015, when rules took effect for a CBSFA in Hā‘ena, Kaua‘i.  
 
 
	93 
4.3 METHODS 
 
The institutional complexity, ethnic diversity, and legacy of customary management make 
Hawai‘i an ideal locale to examine barriers to co-management implementation. This study 
employed a mixed method research design (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003) that relies primarily on 
the qualitative analysis of data from key respondent interviews (N=19 and archival data sources 
to identify institutional barriers associated with the transition to co-management systems. These 
qualitative data were then used to analyze the transaction and transformation costs associated 
with this transition. This approach to the analysis of transaction costs and transformation costs 
builds upon the IAD Framework developed by Elinor Ostrom (2005) and her colleagues (Ostrom 
et al. 1993; Imperial 1999; Imperial and Yandle 2005). 
 
Nearly two years of informal meetings with participants involved in the planning and 
implementation of co-management between March 2010 and May 2012 informed the purposive 
sampling of initial interview respondents (Maxwell, 1998). After several interviews were 
completed, snowball or chain referral sampling (Noy, 2008) was then used to identify additional 
key respondents knowledgeable about efforts to develop and implement CBSFAs until data 
saturation was reached (Bernard, 2013). Interviews were semi-structured; respondents answered 
the same questions but the interviewer remained open to new conversation threads (Patton, 
2002). Interview questions are provided in Appendix A. A breakdown of the interviewees and 
their sectors is provided in Table 4.1. Eighteen interviews were recorded, transcribed, and 
iteratively coded using NVivo 9 QDA software. One interview was not recorded due to a 
difficult research setting and was not analyzed. Coding followed a deductive, iterative process 
whereby interview transcriptions were analyzed and strings of text were selected and organized 
by themes when patterns emerged from the data (Bernard & Ryan, 2009; Miles & Huberman, 
1994). This dissertation also draw upon years of ongoing ethnographic data collected during the 
planning for the only actively co-managed area in Hawai‘i (Vaughan & Caldwell, 2015). 
Archival data sources included management plans and meeting minutes for proposed co-
management areas, community guidebooks, stock assessments, and legislative testimony. A 
policy analysis of the State of Hawai‘i administrative rulemaking process is also referenced 
(Kittinger et al., 2012).  
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Table 4.1. Total number of completed interviews by sector (N=19) 
Interviewee sector Total 
State government 6 
NGO/Foundation 5 
Community 3 
Federal Government 2 
Academia 2 
Consulting 1 
 
Table 4.2. Definitions of key terms and supporting citations 
Term Definition Supporting 
Citations 
Institution humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction 
(North, 
1990, p. 1) 
Institutional 
analysis 
a tool to examine how institutions at multiple levels 
affect social-ecological interactions and program 
implementation 
Ostrom 2005 
Conservation 
or Policy 
stalemate 
when heightened public participation allows 
stakeholders multiple opportunities to influence and 
polarize environmental policymaking, rendering 
government decision makers unable to implement 
effective policy or programs that can satisfy competing 
interests 
Amy 1983 
Transaction 
costs 
information gathering about key social-ecological, 
governance system, and stakeholder attributes 
Ostrom 2009 
Coordination 
costs 
all costs associated with planning and implementing a 
co-management regime, including time, capital and 
personnel costs 
Ostrom, 
Schroeder, 
and Wynne 
1993 
Information 
costs 
the costs of gathering and organizing temporal and 
place-specific information and scientific data (social 
and biophysical) 
Strategic costs 
increased implementation costs as a result of 
individuals or entities that exploit information 
asymmetries, power relations, political influence, or 
financial advantages in order to tip resource benefits in 
their favor 
Free Riding when exclusion is difficult, individuals are incentivized to consume more than their share or their contribution 
(E. Ostrom, 
1990) 
Rent seeking 
can encompass a wide variety of behaviors, but 
generally occurs when individuals influence policies or 
programs that will disproportionately benefit them at 
the expense of others (E. Ostrom et al., 1993)  
Corruption 
the use of government resources to benefit private 
entities, including nepotism, favors, extortion, or 
persuading public officials pass policies that subsidize 
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4.4 RESULTS 
 
4.4.1 Barriers to co-management in Hawai‘i 
The first stage of the qualitative analysis focused on identifying the barriers associated with 
making the transition from the current governance arrangement for state fisheries management to 
the formal adoption and implementation of CBSFAs. The analysis further grouped these into 
four general institutional barriers to co-management implementation in Hawai‘i: governmental 
structure and operations; planning and decision making processes; organized opposition from 
special interest groups; and consensus building processes. The four primary barriers and sub-
themes identified by key respondent interviews are presented in Table 4.3. Examples of quotes 
that provide additional support for the identification of these institutional barriers are provided in 
Table 4.   
  
public goods, particularly when demand is high 
Consensus 
building 
Activities undertaken by a self-organized community to 
build support and achieve consensus toward actionable 
objectives 
Innes and 
Booher 
1999; Ayers 
and Kittinger 
2014  
Transformation 
costs 
the costs of changing citizen preferences about co-
management, which occurs at the planning stage 
(consensus building); arranging for funding during the 
policy design; and monitoring performance, regulating 
patterns of use, and enforcing regulations, all of which 
occur during policy implementation 
Ostrom et al. 
1993, 120 
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Table 4.3. Barriers to fisheries co-management implementation in Hawai‘i coral reef fisheries, 
identified through iterative coding using NVIVO qualitative data analysis software (N=18) 
Barrier Total respondents 
mentioning theme 
Governmental structure and operations 
- Organizational culture resistant to change 
- Lack of enforcement and management capacity 
- Institutional design flaws 
- Lack of trust in government 
17/18  
Planning and decision-making process 
- Administrative rulemaking process too long and onerous 
- Requirements for site assessment, administrative process, 
plan development difficult to meet 
- Ambiguous enabling legislation 
13/18  
Organized opposition from special interest groups 
- Organized interests oppose any fisheries regulation 
- State government support dwindles under any opposition 
- Communities disenfranchised by organized lobbying efforts 
10/18  
Consensus building  
- Stakeholder factions and diversity complicate consensus-
building 
- Insufficient outreach and resources to build consensus 
- Difficult to continually engage community members 
10/18  
 
A. Governmental structure and operations 
Nearly every interview respondent (17/18, 94%) identified governmental structure and 
operations as a barrier to co-management implementation in Hawai‘i. Governmental structure 
and operations was divided into four subthemes: organizational culture; enforcement and 
management capacity; institutional design flaws; and lack of trust. Interviewees reported that the 
state resource management agency tasked with managing coral reef fisheries, DAR, possesses an 
organizational culture that promotes resource extraction despite observed fisheries declines and 
is resistant to change. DAR’s culture appears to be the product of its historical legacy from when 
it was originally founded as the Division of Fish and Game. Respondents also cited a lack of 
regulatory enforcement and management capacity leading to a de facto unregulated, open access 
property arrangement for most areas (see Table 4.3 and Table 4.4). Overall, management 
capacity at the DLNR is limited by low funding levels and a lack of expertise. Interview 
respondents explained that many DLNR positions go unfilled when employees retire and most 
DAR employees do not have the training or the skillset to work effectively with communities.  
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B. Planning and decision-making process 
A majority of interview respondents (13/18, 72%) also identified the planning and decision 
making process as an important barrier preventing co-management implementation. In particular, 
respondents referenced four sets of problems associated with planning and decision making: an 
administrative rulemaking process that is long and onerous; requirements for site assessment and 
administrative processes that are difficult to navigate, and requirements for plan development 
that are difficult to meet; and ambiguity in the enabling legislation (See Ayers & Kittinger 
(2014) for additional discussion of this process). One example of legislative ambiguity is that 
“community” is undefined in the enabling legislation. Leaving community undefined 
consistently opens processes to contestation. Communities must engage with a broader 
community when planning for co-management, but to what extent and what area is also unclear. 
In terms of outputs, the legislation authorizing the State of Hawai‘i’s co-management process 
requires community organizations to develop a comprehensive management plan. The 
management plan must provide an overview of funding and enforcement methods, evaluation 
and monitoring processes, and it must assess how rules for the area may interfere with boating, 
navigation, and public recreation (Hawai‘i State Legislature, 1994, sec. 1). 
 
Accordingly, these plans have the potential to affect a wide range of economic interests. 
Respondents frequently cited the burden of these activities as a major barrier for communities. 
For example, communities do not often possess the expertise necessary to frame and conduct 
scientifically rigorous baseline data collection and monitoring activities. The state of Hawai‘i 
also privileges data gathered via western scientific methods over customary monitoring 
activities, which further challenges Hawai‘i communities. Respondents also described barriers 
associated with the co-management legislation, which is ambiguous in key areas relevant to the 
establishment of co-management. For example, the legislation does not define community, which 
places the burden on a community to define their claims to an area. This ambiguity also makes it 
difficult to know whether the stakeholders engaged in the planning process are sufficient. Much 
of this process-related ambiguity was resolved in late 2014 when the DLNR approved a clear, 
step-by-step procedural guide for CBSFAs (Zanre, 2014). This CBSFA process manual reduced 
legislative ambiguity by clearly delegating state and community responsibilities for data 
collection from pre-proposal through rulemaking.  
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C. Organized opposition from special interest groups 
Organized opposition from special interest groups was listed by 10 of 18 interviewees (56%) as a 
major barrier to co-management in Hawai‘i. My analysis identified several subthemes, including: 
organized interests that oppose any fisheries regulation; state government support dwindles 
under any opposition; and community disenfranchisement from organized lobbying efforts (see 
Table 4.4). These interview data are further supported by legislative testimony submitted in 
opposition to proposed co-management areas in Hā‘ena, Kaua‘i and Miloli‘i on Hawai‘i Island. 
In the case of Hā‘ena, several commercial tour operators from the island of Maui submitted 
testimony against the proposed co-management area due to the precedence it may set later on for 
their respective island businesses. Representatives from a well-organized commercial fishing 
lobby also testified against Hā‘ena at public hearings. Respondents also explained how state 
government support for co-management dwindles under any opposition, particularly if the 
opposition is vocal and consistent. Still, the Hā‘ena co-management area passed because public 
support was overwhelmingly positive – over 99% of written and oral testimony collected during 
public meetings and hearings supported the area (Vaughan & Caldwell, 2015).  
 
D. Consensus building 
Consensus building was identified by 10 of 18 respondents (56%) as a key challenge to co-
management in Hawai‘i. Under the broader category of consensus building, respondents cited: 
stakeholder factions and diversity within communities complicate consensus building; a lack of 
community outreach about rules proposals; and, difficulties encountered when continually 
engaging community members. Several interview respondents referenced Miloli‘i as an example 
of incomplete consensus around a rules package. In the case of Miloli‘i, one segment of the 
Miloli‘i community worked closely with a local legislator to establish a permanent CBSFA 
designation for their area. However, once their proposed rules were available for public comment 
it became evident that there was not adequate consensus within the community around several of 
the rules (see Table 4.4).  
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Table 4.4. Selected quotes from interview respondents separated by barriers to co-management 
of coral reef fisheries in Hawai‘i and coded by subthemes (N=18) 
Barrier Exemplar quotes 
Governmental 
structure and 
operations (17) 
“We’ve done too many unfunded mandates. The Legislature has not come to 
the table… Where is the will? There’s a lot of lip service… Look at our budget 
– one-half of one percent of the state’s budget.” (Lack of enforcement and 
management capacity) 
 
“Yes it is. Just an aside on this, in some respects Hawai‘i is very much behind 
a lot of areas in the Pacific just in terms of having really effective nearshore 
fisheries management. We’re almost like the fourth world here, not even the 
third world. If you look at what we consider third world countries and you look 
at their marine resource stuff, and you’re like whoa, they’re doing that? And 
they don’t allow that?” (Institutional design flaws) 
 
“I think we could do more with what we have, but it takes leadership [within 
the agency]. And that’s the key. Right now there’s none so people are off 
doing their own little thing. There’s no concerted effort to focus on various 
things. If we had an administrator that said ʻHey, Hā‘ena is moving a long 
ways, they’ve got to get this going, you and you and you need to go over there 
and work with the community, and help come up with some drafts and let’s 
move forward with creating those rules, then it would get done right?’ But 
nobody is doing that right now and as far as I can tell, there’s no light at the 
end of tunnel, not in the near term anyway.” (Organizational culture resistant 
to change) 
 
“Unfortunately right now it’s a lack of institutionalized enforcement, it’s just a 
free for all.” Lack of enforcement and management capacity) 
 
“And in the other side, there hasn’t been a willingness for anyone in DAR to 
participate – no one in DAR wants to participate. There’s that whole dynamic. 
I don’t know how you crack that nut. “(Lack of trust in government) 
Planning and 
decision-
making process 
(13) 
“It’s a long process. It’s two or three years just to go through the process. I’ve 
been explained the process. I’d like to have it figured out…At some point I’ll 
figure out institutionally, you know, it has to go the attorney general, then it 
waits six months…” (Administrative rulemaking process too long and 
onerous) 
 
“I think the original legislation I take issue with because I think there’s lack of 
clarity, a lack of definitions in what they’re requiring, what they’re asking. It 
just says to work with the department… There’s such a range, well I’m 
working with you by providing you with this management plan or am I 
working with you by inviting you to every single community meeting? There’s 
no layout…” (Ambiguous enabling legislation) 
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“As far the other communities that could go through the Land Board and not 
actually have to have their own statute, because that is an option, I think that 
goes back to a lack of a clear process. There might be communities that are 
interested but it’s a difficult process to navigate because it hasn’t even been set 
officially by DLNR, and also it says you have to have a management plan. 
They are probably going to need support to do these things. And so on that 
end, there needs capacity and on the state end it’s been five years budget cuts 
and staffing cuts, so it’s very difficult...” (Administrative rulemaking process 
too long and onerous) 
Organized 
opposition 
from special 
interest groups 
(10) 
“And one of the things unfortunately about government at least on the state 
level is it’s almost axiomatic if somebody almost in the singular is strongly 
enough opposed to something, government wilts. And certainly if you get an 
organized group of people, even though you maybe have lots of people in 
favor of it that are not in somebody’s face and maybe it’s obvious that it’s the 
right thing to do, it doesn’t take much to make government back off.” (State 
government support dwindles under any opposition) 
 
“Well, I mean, just the Hā‘ena rules in particular, when they were going 
through the legislature, we had a bunch of commercial/recreational operators, 
boating recreational operators from Maui show up and testify against the 
Hā‘ena bill you know, because they were afraid of the precedent it was setting 
to give community members a say in regulating commercial activities.“ 
(Organized interests oppose any fisheries regulation) 
 
“I think some of these rights to fish groups are very… against community-
based fisheries.” (Organized interests oppose any fisheries regulation) 
 
“You’ve got a real strong advantage in that most fishermen in Hawai‘i, most 
people that have any traditional roots will not try to tell another community 
what to do, what not to do. That’s your place, you do what you want to do. But 
there is a commercial fishing lobby in Honolulu that will show up to any 
hearing at any site and argue against it just on the basis of the constitutional 
right to fish and that is usually a problem although I think that can be 
overcome.” (Organized interests oppose any fisheries regulation) 
Consensus-
building (10) 
“I think you know, Miloli‘i is a good example of where there was not a 
community that was on the same page, even though they had the legislation… 
I think to think that you’ll have a community that is 100% on the same page is 
foolish, it will not happen. But I think you can hope for a large percentage of 
buy-in and a good process and you’ve vetted it.” (Stakeholder factions and 
diversity complicate consensus building) 
 
“The community members often don’t get consensus.” (Insufficient outreach 
and resources to build consensus) 
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4.4.2 Transaction costs 
Next the analysis focuses on the transaction costs associated with co-management arrangements 
in Hawai‘i by drawing upon data from key respondent interviews, previous research in Hā‘ena, 
Kaua‘i (the only active co-management area in Hawai‘i), and public testimony. The institutional 
analysis and design (IAD) framework identifies three primary categories of transaction costs: 
information costs; coordination costs; and strategic costs (Ostrom et al. 1993; Imperial 1999). 
The results of my analysis of the transaction and transformation costs of co-management and 
centralized management are summarized in Table 4.5. 
 
A. Information costs 
Information costs include the costs of gathering and organizing place-based information and 
social and biophysical scientific data. In Hā‘ena, information costs included developing baseline 
data through resource monitoring activities and community interviews, including a catch per unit 
effort (CPEU) survey, and an analysis of human uses and spatial conflicts. The Hā‘ena 
community also engaged stakeholders in informal meetings and performed public education and 
outreach via the Makai Watch program (a community-state collaboration whereby community 
members educate the public on marine fisheries and document rule noncompliance). Hā‘ena 
community members often provided food for informal meetings, publicized upcoming public 
hearings, drafted testimony for supporters, and conducted petition drives to collect support. The 
Hui Maka‘ainana o Makana, a Hā‘ena community organization, performed or organized all of 
these activities with assistance from a local nonprofit organization, Kua‘āina Ulu ‘Auamo 
(KUA). The government did not gather any temporal or place-specific information. Therefore, 
the costs of these activities were borne entirely by the community. The Hā‘ena co-management 
area rules included a small no-take area sheltered by the fringing coral reef to protect a juvenile 
spawning habitat. At first, the DLNR did not accept community claims about the nursery, despite 
generations of observational data and customary knowledge gathered by local fishers and 
community members. The community was required to commission a scientific study by coral 
reef ecologists that confirmed community claims before the DLNR allowed the area to remain a 
part of the rules package. Thus, the burden was on the community to gather scientific 
information about their area.  
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B. Coordination costs 
Coordination costs refer to all costs associated with planning and implementing a co-
management regime, including time, capital and personnel costs. In Hawai‘i, costs were 
expended to plan, negotiate agreements, monitor compliance, and enforce regulations. Due to 
low funding and administrative capacity at the state level, communities were forced to absorb 
many of the coordination costs for co-management in Hawai‘i. Fortunately, the non-profit sector 
including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and a local foundation helped communities 
absorb these costs by providing human and financial capital investments in community 
coordination processes. Respondents from multiple sectors cited a lack of capacity at the state 
level as a major barrier. Until 2012, when the locally based Harold K.L. Castle Foundation 
funded a co-management planner position, there were no employees at the state level responsible 
for working with communities to support the development of co-management governance 
arrangements. This position, along with support from several local NGOs, including KUA, The 
Nature Conservancy, and Conservation International Hawai‘i, provided community assistance 
for planning, community organizing, developing rulemaking proposals, engaging with 
government officials and other planning activities. These bridging and brokering roles represent 
a significant portion of the coordination costs for transitioning to a co-management system in 
Hawai‘i.  
 
C. Strategic costs 
Strategic costs are incurred when individuals or organizations exploit information asymmetries, 
power relations, political influence, or financial advantages to tip resource benefits in their favor. 
Strategic costs include free riding, rent seeking, shirking, social loafing, and corruption. My 
analysis reveals several examples of strategic costs associated with making the transition to co-
management governance systems. A lack of institutionalized enforcement means that many 
fishing areas across Hawai‘i have become de facto open-access (an absence of defined property 
rights), which encourages free riding behavior. A 2012 creel survey in a West Maui herbivore 
no-take area found that nearly 20% of reported catch included restricted herbivore reef fish 
(Friedlander, Koike, Kekoa, & Sparks, 2012). In terms of rent-seeking behavior, respondents 
described how organized fishing interests actively work against co-management planning efforts 
by lobbying politicians, co-opting public meetings, and using their process-related knowledge to 
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subvert community-led initiatives. For example, organized fishing interests heckled crowds and 
decision makers at public meetings, filed petitions to delay an administrative decision, and 
lobbied new legislators in an attempt to block approval of rules. Respondents frequently reported 
that organized interests opposed any rules changes despite documented resource depletion across 
the Hawaiian archipelago (Friedlander & DeMartini, 2002b; Kittinger et al., 2011). There is no 
data to indicate that corrupt activities affected co-management or centralized fisheries 
management in Hawai‘i. 
 
Table 4.5. Comparative Performance of Institutional Arrangements Related to Coral Reef 
Fisheries Management Costs (Transformation and Transaction costs) in Hawai‘i, (adapted from 
Ostrom, Schroeder & Wynne (1993)  
Intermediate performance criteria/provision costs Co-management Centralized 
management 
Transaction costs 
Coordination costs High Low 
Information costs   
Time and place  High High 
Scientific High High 
Strategic costs   
Free riding Med High 
Rent seeking High High 
Corruption N.A. N.A. 
Transformation costs High High 
 
*The ordinal scale of ‘Low’, ‘Med’ for Medium, and ‘High’ for Co-management and Centralized 
Management in Table 4.5 are based upon descriptive, qualitative assessments of the individual 
aspects of each cost and not a precise calculation of transaction and transformation costs. These 
assessments are made based upon interview data, an analysis of archival documents such as 
legislative testimony, participant observation of public meetings, general knowledge gleaned 
from informal discussions, and being tangentially involved in Hawai‘i co-management processes 
for five years. A ‘Low’ ranking describes costs and activities that are currently accounted for in 
the regulatory regime; in other words, funds are allocated to this task and staff currently work to 
complete this as part of their work plans. Thus the transaction or transformation costs are low. A 
‘Med’ or Medium ranking describes some extra costs incurred outside of the current regulatory 
regime or activities. For example, a ranking of ‘Med’ for the Free Riding subcomponent of 
Strategic costs describes extra costs that must be accounted for to reduce free riding by the 
community or the state, such as monitoring and incident reporting to report rules violations. A 
‘High’ ranking describes significant costs, such as extensive longitudinal scientific studies, 
multiple public meetings, or several new full-time positions. The rankings reported for 
Centralized Management consider costs that have already been absorbed within the system. The 
current rankings for Centralized Management describe costs that must be disbursed to adequately 
address remedial regulatory deficiencies.  
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4.4.3 Transformation costs 
Transformation costs include the costs of changing citizen preferences about governance 
arrangements (i.e., transitioning to co-management). During the planning process, this includes 
the cost of changing citizen preferences using consensus-building processes. During the policy 
design stage it includes costs associated with funding the transformation and implementation of 
the new governance system. During the policy implementation stage it includes the costs to 
monitor performance, regulate patterns of use, and to enforce rules. It is important to note that 
the perceived costs are in many ways just as important as the actual costs. Moreover, there may 
be benefits (or perceived benefits) associated with the governance transitions as well. 
Accordingly, the combination of these costs and benefits is what can create significant barriers to 
making the transition to a new governance arrangement.   
 
Until the Hā‘ena rules were signed into law on August 2015, the only other CBSFA in the 
Hawaiian archipelago was the pilot project at Mo‘omomi on Moloka‘i. Mo‘omomi was only 
designated for a trial period of two-years. Designation of just one co-management area in 21 
years, despite the presence of a legal mandate and at least two dozen highly engaged 
communities pushing for a transition to co-management provides some evidence of the barrier 
that high transformation costs present to co-management in Hawai‘i. This analysis reveals a 
number of transformation costs. Respondents cited the lack of governmental support for 
coordination, site assessment, and information gathering, high strategic costs brought on by 
organized special interest groups, and an arduous and complicated administrative rulemaking 
process (Kittinger et al., 2012) as impediments to making the transition to co-management 
systems. Resource rules for centralized management and co-management must both pass through 
the Hawai‘i administrative rulemaking process to become law, which may take up to six years, 
depending on the complexity of the proposed rules. For example, rules for recent revised bag and 
size limits on Maui took a total of six years, while the Hā‘ena co-management rules took four 
years from inception to implementation. No matter how small, any new (or amended) rules must 
revisit the administrative rulemaking process. It took a highly engaged ten year effort by the 
Hā‘ena community, active support by a local NGO (KUA), and a significant, multiyear funding 
investment in a state-
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dedicated to co-management to overcome high transformation costs and achieve a permanent 
CBSFA.  
 
4.5 DISCUSSION 
 
Despite the presence of enabling legislation, extensive community interest across the 
archipelago, and significant NGO/Foundation support, implementation of CBSFAs remains 
limited (Ayers and Kittinger 2014). This analysis suggests many possible explanations for the 
lack of progress, that are organized using the IAD framework. The transaction and 
transformation cost framework presented in Figure 4.1 helps explain why these problems 
manifest when transitioning to a new co-management governance system. The contribution of 
this framework is reviewed below.   
 
4.5.1 A framework for examining the transformation and transaction costs 
Figure 4.1 summarizes the framework created to structure the analysis of the transaction and 
transformation costs identified in this case study. A wide range of transaction costs (or benefits) 
occurred during the different stages of the governance transition process – planning, policy 
design, implementation, and evaluation (Ostrom et al. 1993; Imperial 1999). Information costs 
occur throughout the co-management life cycle, whereas coordination costs and strategic costs 
only occur from planning through implementation. There are also transformation costs that occur 
during each stage of the transition process except evaluation (Ostrom et al. 1993). During the 
planning stage there are costs to change citizen preferences so that the new governance system is 
viewed as being a legitimate, appropriate, and better system for managing the problem(s) than 
the status quo arrangement. During the policy design stage, transformation costs are also 
associated with the design of the new governance arrangement. This might involve changes in 
how the system is funded or how resources are allocated. It could also change who shoulders the 
burden (i.e., cost) to develop rules. Making newly designed policies operational can also 
generate a different set of transformation costs during the implementation stage by changing the 
allocation of costs to administer the program, collecting monitoring information, requiring 
changes in enforcement mechanisms, or producing different resource allocations. The upward 
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arrow in Figure 4.1 between transaction and transformation costs denotes a positive relationship, 
whereby higher transaction costs generate higher transformation costs for an institutional change.  
 
 
Figure 4.1. The transformation and transaction costs associated with governance transitions 
 
 
 
  
	107 
4.5.2. The configural nature of transformation and transaction costs and benefits 
When costs of institutional change exceed potential benefits, theories of institutional change 
postulate that there is no incentive for individuals to change rules so the rules remain unchanged 
(Basurto & Ostrom, 2009). This idea is also captured in one of Ostrom’s design principles for 
enduring common pool resource institutions: “congruence between appropriation and provision 
rules and local conditions” (E. Ostrom, 1990, p. 90), which was later divided into two parts by 
other commons scholars to more accurately reflect the complexity of its two component parts: 1) 
tailoring rules to local conditions; and 2) the benefits received by resource appropriators are 
proportional to the costs incurred (Cox, Arnold, & Tomás, 2010). This may also be termed the 
configural nature of transformation and transaction costs or the combinations of costs and 
benefits incurred by different stakeholders. The ability to transition from one governance 
arrangement to another is influenced by how the pattern of costs and benefits shapes perceptions 
among stakeholders about the efficacy of the proposed governance arrangement, which in turn 
influences decisions about whether to participate, support, or oppose the governance transition.  
 
Conversely, the distributional consequences of certain configurations can also create strong 
incentives for participants to work cooperatively to craft new governance arrangements that are 
win-win or at least win-no-lose in nature (Imperial and Kauneckis 2003; Kauneckis and Imperial 
2007). In this case, the distributional pattern associated with the transition to co-management 
systems in Hawai‘i creates formidable obstacles. For example, one of the problems with the 
design of the 1994 enabling legislation is that it shifts almost all of the cost associated with 
developing a CBSFA to the community partners. Communities pursuing co-management in 
Hawai‘i are faced with the burden of gathering scientific and socio-economic information for a 
fishery, engaging stakeholders, navigating a complex administrative and political process, and 
securing a broad base of public support. Many of these communities are experiencing their own 
economic hardships. However, all residents of the state share the benefits of improved 
management of the fishery over the long-term. Fortunately, some communities found supporters 
in NGOs and other organizations willing to absorb some of the information and coordination 
costs. Without these organizations and their support, even less progress in co-management 
transitions may have occurred. If other communities are going to be successful, these 
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uncompensated costs must be reduced or redistributed to create stronger incentives for 
community participation. 
 
4.5.3 Perceptions of costs and benefits 
Many of these transaction costs could be expressed in terms of person-days or person-hours but 
would be difficult to monetize. In Hā‘ena for instance, beach surveys documenting the frequency 
and location of tourist and recreational users in the area took two full summers to complete. 
These surveys involved several graduate students and community members. Data collection took 
substantial time and expertise was needed to analyze data and present findings. In another 
summer, a reef fish census survey was commissioned to document the numbers and types of fish 
present in a suspected juvenile fish nursery and habitat. Again, this data had to be commissioned 
by scientific experts. Co-management planning in Hā‘ena occupied a substantial amount of time 
for many members of Hui Maka‘āinana o Makana in addition to a large portion of time for a 
state-level planning position funded by The H.K.L. Castle Foundation, and several staff members 
of KUA. The investment in time and expertise needed to establish a single co-management area 
for a two-mile swath of coast in Hā‘ena, Kaua‘i was significant and almost none of it was funded 
by DLNR budgets.  
 
However, perceived costs and benefits are also important drivers in the transition process 
because they provide strong incentives or disincentives to participate, support, or oppose the 
governance transition. In Hawai‘i, interview data suggests that opportunistic behavior is 
prevalent in areas under centralized management across the archipelago. Respondents shared a 
perception that many fishers take advantage of minimal enforcement presence by not complying 
with resource rules. Similarly, those that benefit from the current institutional arrangement are 
largely opposed to the development of CBSFAs because they fear that the new systems will 
impose new costs or constraints that interfere with their current use of the marine resources. 
Alternatively, the supporters of CBFSAs hope that the Hā‘ena community will increase social 
pressure on users to comply with rules, encourage reporting of incident violations to the state, 
and engage both the community and the DLNR in monitoring resource users. As a result, they 
hope that opportunistic behavior common in the current system, the so-called “tragedy of the 
commons,” will decrease, regulatory compliance can then improve, and better management of 
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marine resources will result. While there is little direct evidence as to whether either set of 
perceptions is correct, the combination of perceptions has framed the governance transition as a 
win-lose situation with the “losers” mounting well-orchestrated opposition to co-management. 
 
4.5.4 Accrual of costs and benefits over time 
My analysis also suggests that it matters when costs (and benefits) occur over time. Generally 
speaking, it is difficult to develop and implement policies when great costs are incurred today for 
vague or unspecified gains in the future. Participants can also use very different discount rates, 
which mean that the costs (or benefits) are viewed in very different ways as a result of history, 
culture, or different worldviews. Discount rates refer to differing perceptions of present versus 
future values of fisheries resources. A low discount rate places a greater value on the future value 
of resources. Conversely, attaching a high discount rate to the value of resources may mean that 
it makes more sense to harvest resources now rather than in the future when their value has 
depreciated. Without understanding these different discount rates, it is difficult to make accurate 
predictions about the interactions among actors (e.g., the ability to absorb high transformational 
costs) or the outcomes for governance change (e.g., the adoption of new rules systems) (Gelcich 
et al., 2006; Hauck & Gallardo-Fernández, 2013; Raemaekers et al., 2011).  
 
The case illustrates this point. Communities engaged in co-management planning have persisted 
for a decade or longer in spite of significant costs and seemingly few immediate benefits. 
However, many Native Hawaiians consider the health of local fisheries as an ancestral 
responsibility. Their motivation is to perpetuate key cultural practices and maintain a Hawaiian 
way of life for future generations (McGregor, 2007) despite significant social, economic, and 
technological change. Their use of a very low discount rate attaches importance to the long-term 
benefits and creates a willingness to incur larger upfront change costs. This is consistent with 
findings from elsewhere in the Pacific (Teh et al. 2011). These findings support the inclusion of 
cultural expression to the list of social responses in the typology presented in Chapter 3. The 
pursuit of rights to manage local resources is also congruent with historical marine tenure 
regimes in Hawai‘i that devolved management to local and regional scales (Beamer, 2014; 
Gonschor & Beamer, 2014).  
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Even though current co-management systems in Hawai‘i devolve little in the way of rights to 
resource users (see Chapter 2), the ability to advance place-based rules is congruent with 
historical management approaches. Alternatively, the stakeholders involved in organized 
opposition may use much larger discount rates which would attach more value to the current 
gains that result from the lack of enforcement and exploitation of marine resources. However, it 
is also possible that the same stakeholders do not perceive a problem with marine resources. 
 
 
4.6. MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS 
 
4.6.1 Resolve asymmetric cost distributions 
If co-management is to fulfill its promise, there must be a better understanding of the barriers 
associated with making governance transitions. The transformation and transaction cost 
framework presented in Figure 4.1 provides a means of identifying potential barriers. This 
framework can also be used to identify and evaluate strategies for modifying the configuration of 
transaction costs in ways that create greater incentives for participation by alleviating perceived 
inequities in the distribution of costs and benefits. One clear obstacle is the asymmetries of 
information and coordination costs. Communities carry the burden for the information and 
coordination costs needed to develop the CBFSA. The state, which is the other partner in the co-
management arrangement, is a free rider in the transition process, but still becomes one of the 
main beneficiaries of the transition once it shifts implementation costs to the communities. 
Fortunately, strong support from foundations and NGOs offset the asymmetric cost allocation. 
However, if the state really wanted to encourage CBFSA development it should provide greater 
support for the transition process that helps offset the high costs at the community level. This 
could be achieved through planning grants, subsidizing scientific studies, or modifying the 
information and regulatory requirements that create high transaction costs.  
 
The development of collaborative agreements like co-management systems also works best when 
all parties affected by the outcome lack a better alternative to the negotiated agreement 
(BATNA) (Fisher & Ury, 1991). This causes participants and stakeholders opposed to the 
proposal to negotiate in good faith and seek win-win or at least win-no-lose arrangements 
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(Imperial and Kauneckis 2003; Kauneckis and Imperial 2007). However, the current co-
management rulemaking process creates an alternative to a negotiated agreement. Stakeholders 
opposed to CBSFA development do not have to bargain in good faith. If they fail to get their 
preferred negotiated agreement, they can exit negotiations and use the rule making procedures to 
prolong the process and exacerbate local coordination costs. However, local communities and 
stakeholders supportive of a CBSFA have no equivalent alternative other than a negotiated 
agreement. This power asymmetry allows a small group of stakeholders to block CBSFA 
development while they continue to engage in other costly forms of strategic behavior (e.g., 
illegal fishing) because the state does not invest in monitoring or enforcement. 
 
4.6.2 Streamline co-management transitions  
Accordingly, if Hawai‘i wants to encourage co-management, it needs to modify the 
administrative rulemaking process or perhaps create a separate CBSFA approval process 
designed to minimize transaction costs. It could also minimize the opportunities for stakeholders 
to exit the transition process, which will encourage stakeholders to bargain in good faith. There 
are successful examples of transition processes that could serve as possible models including 
territorial user rights for fishing (TURFs) in Chile (Gelcich et al., 2010), community 
development quota funds used in Alaska (Ginter, 1995); fisher-government coalitions in the co-
management of the lobster fishery in Maine (Acheson, 2003); and culturally-based co-
management in Aotearoa (New Zealand) (Memon et al. 2003). 
 
4.6.3 Build public support for co-management 
An overall change in strategy may also be needed. A major challenge is clearly transforming 
citizen preferences, particularly among those lacking Native Hawaiian ancestry. One way to do 
this is by using demonstration projects and phasing in CBSFA implementation by focusing on 
selected communities where strong support exists. Indeed, some community leaders and 
practitioners described the need to start small with successful demonstration projects in order to 
reopen this pathway and create a precedent for other communities. Since the state currently lacks 
the resources to subsidize large-scale development of CBSFAs, this strategy would also focus 
limited resources in a few selected communities to test whether co-management systems actually 
lead to improved marine resource management. Implementation experience will also help all 
	112 
stakeholders to better understand whether the perceived costs and benefits are realized. 
Overtime, if the demonstration projects are successful, it could help alter citizen perceptions in 
favor or co-management. If they are unsuccessful, the state could pursue a different institutional 
arrangement to improve the management of its marine resources. 
 
The results also demonstrate that changing citizen perceptions during governance 
transformations is critical when organized opposition from special interests is entrenched, 
politically powerful, and the transition process provides points of leverage that can be used to 
prolong the process. Building a broad base of support at the multiple scales – both at the 
community level and statewide – was critical in breaking two decades of path dependence and 
lock-in in Hawai‘i. The results also demonstrate that effective organization and construction of a 
broad base of support by the Hā‘ena community and their partners could overcome significant 
transaction and transformation costs. Other communities have not been as successful.   
 
4.6.4 Manage conflict to avoid conservation stalemates 
While collaboration and co-management are often viewed in positive terms, it is important to 
remember that these governance strategies are not appropriate for addressing all resource 
management problems (Imperial 2005). For example, Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000: 58) 
examined nearly 200 contentious collaborative decision making processes and observed many of 
the same barriers observed in this study. Similarly, many Hawai‘i communities have had limited 
success in achieving the prerequisites for successful collaboration noted by Wondolleck and 
Yaffee (2000). In Hawai‘i, many stakeholders still have difficulty working together and 
problems and policy solutions are framed largely in terms of win-lose situations rather than win-
win or win-no-lose situations that are more likely to encourage cooperative solutions (Imperial 
and Kauneckis 2003; Kauneckis and Imperial 2007). As a consequence, co-management 
transitions in Hawai‘i have largely resulted in a conservation or policy stalemate (Amy, 1983), 
highlighting the need for effective conflict resolution strategies built into the governance 
transition process in Hawai‘i (Fisher and Ury 1991; Forester 1987; Lowry, Adler, and Milner 
1997).   
 
  
	113 
4.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Co-management is a promising and appropriate alternative to address some problems with top-
down governance. However, the governance transition process required for establishing co-
management regimes creates several significant barriers, including transaction and 
transformation costs that inhibit its development. In places where co-management transitions 
have been successful, the process has taken a decade or longer (Gelcich et al., 2010; Pinkerton, 
1999; Yandle, 2003). There is no reason to believe that the transition to widespread use of co-
management systems will happen quickly without addressing the structural attributes that create 
these barriers. This will likely require substantial investments in the transition process that 
balance the current inequities in the distribution of transaction and transformation costs. In 
addition to investments, targeted efforts are also needed to build public support and manage 
conflict surrounding the establishment of co-management areas. Doing so may help Hawai‘i 
overcome many of the barriers currently impeding co-management planning and 
implementation.  
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Chapter 5. 
Many paths, one destination: developing community guidance in state-centric co-
management 
 
Chapter 4 categorized the barriers to  community-based subsistence fishing area implementation 
and indicated how communities and their NGO partners are absorbing most of the transaction 
costs associated with co-management transitions. Given the challenges associated with co-
management governance transitions through CBSFAs, some other state-level marine 
management designations may offer an easier path to implementation. Although these state-level 
marine management designations were not designed for co-management, there are opportunities 
for extensive community involvement analogous to co-management governance. This chapter 
will combine institutional analysis, policy analysis, and semi-structured interviews to analyze six 
different non-CBSFA marine management partnerships in Hawai‘i. First, existing marine 
management authorities are organized based upon community goals. Next, an institutional 
analysis is used to assess differences in community involvement, how property rights 
components are shared, and the operational rules present in each area. This chapter will conclude 
by considering six non-CBSFA and two CBSFA areas in the context of Elinor Ostrom’s design 
principles for common pool resources. The findings of this chapter have important implications 
for common pool resource theory and co-management planning and implementation.  
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Small-scale fisheries are important to millions of people worldwide for sustenance, livelihoods, 
and food security (FAO, 2015). Despite their importance, many small-scale fisheries are located 
in remote areas or are plagued by a lack of resources or capacity needed for effective 
management (Berkes, 2001). Co-management widely touted as solution for many of the 
capacity- and resource-related issues facing the world’s fisheries (Gutierrez et al., 2011). Co-
management involves an iterative learning process whereby a communities or resource users 
negotiate with the state to share management authority of a given area or resource system 
(Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2000; Pomeroy & Rivera-Guieb, 2006). Co-management governance 
arrangements may exhibit significant diversity in terms of the shared property rights and 
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responsibilities between the state and communities or resource users (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992; 
Yandle, 2003).  
 
Much co-management research examines communities that are actively involved in the 
management process, documenting policy implementation over time (Gelcich et al., 2010), 
conditions associated with success (Cinner et al., 2012; Olsson et al., 2004; Pomeroy et al., 2001; 
Sen & Nielsen, 1996), beneficial aspects of the co-management process (Berkes, 2009), barriers 
to implementation (Pinkerton, 1992; Vaughan & Caldwell, 2015), power dynamics (Nadasdy, 
2003a), indigenous issues (Castro & Nielsen, 2001; Natcher, Davis, & Hickey, 2005; Vaughan, 
Ayers, & Thompson, Accepted), and regulatory capture (Singleton, 2000). Additionally, much 
research considers the proper or ideal roles of government, communities, and markets (Armitage 
et al., 2009; Jentoft, 2000b; McCay & Jentoft, 1998; Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997). However, little 
research explicitly describes the formal institutional arrangement for co-management, 
particularly in terms of how property rights are arranged and how authority is shared (see 
Chapter 2). Further, researchers rarely examine cases of state-centric co-management, where 
most power and authority is nested within an existing state-level bureaucracy. In state-centric co-
management,  the state may hold all marine tenure or property rights components (Carlsson & 
Berkes, 2005, p. 68). State-centric co-management is more prevalent in the developed world, 
where multiple jurisdictions, management agencies, and hierarchical legal and institutional 
structures may constrain devolution of rights to local resource users (see Chapter 2).  
 
Although part of the United States, small-scale fisheries management in Hawai‘i is hampered by 
many of the same issues facing remote areas or developing nations (Ayers et al., In review). In 
Hawai‘i, small-scale coral reef fisheries have declined significantly since western contact 
(Kittinger et al., 2011) and most can be described as open access due to the absence of 
institutionalized enforcement and management presence (Finkbeiner et al., 2015; Jokiel et al., 
2011). Many view contemporary centralized management in Hawai‘i to be ineffective and 
lacking legitimacy, leading as many 20 communities to pursue co-management or other 
institutional arrangements (Ayers et al., n.d.; Levine & Richmond, 2014). Although a legal 
pathway for co-management in Hawai‘i has existed for over 20 years via community-based 
subsistence fishing areas (CBSFAs) (Higuchi, 2008), to date, there has been just one two-year 
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pilot project in the late 1990s and one actively managed area designated in late 20152 (Vaughan 
& Caldwell, 2015). Co-management implementation (via CBSFAs) has been stymied by high 
transaction and transformation costs, process- and capacity-related challenges, and state-level 
reluctance to devolve management authority to communities (see Chapters 2, 3 and 4 for more 
information on these findings).  
 
The lack of traction in co-management implementation via CBSFAs led some Hawai‘i 
practitioners, NGOs, and grantmaking organizations to consider whether many of the same co-
management goals and objectives communities seek may be accomplished via existing state-
level marine management designations. The State of Hawai‘i Department of Land and Natural 
Resources (DLNR) is authorized to designate the following marine management designations: 
Fishery Management Areas (FMAs); Marine Life Conservation Districts (MLCDs) – often 
described as Marine Protected Areas (MPAs); Fishery Replenishment Areas (FRAs); and Natural 
Area Reserve System (NARS). Although these management designations are not considered to 
be co-management per se, several communities across Hawai‘i have partnered with the State of 
Hawai‘i DLNR to assist in various management aspects including rule development, resource 
monitoring, public outreach and education, and reporting resource infractions to enforcement 
officers. I conducted a formal study in 2014-2015 to assess the level of institutional flexibility 
that exists for potential co-management partnerships within these alternative state-level marine 
management designations. I sought to examine how the level of community involvement, 
management rules, and property rights are shared within these alternative designations. I also 
examined the governance regimes using Elinor Ostrom’s design principles (E. Ostrom, 1990). 
The purpose of this study is twofold:  
 
1) Can additional mechanisms that share management authority ease co-management 
implementation?  
2) What do Ostrom’s Design Principles and a Property Rights analysis reveal about the 
design and implementation of eight co-management areas in Hawai‘i? 
 
                                                
2 For more background about CBSFAs, see Chapter 3. 
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This research begins with a legal and institutional analysis of various state-level marine 
management designations, which formed the creation of a community-level co-management 
decision support tool. Next, I analyzed the level of community involvement in the designation 
process, the rules present, and the property rights devolved to communities (Schlager & Ostrom, 
1992). Then, I assessed various marine management designations using Elinor Ostroms’s design 
principles for enduring common pool resource governance regimes (E. Ostrom, 1990). The 
chapter concludes by considering the implications of the findings for both Hawai‘i communities 
seeking co-management, for common pool resources theory, and for co-management 
implementation under state-centric co-management.  
 
5.2. METHODS 
 
This research utilized a mixed methods research design (Creswell & Clark, 2007), combining 
legal and institutional analysis of state-level laws and governance regimes; administrative rules 
governing fishing areas; and semi-structured interviews of community members. The legal and 
institutional analysis began with a census of all 47 marine management designations and 
locations across the state of Hawai‘i to capture variation in regulatory implementation present 
across sites. I reviewed fishing regulations from each of these sites to assess the full suite of rules 
currently implemented for each management area and submitted my analysis to a legal specialist 
in the Division of Aquatic Resources (DAR, the state-level agency responsible for marine 
resource management) to confirm my findings. Initial drafts of community-level decision support 
tools3 were shared at a community workshop in December 2014. The community provided 
comments and suggestions to increase the utility of the tool for other communities interested in 
partnering with the state to change institutional arrangements.  
                                                
3The community level decision support tool was conceived to help communities decide which 
marine management designation fit their area given their management goals. A DAR planner 
piloted an early draft of the decision support tool with a focus group of community members in 
December 2014. The purpose of the meeting was to gather input about the CBSFA process, so it 
was a natural opportunity to discuss some alternative management pathways. As a result of the 
meeting the tool was modified to focus first on broad community-level goals, and then more 
specific community-level goals. Depending on community-level goals, the tool specifies which 
agencies a community should contact or involve in the process, along with some caveats for each 
pathway. 
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The initial list of 47 marine management designations was narrowed down to a subset of 21 areas 
with some level of community involvement. Community involvement was defined by: local 
representation on a management or advisory board; the formation of community group that was 
involved either in the designation or rulemaking process; or active participation via Makai Watch 
(an outreach, education, and incident reporting program). From the subset of twenty-one 
potential areas, a purposive sample of six was chosen for fieldwork based on a) amount and level 
of community involvement as described above; b) durability or uniqueness of the designation; c) 
some island and institutional variation; and d) some evidence of positive social and ecological 
outcomes. The six communities chosen for fieldwork were: Pūpūkea-Waimea on the island of 
O‘ahu (MLCD); Miloli‘i, Ho‘okena, Honaunau on Hawai‘i Island (FMAs/FRAs); 
Ka‘anapali/Kahekili on the island Maui (also an FMA, but the only herbivore no-take area in the 
state); and ‘Ahihi-Kīna‘u, also on Maui (the only marine NARs in the state – all other NARs are 
terrestrial). See Figure 5.1 for a map of the various communities and management areas. 
Purposive sampling of fieldwork sites allowed for representation among management 
designations (Patton, 2002). 
 
Figure 5.1. Hawai‘i communities and marine management areas within the Main Hawaiian 
Islands chosen for analysis in this study 
 
 
Field interviews were conducted via telephone and in-person between July 2014 and July 2015. 
In-person interviews were conducted whenever possible. Initial interviewees were selected based 
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upon their knowledge of and involvement with the designation or management process. Then, 
snowball or chain referral sampling (Creswell, 2007) was employed until sufficient data 
saturation was reached (new respondents repeated the same themes as those interviewed earlier 
without describing any new ones) (Bernard, 2013). This self-assessment of data saturation 
(Curry, Nembhard, & Bradley, 2009) was further confirmed by informal “talk story” 
conversations with other community members to confirm or crosscheck research findings. All 
interviews were recorded with participants’ consent and all data are reported anonymously or in 
the aggregate to comply with committee on human subjects research requirements. Recorded 
interviews were transcribed and iteratively coded, first based upon general themes related to 
questions (for example, lessons or suggestions for other communities), then participant responses 
were further broken down into more general themes and subthemes using qualitative data 
analysis techniques (Bernard & Ryan, 2009; Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
 
Table 5.1. Total interviews by community and management designation  
Field site Management Designation Total interviews 
Ka‘anapali/Kahekili (Maui) Herbivore FMA 10 
Pūpūkea-Waimea (O‘ahu) MLCD 6 (via focus group) 
‘Ahihi-Kīna‘u (Maui) NARs 4 
Miloli‘i, Ho‘okena, Honaunau 
(Hawai‘i Island) 
FMAs/FRAs 3  
 
Fishing regulations were analyzed using a Schlager & Ostrom (1992) property rights framework 
containing five primary components: access, withdrawal, exclusion, management, and alienation. 
Governance regimes were analyzed using Ostrom’s design principles (E. Ostrom, 1990), several 
of which have been separated into component parts to capture their complexity (Cox, Arnold, & 
Tomas, 2010). I used the revised Cox et al. (2010) design principles in this study.  
 
5.3. BACKGROUND 
 
The following section provides a short historical background on co-management in Hawai‘i via 
community based subsistence fishing areas and the administrative rulemaking process that 
precedes any rule change. A short synapsis of alternative co-management pathways that exist 
though state-level marine management designations is also included. Next, a brief description of 
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the communities chosen for fieldwork and their role in management is provided under each of 
their respective management designations.  
 
5.3.1 Co-management in Hawai‘i  
Co-management in Hawai‘i is typically thought of in terms of community-based subsistence 
fishing areas (CBSFAs). The pathway to CBSFAs was legislated in Hawai‘i in 1994, allowing 
communities to partner with the State of Hawai‘i to develop place-based and culturally rooted 
regulations for their ocean areas (Hawai‘i State Legislature, 1994, sec. 1). Although fishing 
regulations may be rooted in customary practices and values, the Hawai‘i State constitution 
ensures that rules apply equally to all users (Hawai‘i State Constitution, Article XI §6). 
Communities may be creative in their rulemaking to ensure that regulations privilege certain 
fishing methods, so long as no one is excluded (Vaughan et al., Accepted). Moreover, any rules – 
CBSFAs included – must pass through the State of Hawai‘i Chapter 91 administrative 
rulemaking process (Kittinger et al., 2012). With few exceptions, any new rules, amendments to 
existing rules, or elimination of rules follow this process. Likewise, any citizen or community 
group may propose a rules change. However, for CBSFAs, the rules change must be proposed by 
a community group that includes group membership, a management plan, a monitoring and 
evaluation component, and funding sources (Zanre, 2014). The rulemaking process alone is long 
and daunting for many Hawai‘i communities and the results demonstrate just how difficult. 
There have been just two active CBSFAs in over 20 years since the legislation was passed. There 
was one two-year CBSFA pilot project at Mo‘omomi on the island of Moloka‘i in the late 
1990s(Guth, 1999) until Hā‘ena, Kaua‘i became just the second active CBSFA in Hawai‘i in 
August 2015. Miloli‘i was designated a CBSFA via in 2005 but has yet to submit draft rules and 
a management plan to the Department. At this time, Miloli‘i retains its designation but is not 
currently an actively managed CBSFA. 
 
5.3.2 Chapter 91 administrative rulemaking process 
Before specifics of the different marine management designations are discussed, it is important 
to understand how fishing regulations become administrative rules in Hawai‘i. The State of 
Hawai‘i Administrative rulemaking process is a public process whereby state-level executive 
branch agencies such as the DLNR develop specific administrative rules to implement statutes. 
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The administrative rulemaking process is the same for any rules changes. In the case of the 
Hā‘ena CBSFA, the rulemaking process took four years from initial submission to final approval 
(Vaughan & Caldwell, 2015). Depending on whether impacts to small businesses are anticipated, 
the public has at least four opportunities to comment on the rules (see Figure 5.2), which 
significantly increases the transaction and transformation costs associated with the governance 
transition to co-management (see Chapter 4). Although there are multiple opportunities to 
comment on any regulations, there appear to be extra barriers and opposition to CBSFAs. Efforts 
are underway at the state level to streamline the rulemaking process. Recently completed, a 
community guidebook also clarifies what is expected of communities desiring a different 
management designation (Zanre, 2014). Some community practitioners and grantmaking 
organizations have speculated that some of the same goals might overlap with other management 
designations and perhaps these designations might offer an easier path to co-management. 
 
5.3.3 Marine management designations in Hawai‘i 
In recognition of differences in resources, habitat, geological features, and human uses across 
Hawai‘i, several different marine management designations are available to develop place-based 
rules. For coral reef fisheries under state jurisdiction, place-based regulations are primarily 
implemented through fishery management areas (FMAs), fishery replenishment areas (FRAs), 
and marine life conservation districts (MLCDs). FMAs offer the greatest rulemaking variation in 
rulemaking authority. FMA rules may focus on a single fish or limu (seaweed) species or may 
manage a large area for cumulative impacts like the entire west coast of Hawai‘i Island. FRAs 
are areas designated under Act 306 (1998) put in place to protect reef fish along 30% of West 
Hawai‘i Island from aquarium collection. MCLDs are primarily considered marine protected 
areas, although some areas do allow some fishing with specific gear types. NARS are areas 
protected for ecological and cultural uniqueness that are protected in perpetuity. They do not 
allow any extractive activities and offer the greatest protection among these areas. As mentioned 
earlier, there is one community-based subsistence fishing area (CBSFA) in Hā‘ena, Kaua‘i and 
one marine natural area reserve (NARS) at ‘Āhihi-Kīna‘u on Maui. Together these areas 
comprise under 2.6% of ocean area in Hawai‘i. Although this study focuses on these five areas, 
other special areas exist including Kaho‘olawe Island Reserve (a former target bombing range 
for the U.S. Navy that is now being restored for Native Hawaiian Cultural uses), a marine 
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laboratory refuge on Coconut Island in Kāne‘ohe Bay on O‘ahu, a community fisheries 
enforcement unit in North Maui, a national historic park in Kalaupapa, Moloka‘i, and a wildlife 
sanctuary at Paikō Lagoon on O‘ahu.  
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Figure 5.2. The Chapter 91 Administrative rulemaking process for the State of Hawai‘i.  
 
Figure source: Kittinger et al (2012) 
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5.3.4 Fishery Management Areas (FMAs) and Fishery Replenishment Areas (FRAs) 
Fishery Management Areas (FMAs) are the most prevalent marine management designation in 
the state. The authorizing statute for FMAs (HRS 188-53) provides significant leeway in terms 
of management areas. For example, one FMA manages a single species of edible limu, while a 
second prevents take of herbivorous reef fish, and a third provides a framework to manage the 
entire 235km coastline of West Hawai‘i (Capitini, Tissot, Carroll, Walsh, & Peck, 2004). There 
are 21 FMAs, 13 of which have some element of community involvement. Fishery 
Replenishment Areas (FRAs) are a subset of FMAs that only exist in West Hawai‘i and are 
closed only to commercial aquarium collecting. Hōnaunau, Ho‘okena, and Miloli‘i are the three 
areas chosen for fieldwork. Ho‘okena and Miloli‘i were both actively involved with FMA/FRA 
siting and regulations in the mid-late 1990s and are currently pursuing CBSFAs. Hōnaunau, 
which is adjacent to Ho‘okena, is a U.S. National Historical Park designated for its cultural and 
historical importance.  
 
5.3.5 Marine Life Conservation Districts (MLCDs) 
There are 11 Marine Life Conservation Districts (MLCDs) in Hawai‘i, six of which have some 
degree of community-level management involvement. Although some MLCDs allow certain 
types of fishing, they are generally considered marine protected areas. The community group 
Mālama Pūpūkea-Waimea became the first active Makai (Ocean) Watch program in Hawai‘i in 
2005, partnering with the Hawai‘i State DLNR to report rules violations and educate the general 
public regarding regulations for the Pūpūkea-Waimea MLCD, one of the field sites chosen for 
this research. Makai Watch has become a state-level program to involve communities in 
education, outreach, resource monitoring, and incident reporting to the Division of Conservation, 
Resources and Enforcement (DOCARE, the enforcement wing of the Department of Land and 
Natural Resources). Several interviewees described Makai Watch as a good ‘first step’ for 
communities looking to get involved in co-management  
 
5.3.5 Natural Area Reserve System (NARS) 
The Natural Area Reserve System is primarily used to protect ecologically and culturally unique 
areas in perpetuity. The only marine NARS in the state is located at ‘Āhihi-Kīna‘u on the island 
of Maui. The ‘Āhihi-Kīna‘u NARS was designated to protect ecologically unique Anchialine 
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pools4, but the area receives thousands of tourist visitors annually, meaning that both land- and 
ocean-based access must be managed (Antolini, 2004). Beginning in 2008, a multi-stakeholder 
community group became very involved in a multi-year management plan review process for the 
area.  
 
5.3.6 Community-based Subsistence Fishing Areas (CBSFAs) 
Community-based subsistence fishing areas were legislated in 1994 based on the efforts of one 
rural Moloka‘i community. In 1993, Hawai‘i Governor John Waihe‘e commissioned a study that 
later found many Moloka‘i residents were dependent on land and ocean resources for subsistence 
(Matsuoka et al., 1994).The legislation created a pilot project on the Northwestern coastline of 
Moloka‘i, encompassing Mo‘omomi and Kawa‘aloa Bays. At the end of the two-year pilot 
project, the Mo‘omomi community and the State of Hawai‘i mutually agreed to terminate the 
project due to differences in management expectations. Nonetheless, Mo‘omomi’s rules are 
compared with other areas in Table 5.3. Hā‘ena, Kaua‘i was designated as the second active 
CBSFA in the State of Hawai‘i in August 2015 after a ten year planning and rulemaking process. 
These rules are also included and considered in Table 5.3.  
 
5.4. RESULTS 
 
Below I present the results of a legal and institutional analysis of five Hawai‘i marine 
management designations, which was reviewed by the DAR planner and legal fellow. This 
analysis was also shared with the same focus group of community members that informed the 
creation of aforementioned community-level decision support tool (Table 3.2).  
 
5.4.1 Institutional and legal analysis of marine management designations 
The rules for the marine management designations in the following paragraphs represent a 
sample of the different models of how authority has been negotiated and formalized between 
communities and a state-level bureaucracy. An initial institutional and legal analysis reveals that 
significant overlap exists between marine management designations. For instance, Fishery 
                                                
4 Anchialine pools are landlocked, brackish water areas that contain an underwater connection to 
the ocean. 
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Management Areas (FMAs) contain the following sub-designations: Fishery Replenishment 
Areas (FRAs), Public Fishing Areas, and Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Marine Refuge. Within 
these designations there are vast differences in the level of production, allowable human 
interactions, and fishing activities allowed. Some areas restrict temporal effort, such as no 
nighttime fishing for ornamental coral reef fish species within the West Hawai‘i Regional 
Fishery Management Area (WHRFMA) and restrictions on the take of certain herbivorous fish 
and sea urchins in the Kahekili Herbivore FMA. FRAs are limited to the WHRFMA and share a 
collective set of rules that restrict some commercial activities, temporal, gear types, take, and 
overall effort. FMAs primarily prohibit fishing methods such as fishfeeding or snagging, and 
certain gear types that include gill nets and number of fishing poles).  
 
Marine Life Conservation Districts (MLCDs) differ statutorily from other management 
designations in that they specifically regulate anchoring, mooring, and boating activities, and 
restrict the take of geological features or biological specimens. However, HRS 190-3 allows the 
DAR to apply rules “either generally throughout the state or in specified districts or areas”, 
which provides the agency with extensive rulemaking authority under this designation. Although 
an initial reading of the statute indicates the protection and preservation goals of this designation, 
some extractive activities are allowed in with a permit. For example, some MLCDs such as 
Wailea Bay allow fishing with a permit. The Pūpūkea-Waimea MLCD allows pole and line 
fishing from shore along and the netting of seasonal finfish, opelu (Decapterus spp.) and akule 
(Selar crumenophthalmus) within Waimea Bay.  
 
The Natural Area Reserve System (NARS) are administered by the Division of Forestry and 
Wildlife (DOFAW) and is primarily limited to terrestrial areas, with ‘Āhihi-Kīna‘u as the lone 
joint marine/terrestrial area designation in the state. The ‘Āhihi-Kīna‘u NARs is preserved in 
perpetuity and any rules adopted by DOFAW/DAR must first be approved by the NARS 
commission, whose members are appointed by the Governor and are intended to represent a 
diverse group of stakeholder interests (e.g. academics, hunters, hikers, and cultural practitioners). 
Ex officio members include the DLNR chairperson, Office of Planning Director, the Board of 
Agriculture Chairperson, and the University of Hawai‘i President or their designated 
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representative. Although the NARS system offers very strong protections, the DAR can 
potentially devise rules that are just as strong through FMAs or MLCDs. 
 
Even though the DAR (and DOFAW in the case of the NARS) have a broad authority to develop 
rules and manage marine resources in Hawai‘i, in general, there is minimal variation in rules 
within marine management designations, including those with community involvement. For 
instance, there is no variation in rules for FRAs and little variation across MLCDs. Although 
DAR has the authority to implement more stringent rules within the various marine management 
designations, any new or amended rules would still have to go through the Chapter 91 
administrative rulemaking process. If communities endeavor to devise special rules that as of yet 
have not been implemented via an FMA, HRS187A-5 and HRS 188-53 allow the State of 
Hawai‘i the authority to approve, modify, or reject them. Likewise, if a community was looking 
to partner with the State and wanted take a more active role in rulemaking or stewardship, there 
is nothing in any of the statutes that would prevent them from pursuing that route.  
 
5.4.2 Decision support tool for Hawai‘i communities pursuing co-management 
The results of the institutional and legal analysis were shared with a focus group of community 
members to increase the focus of the tool for future use in other communities. Community 
members changed the focus of the tool from a selection of management tools to how broad goals 
could potentially be addressed by regulatory agencies and management designations. Following 
community input, I added the agencies and management tools or designations that may best 
match up with community goals. The results of this analysis are presented below in Table 5.2.  
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Table 5.2. Decision support tool for Hawai‘i communities pursuing co-management  
Potential Management 
Goals 
Agency Responsible, Available 
Management tools or designations 
Caveats 
Limit/restrict 
access 
Land-based 
access 
Office of Conservation and Coastal 
Lands (OCCL): Special Management 
Areas (SMAs) 
See responsible 
management agency 
(Hawai‘i CZM) or 
owner/landowner 
Ocean-based 
access 
Division of Aquatic Resources (DAR)* if 
access restrictions are needed to manage, 
conserve, and restore the state’s unique 
aquatic resources and ecosystems: Marine 
Management Designations: CBSFA* - if 
access impedes traditional fishing practices 
from being exercised, FMA, MLCD 
Division of Forestry and Wildlife 
(DOFAW): NARS* - if area must be 
protected & preserved in perpetuity 
Limiting access may be 
possible but must apply 
equally to all community 
members 
Obtain available permits: State Office of 
Planning: Limited Entry, Special-Use, 
SMA Major & Minor, Commercial activity 
permits 
If justified, limiting 
access may be possible 
through permitting 
Limit extractive uses DAR: Bag and size limits, Gear 
restrictions, Marine Management 
Designations: FMA, MLCD, CBSFA* - if 
extraction prevents traditional fishing 
practices from being exercised 
Limiting extractive uses 
may be possible but 
must apply equally to all 
community members 
Restrict boating 
& recreation 
activities 
*mitigate 
non-
extractive 
user conflicts 
Division of Boating and Ocean 
Recreation (DOBOR): Ocean Recreation 
Management Area (ORMA)  
Non-extractive uses fall 
under DOBOR 
jurisdiction 
*mitigate 
extractive 
user conflicts 
DAR: FMA, CBSFA* - if activities 
impede traditional fishing practices from 
being exercised 
Extraction of living 
resources: DAR  
OCCL - Special Area Management Plans 
(SAMPs) 
Non-living resources: 
OCCL 
*mitigate 
boating 
impacts on 
resources 
Day-use mooring - permits may be needed 
from: Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE); 
DOBOR; OCCL; Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA); 
DAR: MLCD, CBSFA* - if impacts 
marine resources and are important to 
native Hawaiian subsistence, culture or 
religion 
 
Limit commercial activities 
DAR: CBSFA, FMA, MLCD 
DOFAW: NARS *only if area is 
ecologically and culturally unique and the 
area must be protected in perpetuity 
May be subject to 
regulation when they 
impinge upon 
cultural/natural resource 
or public use 
Address unsustainable fishing 
practices DAR: FMA, CBSFA, Makai Watch  
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Promote pono (right or just) 
behavior and values/Inspire 
people to malama (care for) 
resources 
DAR: Makai Watch   
Protect important species or 
habitat 
DAR: MLCD, CBSFA* - if species or 
habitat is important to traditional fishing 
practices carried out for Native Hawaiian 
subsistence, culture and religion 
May need to 
demonstrate species or 
habitat importance 
through scientific 
research 
Mitigate or reduce land-based 
impacts/pollution 
*water quality 
OCCL: Special Management Area (SMA) 
DOH: Clean Water Branch (CWB) 
See management agency 
or landowner 
responsible for impacts 
Allow population recovery 
DAR:  MLCD, FMA, CBSFA* - if species 
or habitat is important to traditional fishing 
practices carried out for the purpose of 
Native Hawaiian subsistence, culture and 
religion 
Must document 
population changes over 
time 
Mitigate invasive species *No designation needed  
May remove if other 
marine resources are not 
impacted during 
extraction 
Improve rules compliance DAR: Makai Watch 
Makai Watch volunteers 
cannot enforce 
regulations.  
Protect marine resources 
important to traditional 
practices 
DAR: CBSFA  
Existing regulations/rules are 
ineffective 
DAR Marine Management Designations 
(MLCD, FMA, CBSFA) 
May need to justify 
ineffectiveness of 
existing 
regulations/rules 
Restore ecosystem 
dynamics/address changes in 
habitat, species or composition 
DAR: MLCD May need to justify restoration efforts 
 
The decision support tool in Table 5.2 provides a set of 14 potential goals communities might 
pursue, the agencies whose jurisdictions those goals fall under, available management tools, and 
some caveats to consider. Many goals align with multiple management options under the 
jurisdiction of one agency, while other goals such as land-based pollution and water quality may 
require collaboration with less apparent agencies such as the Department of Health, Clean Water 
Branch and Office of Coastal and Conservation Lands Special Management Areas. Also, 
communities looking to address fishing impacts or limiting extractive or commercial uses in their 
adjacent marine areas have several different management designations to consider. The decision 
support tool highlights some important nuances within certain designations. For example, there is 
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nothing in the suite of marine management statutes that would prohibit culturally based 
management rules if cultural expression is part of community goals. The caveats section is brief, 
but does raise some important issues for communities to consider. For instance, communities 
dealing with land-based or point-sources of pollution in a marine area may need to extend 
partnerships beyond the state to include private landowners within their specific watershed. 
Altogether, the decision support tool presents an institutional map that summarizes different 
authorities responsible for potential community-level goals.  
 
5.4.3 Property rights analysis of communities pursuing state-centric co-management 
Table 5.3 presents several of the communities designated as marine management areas currently 
partnering with the State of Hawai‘i, including the year they were instituted, the specific 
community group involved, and their main focus. The table also displays the property rights held 
by the community, the current rules governing the area, and whether or not they are currently 
pursuing a CBSFA. The table also includes the Hā‘ena and Mo‘omomi CBSFAs to provide a 
comparison with other marine management designations in terms of property rights, rules, and 
community involvement (see Table 5.3).  
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Table 5.3. Comparison of eight Hawai‘i marine management designation, community 
involvement, property rights, rules, whether the group is currently pursuing a CBSFA  
Marine 
Management 
Designation 
Management 
Area and year 
instituted 
Community 
group and year 
founded 
Focus of 
community 
group 
Property 
rights held by 
community 
Current 
rules 
Currently 
pursuing 
a 
CBSFA? 
Herbivore 
Fishery 
Management 
Area 
(HFMA) 
Kahekili 
(2009) 
Kā‘anapali 
Makai Watch 
(2010) 
Outreach, 
education and 
incident 
reporting of 
rules 
violations 
Access,  
Withdrawal 
(limited) 
To injure or 
remove sea 
urchins, 
rudderfish, 
parrotfish or 
surgeonfish; 
Fish feeding 
prohibited 
except for 
permitted 
marine life 
No 
Fishery 
Management 
Area (FMA) 
/Fishery 
Replenishme
nt Area 
(FRA) 
Miloli‘i 
(1998) 
Pa‘a Pono 
Miloli‘i (1980) 
Community-
based group 
focused on 
improving the 
quality of life 
in the area 
Access,  
Withdrawal, 
Management 
(limited) 
All fishing 
activities 
allowed 
except: 
aquarium 
fishing in 
exclusion 
zones; lay 
nets; fish 
feeding 
activities; 
multi-panel 
nets must be 
registered 
with the 
state. 
Yes 
Ho‘okena  
(FRA,1998) 
(FMA,1999) 
Kama‘āina 
United to 
Protect the 
‘Āina (KUPA) 
(1998) 
Conservation-
based 
organization 
focusing on 
sustainability 
and the 
protection of 
Hawaiian 
gathering 
rights in 
South Kona  
Access, 
Withdrawal Yes 
Kalako-
Hōnaunau 
(1998); 
Napo‘opo‘o-
Honaunau 
(1999) 
Ka ‘Ohana ‘O 
Honaunau 
(1998) 
Preserve 
coastal 
shoreline and 
natural 
resources via 
ecosystem-
based 
management; 
educate 
community & 
visitors	
Access,  
Withdrawal Yes 
Community-
based 
subsistence 
fishing area 
(CBSFA) Hā‘ena (2015) 
Hui 
Maka‘āinana o 
Makana (1998) 
Community-
based group 
with the goal 
of restoring 
Native 
Hawaiian 
values and 
stewardship 
practices 
Access, 
Withdrawal, 
Management 
(limited) 
Small no-
take area; 
gear 
restrictions 
based upon 
Customary 
Native 
Hawaiian 
practices 
- 
Community- Mo‘omomi  Hui Mālama o Maintain Access,  Permitted Yes 
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based 
subsistence 
fishing area 
(CBSFA) 
(1995-1999) Mo‘omomi 
(1994) 
natural 
resources at 
sustainable 
levels, 
educate 
novice fishers 
in customary 
methods and 
values; blend 
local 
knowledge 
and 
experience 
with modern 
scientific data 
collection 
Withdrawal, 
Management 
(limited) 
fishers must 
submit 
monthly 
catch 
reports; 
Pole-and-
line fishing, 
throw net, 
scoop net 
and hand-
harvesting 
allowed in 
Zone 1; 
Daytime 
spearfishing 
allowed, 
nighttime 
spearfishing 
prohibited 
and akule 
netting 
allowed in 
Zone 2.   
Marine Life 
Conservation 
District 
(MLCD) 
Pūpūkea-
Waimea (1983);  
Rules revised in 
2003.  
Mālama 
Pūpūkea-
Waimea (2005) 
Support, 
strengthen 
rules; 
outreach and 
education; 
discover 
pollution 
threats; 
develop 
funding 
streams for 
long-term 
support of 
organization 
Access,  
Withdrawal 
(limited), 
Management 
(limited) 
All fishing 
activities 
and take of 
geological 
features or 
specimen, 
except: 
Allowed to 
take up to 
two lbs of 
limu per 
day, per 
person; to 
take finfish 
from pole 
and line in 
Waimea Bay 
only; To 
take ‘opelu 
by net in 
August and 
September; 
To take 
akule by net 
in October 
and 
November;  
No 
Natural Area 
Reserve 
System 
(NARS) 
‘Āhihi-Kīna‘u  
Initially 
established in 
(1973); 
Management 
plan reviewed in 
‘Āhihi-Kīna‘u 
Natural Area 
Reserve/Keone‘
ōio Advisory 
Group (2004) 
Multi-
stakeholder 
group 
Access 
(limited) 
Preserve 
unique 
ecological, 
geological, 
and cultural 
resources 
No 
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2008, approved 
in (2013) 
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A. Management area, level of community involvement, focus  
The community-based management projects analyzed in this study are situated on five of the 
eight main Hawaiian Islands. Just two of the eight areas analyzed were designated in the last 20 
years (Kahekili and Hā‘ena). The majority were designated in the late 1990s (Miloli‘i, Ho‘okena, 
Honaunau, Mo‘omomi), with one in 1980s (Pūpūkea-Waimea), and one the early 1970s (‘Āhihi-
Kīna‘u). However, both Pūpūkea-Waimea and the ‘Āhihi-Kīna‘u statutes were significantly 
revised with community input in the 2000s and the 2010s, respectively. Newly formed 
community groups drove these revisions. Newly formed community groups motivated by 
changing social-ecological conditions were also involved in the management designation 
processes in other areas. Even though the official establishment of the community group may 
have occurred after the designation, community members were involved in the scoping or 
planning process.  
 
Although communities were involved in the designation process in each case, the focus of the 
community groups varied. The ‘Āhihi-Kīna‘u group convened as part of a management plan 
review and still meets regularly to review updates on any changes planned for the area. Pūpūkea-
Waimea provides outreach and education every Saturday on the coastline fronting a popular reef 
area. Ka‘anapali Makai Watch in Kahekili focuses on incident reporting, outreach and education. 
The Ka‘anapali Makai Watch contact for the area often coordinates community events in the 
West Maui area, focusing on marine environmental issues and awareness. Miloli‘i, Honaunau, 
Ho‘okena, and Mo‘omomi communities are all currently pursuing CBSFAs. Mo‘omomi was the 
first active CBSFA in the late 1990s, but its status was not made permanent and terminated in 
1999. At this time, it is unclear what Mo‘omomi’s revised rules will contain, but previous 
regulations for their area included a small no-take area, prohibitions on scuba spearfishing and 
night diving; and gear restrictions. The Mo‘omomi community is currently updating their 
management plan and rules package. Miloli‘i, Honaunau, and Ho‘okena are also working to 
build community support behind CBSFA proposals. Miloli‘i is a legislatively designated 
CBSFA, but has yet to submit a rules package to the state for review.  
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B. Property rights and current rules 
Federal and State laws state that rules apply equally to all citizens, which restricts the types of 
rules local communities may adopt at the local level. In terms of management rights, 
communities are ceded some management authority (rulemaking authority only), provided that 
rules apply equally to everyone. Hā‘ena, Mo‘omomi, Miloli‘i, and Pūpūkea-Waimea all actively 
worked with the DAR to devise local rules for their adjacent marine areas and thus hold limited 
management rights. Each of these four areas possesses access and withdrawal rights, but these 
rights are also not exclusive. Anyone entering these areas possesses the same rights to access and 
withdraw resource units subject to area rules. However, the rules governing the eight areas do 
diverge.  
 
As a natural area reserve that functions to protect unique cultural and ecological resources in 
perpetuity, rules governing ‘Āhihi-Kīna‘u prevents any extractive activities and restricts access 
in many areas. Rules in the NARS are enforced by DOCARE. In the Kahekili herbivore fisheries 
management area, rules restricts the take of any herbivorous reef fish. Honaunau, Miloli‘i, and 
Ho‘okena areas all have areas that restrict the take of ornamental reef fish targeted for aquarium 
collection. Hā‘ena’s rules include regulations that mandate fishers abide by cultural fishing 
practices specific to that area. Thus, rules privilege fishers in Hā‘ena proficient in those practices 
without excluding anyone from fishing. Formal enforcement is provided by DOCARE for all 
areas. Informal enforcement via Makai Watch is present for all areas except the ‘Āhihi-Kīna‘u 
NARS.  
 
C. Currently pursuing a CBSFA 
Four of the eight communities involved in a marine management partnership with the state of 
Hawai‘i are currently pursuing a community-based subsistence fishing area. Many communities 
across Hawai‘i look at the resource successes of the past as a model for the way forward. As 
described in Chapter 2, in the Hawaiian Kingdom, autonomy to manage coral reef fisheries was 
devolved to the local level. Decisions to harvest species were made in consult with expert local 
fishers and outsiders could not enter and harvest marine resources without express permission; 
this practice continued, albeit informally, into the recent past (Vaughan & Ayers, 2016). One 
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community described their involvement in another marine management designation in terms of 
an intermediary step towards a CBSFA and, ultimately, modernization of customary 
management plans. Regardless of opportunities presented through other marine management 
areas for co-management, many communities still choose to pursue Community based 
Subsistence Fishing Areas due to a perception that it is a step towards greater local autonomy 
and, eventually, Native Hawaiian sovereignty (Vaughan & Caldwell, 2015). Although not all 
community-state partnerships analyzed shared the same goals, many of the most engaged 
communities pursuing co-management may have loftier goals than collaborating to write new 
fisheries regulations.  
 
5.4.4 Ostrom’s design principles for common pool resources 
Based on over 100 case studies of common pool resources across the world, Elinor Ostrom 
devised eight design principles or ‘rules of thumb’ for enduring common pool resource 
institutions (E. Ostrom, 1990). Since then, scholars have used the design principles to evaluate 
common pool resource governance regimes across the globe. Twenty years after the original 
design principles were published, some scholars conducted a review of 91 studies that had used 
her design principles. After conducting the analysis, the authors found the design principles to be 
theoretically sound, but found a need to divide concepts contained in three of the principles in 
order to unpack some of their complexity (Cox, Arnold, & Tomas, 2010). Below in Table 5.4, 
Ostrom’s design principles are used to evaluate each of the eight areas presented in Figure 5.1 
and Table 5.2.  
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Table 5.4. Analyzing eight Hawai‘i marine management designation using Elinor Ostrom’s 
Design Principles revised by Cox et al (2010)  
 Area, Management Designation and (Community group responsible) 
Kahekili 
herbivore 
FMA 
(Ka‘anap
ali Makai 
Watch) 
Miloli‘i 
FMA/FRA 
(Pa‘a 
Pono 
Miloli‘i) 
Ho‘okena  
FRA, 
FMA 
(KUPA) 
Kalako-
Hōnaunau 
FMA; 
Napo‘opo‘o-
Honaunau 
FRA (Ka 
‘Ohana ‘O 
Honaunau) 
Hā‘ena 
CBSFA 
(Hui 
Maka‘āinana 
o Makana) 
Mo‘omomi 
CBSFA 
(Hui 
Mālama o 
Mo‘omomi
) 
Pūpūkea-
Waimea 
MLCD 
(Mālama 
Pūpūkea-
Waimea) 
‘Āhihi-
Kīna‘u 
NARS 
(Keone‘ōio 
Advisory 
Group) 
Design 
Principles 
Clearly 
Defined 
boundaries 
for local 
resource 
rights 
X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	
Resource 
boundaries 
are clearly 
defined 
X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	
Appropriatio
n rules 
correspond 
with local 
conditions 
X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	
Benefits are 
proportional 
to the inputs 
-	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	
Collective 
choice 
arrangements 
X	 X	 X	 X X X X X	
Monitoring 
is present for 
resources 
and behavior 
X	 -	 -	 -	 X	 X	 X	 X	
Monitors are 
accountable 
to or are the 
appropriators 
X	 -	 -	 -	 X	 X	 X	 X	
Graduated 
sanctions for 
rule-breakers 
X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	
Conflict 
resolution 
mechanisms 
-	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	
Rights to 
devise local 
institutions 
unchallenged 
by external 
groups 
-	 - - - - - - - 
Nested 
enterprises X X X X X X X X 
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A. Clearly Defined boundaries for local resource rights; 
B. Resource boundaries are clearly defined; 
Regulations are clear for resource access and extraction in all of the marine management 
designations analyzed in Table 5.4. The United States and the State of Hawai‘i constitutions 
specify that resource rules must apply equally to all users. The geographic boundaries for each 
area are also clearly defined geographically, with coastal landmarks and latitude and longitude to 
delineate boundaries.  
 
C. Appropriation rules correspond with local conditions 
Specific rules exist for each of the marine management areas analyzed in this study. However, 
rules were tied more closely to local conditions in the ‘Āhihi-Kīna‘u Natural Area Reserve, 
Hā‘ena and Mo‘omomi CBSFAs, Kahekili Herbivore FMA, the Pūpūkea-Waimea MLCD 
because regulations were specifically designed for those areas. The FMAs in Miloli‘i, Ho‘okena, 
and Honaunau also have specific rules tied to particular fishing practices. However, the FRAs in 
Miloli‘i, Ho‘okena, and Honaunau were created to meet the requirements of Act 306, a 
legislative mandate to protect 30% ornamental reef fish along the West Hawai‘i coastline from 
aquarium collection. Yet, in general, the marine management designations were created to tailor 
specific rules to local conditions and the areas in this study mostly meet these criteria. 
 
D. Benefits are proportional to the inputs 
At this time, there is no evidence to show that local communities that partner with the State of 
Hawai‘i are receiving, have received, or will receive resource benefits proportional to their time 
and effort. Most of the communities (and their NGO partners) analyzed in this chapter invested 
substantial resources to improve the stewardship of their areas. Community resources include 
opportunity and material costs of spending time to mobilize community members, organize 
meetings, and gather place-based social and ecological data. Often NGO partners assist by 
spending staff time on writing grants to enable stewardship and meeting activities, and to 
document community meetings. NGO partners also support communities by conducting or 
funding scientific studies such as resource monitoring. Despite the lack of resource benefits, 
communities and NGO partners persist in investing their time, money, and efforts to partner with 
the state of Hawai‘i. This observed behavior runs counter to this design principle and other 
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theories of institutional change that postulate that individuals will not invest in collective action 
if the costs exceed the expected returns (Basurto & Ostrom, 2009; E. Ostrom, 1990). This 
assumption does not hold true for the cases analyzed in this chapter.  
 
Although Hawai‘i communities may not receive benefits in the economic sense, the benefits they 
expect to receive are intertwined within a different worldview. Deep attachment to place and 
kuleana (responsibility) is a likely explanation for the sustained community investment and 
increased community involvement across Hawai‘i. Ceding responsibility to mālama (care for) 
their area is simply not an option for many Hawai‘i communities. There are stories from all over 
Hawai‘i (activism and civil disobedience to end the bombing of Kaho‘olawe are but one 
example) that detail the sacrifices people have made to mālama ‘āina in an attempt to restore 
culture and place. It is much deeper than just cultural expression. Beyond cultural expression, the 
attachment or connection to place is both tangible and spiritual for Hawai‘i communities. For 
example, many Native Hawaiians believe certain animals are ‘aumakua or an actual physical 
embodiment of their ancestors. Belief in ‘aumakua are but one example of the connection exists 
between kanaka (Native Hawaiians), the ‘āina (land and sea) and the many species that inhabit 
it. Additionally, stories from the recent past and Hawaiian legends may be embedded with 
knowledge that prescribe how to harvest in a pono (righteous) manner to ensure sustained, 
mutually beneficial relationships between people and the environment. So this kuleana is deeper 
than just place-based ecological and cultural restoration. It is a worldview in which people are a 
part of, not apart from the environment. Many Native Hawaiians tie the physical health of their 
communities to the health of their local environment. Viewed this way, there is almost no limit to 
what some Hawai‘i communities will do to protect and preserve the ‘āina, despite an absence of 
more tangible, monetary benefits.  
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E. Collective choice arrangements 
Collective choice arrangements are present in each of these cases, with one major caveat: any 
community can suggest new operational rules subject to approval via the administrative 
rulemaking process. Although anyone may propose rules, the administrative rulemaking process 
is so long and burdensome (from start to finish, rulemaking processes may take several years) 
that only the most committed and resourceful communities see their rules approved by the Board 
of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR), the de jure collective choice level of decision making. 
The BLNR is a seven member, appointed body that presides over any administrative rules 
changes. If a majority of BLNR board members approve a rules proposal, then their 
recommendation is forwarded to the Governor of Hawai‘i for final approval and signature. This 
bureaucracy may present an impediment to local collective choice. For example, Hā‘ena’s rules 
sat on the governor’s desk for nearly ten months before he signed them and they became formal 
administrative rules. 
 
F. Monitoring is present for resources and behavior 
G. Monitors are accountable to or are the appropriators 
Communities and the state perform resource-monitoring activities in all areas, but not always on 
a regular basis. Community members may perform more regular informal monitoring, which is 
not currently accepted by the State of Hawai‘i as valid data for rulemaking. For example, the 
State of Hawai‘i DAR determined that observational data and local knowledge could not justify 
closing a small area to fishing and diving within the Hā‘ena CBSFA. To local Hā‘ena fishermen 
and women that fish and monitor the area often, the area was a well-known juvenile fish habitat. 
The community had to partner with the University of Hawai‘i to perform an ecological study that 
confirmed community claims (Friedlander, Goodell, Schemmel, & Stamoulis, 2013). This data 
was later used to justify the creation of a small protected area.  
 
Monitoring of behavior (fishing or extractive activities) is present in five of the eight cases 
described in Table 5.4. Although monitoring should be present in all cases, state-level capacity is 
hampered by low budgets for environmental management. As a result, monitoring and 
enforcement actions are limited in most areas. To make up for this shortfall, monitoring and 
enforcement is supplemented in many of these cases through community-level Makai Watch 
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programs. Makai Watch empowers communities to perform outreach and education activities 
and report incident violations to the Division of Conservation and Resource Enforcement 
(DOCARE), the enforcement wing for the Department of Land and Natural Resources. Although 
a comprehensive examination of compliance has not been conducted across Hawai‘i, there is 
anecdotal evidence in these communities that a community level presence deters rule infractions. 
A community-level presence may include signage that displays area rules and volunteers to 
inform resource users of the current rules and regulations. If community volunteers recognize 
infractions, they can engage fishermen with educational materials or report them to DOCARE. In 
Kahekili, Ka‘anapali Makai Watch volunteers attempt to ensure fishers are not taking any of the 
prohibited herbivore reef fish. Since most coral reef fisheries species exhibit relatively low 
mobility, many of the Ka‘anapali volunteers that frequently swim and snorkel the area were able 
to recognize and name individual parrotfish. Volunteers know immediately when individual fish 
go missing due to predation or poaching, resulting in a very high degree of behavioral and 
resource monitoring in this area. Miloli‘i, Ho‘okena, and Honaunau do not have an active Makai 
Watch program but may benefit from some type of volunteer engagement with the state in the 
future.  
 
H. Graduated sanctions for rule-breakers 
In the majority of management areas, graduated sanctions for resource infractions are available. 
In 2015, the State of Hawai‘i became just the second state in the U.S. (along with Vermont) to 
institute an environmental court system. The environmental court employs specialized judges 
with knowledge of environmental cases and instituted a civil penalty system for resource 
infractions. If the rules infraction is minor, the defendant may pay a small fine in lieu of a costly 
court appearance. Additionally, if a rules infraction is more serious, then the rule-breaker could 
be required to pay a large fine; perform community service in support of an environmental issue 
or program; or serve jail time. Informally, some communities will intercept rules violators and 
explain why their rule-breaking behavior is not pono (right or just). If community members 
know the violator, they may also employ shaming tactics. Whether formal only or in 
combination with informal interventions, graduated sanctions exist in each of these cases. 
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I. Conflict resolution mechanisms 
At this time, other than the court system, there is no formal conflict resolution present in any of 
the areas. There are no formal and established conflict resolution programs in place at the state 
level. However, informal meetings occur between DAR planners or other agency officials, which 
may address some disputes over rulemaking. In some instances, informal conflict resolution may 
exist at the community level through site-based interventions between community members. 
Another special type of conflict resolution is Ho‘oponopono, an indigenous conflict resolution 
process. However, Ho‘oponopono is dependent on willing participants and a skillful practitioner.  
 
J. Rights to devise local institutions unchallenged by external groups 
In Hawai‘i, the right to devise local institutions is frequently challenged by external groups. 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that organized interests present a significant barrier to co-management in 
Hawai‘i. Since rights to organize are challenged, transaction costs become a significant barrier. 
Communities and their NGO partners are faced with the burden of gathering scientific 
information, gathering public input, and organizing at the community level (see Chapter 4). Until 
recently, the State of Hawai‘i has largely stayed out of co-management planning. Historically, 
the partnering agency for marine resources, the Division of Aquatic Resources, has been very 
reluctant to support any proposals where opposition is present. Recent approvals such as Hā‘ena 
and Kā‘upulehu (two areas met by organized resistance of varying levels) provide some evidence 
that DAR’s stance is changing. Yet greater state-level investments to offset local-level 
transaction costs or softening of the data requirements may be necessary to shorten the time from 
planning to implementation for co-management.  
 
K. Nested enterprises 
Hawai‘i, like much of the United States, can be characterized as a polycentric governance 
system, with multiple, fragmented, and formally independent centers of decision making 
authority (V. Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961). Although co-management and the partnerships 
described in this chapter involve communities of resource users and the State of Hawai‘i DAR, 
there are several other jurisdictions that may complicate or influence rulemaking, as evidenced in 
Table 5.2. At the state level, co-management regulations that fall under the jurisdiction of 
another state-level branch must go through a completely different public review through the 
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Chapter 91 rulemaking process. For instance, there is no mechanism to allow community-
developed rules that prohibit boating or recreation in addition to fishing effort to enter an 
integrated approval process. Yet at this time, proposed boating and recreation regulations must 
go through a separate rulemaking process. This significantly increases the transaction costs 
associated with more encompassing or integrated management at the community level.  
 
This is significant because recreational businesses have become entrenched interests with 
compelling claims to many ocean resources. These businesses pay taxes, employ local people, 
and are largely non-extractive, even if they impact ecosystems in some manner. Cumulatively 
however, recreational businesses may impede customary practices or interfere with the behavior 
of certain species like marine mammals. The Marine Mammals Protection Act protects marine 
mammals such as Spinner Dolphins (Stenella longirostris longirostris) and Humpback Whales, 
and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration regulates any human and recreational 
impacts to the species. Communities in West Hawai‘i were alarmed at the increasing number of 
businesses bringing tourists to swim with the dolphins, which rest and sleep during the day and 
may be disturbed by constant interactions with tourists. Communities also believe that these 
tours may also affect the behavior of schooling coastal pelagic fish species, and interact with the 
local fishermen trying to catch these fish.  
 
The interactions with marine mammals described above highlight just one of the many complex, 
interconnected issues that arise between the diverse activities of marine tour operators, the 
livelihoods of local communities, and the health of marine resources. Although nested 
enterprises exist in Hawai‘i, human values, marine resource uses, and different epistemologies 
often come in conflict in what may be deemed a complex environmental commons (Kauneckis & 
Imperial, 2007). In a complex environmental commons, fragmented, overlapping centers of 
authority may significantly complicate rulemaking. The fragmented nature of the commons and 
competing interests complicates the missions of Hawai‘i communities seeking partnerships with 
the state to improve stewardship.  
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5.5 DISCUSSION 
 
Analysis of existing marine management designations, a property rights analysis, and 
comparison of design principles for eight different marine management designations yielded 
some important findings for the theory and practice of co-management. First, depending on the 
scope of proposed co-management rules, fragmented marine management authority may provide 
new opportunities for co-management or complicate implementation. Second, analysis of 
property rights and community fieldwork uncovered a tension between co-management and 
underlying community goals. Co-management devolves relatively little formal rights and some 
communities analyzed in this study are interested in increasing local management authority. 
Lastly, results of an institutional analysis of the design principles for each area revealed some 
important findings for both co-management implementation and common pool resource theory. 
This section concludes by considering some additional ways forward for co-management.  
 
 
5.5.1 Fragmented marine management authority and co-management implementation 
Institutional and legal analysis of legal statutes and how they are implemented may yield 
multiple marine management possibilities for co-management. Several marine management 
designations are available that may accomplish very similar community goals in co-management. 
On the surface, marine management designations in Hawai‘i are seemingly well defined, yet the 
same goals could be accomplished by two or more marine management designations. In contrast, 
there is little variation in terms of regulatory or permitted activities being implemented within a 
given designation. Thus the authorizing statutes for the different marine management 
designations allow for opportunistic communities to construct rules in new and creative ways. 
For example, statutes allow permitting authority via MLCDs and FMAs. Permits could create a 
de facto managed access, whereby fishers would have to complete an educational course. 
Permits could be issued with priority to ancestral or local residents of a given area first or 
grandfathered in, which has been shown to an incentive to collective action in other studies 
(Anderson, Arnason, & Libecap, 2011). Permits are currently used in some Hawai‘i freshwater 
fishing areas via Public Fishing Areas. Theoretically, permits could also be applied to marine 
management areas. 
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Although multiple pathways exist for co-management in Hawai‘i via the different management 
designations, fragmented authority may complicate integrated management. Institutional and 
legal analysis originally focused on four alternative state level management designations for co-
management: FMAs, FRAs, MLCDs, and NARS. Once an early draft of the decision support 
tool was shared with community members, they voiced a desire to address impacts outside of the 
marine areas. The community members viewed recognized that many of the impacts to their 
marine areas originate from the land, via runoff from sedimentation and agriculturally-based 
pollution. As a result, they felt a need to view the impacts to marine areas in a holistic manner, 
similar to the traditional management regime in Hawai‘i under the ahupua‘a system. Ahupua‘a 
were ecologically aligned, culturally appropriate, and spatially bounded areas once used by 
Native Hawaiians to maximize land and ocean productivity while minimizing negative impacts 
(Gonschor & Beamer, 2014). Many resource management entities acknowledge the effectiveness 
of ahupua‘a management or integrated management (Vaughan, Thompson, & Ayers, 2016). 
 
To address all potential community goals and modernize ahupua‘a management, community 
members may need to work with as many as eight different agencies and an undetermined 
number of private sector business or landowners. All of these potential partners exert some 
authority via uses or property rights. The fragmented authority creates a daunting task for 
communities and their NGO partners seeking integrated mountain (mauka) to sea (makai) 
management. Thus multilateral collaboration – between communities, state and federal agencies, 
landowners, and private sector businesses – is needed if integrated management is to occur. The 
areas where integrated management is currently being implemented (for example, Waipā on 
Kaua‘i), are places where one land owner owns most or all of the ahupua‘a. In instances such as 
Waipā, where Kamehameha Schools owns the land, agreements are much easier to reach and 
transaction costs are vastly reduced due to fewer parties present in the negotiation or public 
process.  
 
If community goals seek to address impacts from mauka to makai in areas with 
multijurisdictional authorities, then perhaps building conflict management strategies into 
multilateral collaborations or negotiations may be necessary (Kauneckis & Imperial, 2007). In 
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complex, multi-party watershed collaborations, Kauneckis and Imperial (2007) suggested multi-
party collaborations are inherently conflict-filled processes and therefore collaborators needed to 
establish trust with one another; develop a shared definition of the problem; find mutual 
interests; balance power and authority; and increase the number diversity policy solutions 
available. Adding these strategies to manage conflict of multi-party collaborations along with 
implementation of  conflict resolution strategies within governance regimes should help increase 
the likelihood of meeting the goals of integrated management. 
 
5.5.2 Tension between co-management and underlying community goals 
Similar to the findings in Chapter 2, examination of the property rights uncovered relatively 
limited amount of rights devolved to communities. Although communities were involved in a 
variety of different ways, just four of the eight areas analyzed in Table 5.2 exhibited shared 
management rights at the community level (also see Figure 5.1). Two of these areas were 
CBSFAs (Mo‘omomi and Hā‘ena), one was an FMA (Miloli‘i), with limited rules to protect 
traditional opelu (pacific mackerel scad, Decapterus spp.) fishing practices. The other was an 
MLCD (Pūpūkea-Waimea), or marine protected area. This area still allows some fishing with 
specific gear types within its boundaries. Regulating gear types, resource uses, and culturally 
important species have likely created value for all resource users. Yet exclusive rights were not 
devolved to communities in any of the other areas that involved community-state partnerships. 
Anyone entering those areas shares the same rights as their adjacent communities. Despite the 
relative lack of exclusive local rights and the theorized stewardship incentives that accompany 
them, there is still significant interest in grassroots marine resource management.  
 
Over 20 Hawai‘i communities have reported interest in CBSFAs for the marine areas (Higuchi, 
2008). As described in this chapter, 21 other communities are partnering with the state in some 
capacity via other marine management designations. Of the eight communities analyzed in this 
study and compared in Table 5.2, four of them involved in a non-CBSFA partnership with the 
state are actively pursuing a CBSFA. For these communities, a CBSFA designation is an 
expression of their cultural practices, knowledge, and stewardship. As Hā‘ena’s rules have 
demonstrated, it can also be a creative way to manage and limit access to their area, thus 
privileging local residents that are proficient in traditional harvesting practices. There is a 
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perception among these communities that CBSFAs are a pathway to strengthening local level 
rights. One Hawai‘i community organizer led off community meetings with an explanation that 
CBSFAs were not about sovereignty or konohiki rights. Only later on did the organizer 
understand how much community efforts were intertwined with Native Hawaiian sovereignty 
efforts (Vaughan & Caldwell, 2015, p. 56). Erroneous or not, there is a perception among 
communities that a CBSFA designation will confer more rights to communities than other 
designations. Likewise, efforts to increase local level stewardship via CBSFAs may be 
embedded within a larger Hawaiian cultural renewal, resistance against U.S. occupation, and a 
rejection of western-based property rights that do not allow exclusive local level fisheries rights. 
Thus for some Hawai‘i communities, a CBSFA designation may be viewed as an act of 
resistance to this system and a small step towards sovereignty. 
 
5.5.3 Ostrom’s Design Principles and Hawai‘i Co-management 
Elinor Ostrom’s design principles have been used to evaluate the robustness of common pool 
resource governance for nearly three decades. Case studies from around the world have used this 
framework to guide common pool resources inquiry and there is now a significant amount of 
data available to evaluate how different configurations of design principles perform in different 
resource settings. The design principles have also been parsed from a list of eight, to eleven by 
Cox et al (2010) in order to disambiguate many of the elements in the original list. In light of 
revisions to the design principles, recent scholarship has re-examined their efficacy for effective 
governance of common pool resources. A group of researchers re-coded a large N dataset of case 
studies in order to test Ostrom’s design principles across a variety of areas, contexts, and scales 
(Baggio et al., 2016). Among 69 case studies analyzed with complete data on design principles 
and governance outcomes, the researchers found that areas with nine or more (out of eleven 
total) design principles present all had successful governance regimes (Ibid). Conversely, Baggio 
et al (2016) also found that fisheries cases were never successful without the combination of 
rules that match local conditions; benefits that are proportional to inputs; accountability of those 
monitoring the resource; and graduated sanctions. Although these findings do not present the 
final word on different configurations of design principles, they provide ever-stronger evidence 
for certain combinations.  
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Five of the eight areas analyzed in this study exhibited the presence of eight design principles, 
with six principles present in the other three cases (Table 5.3). Monitors were accountable in five 
of eight areas, and graduated sanctions are present in all of them. Additionally, rules match local 
conditions in all of the areas. However, the benefits are not proportional to community-level 
inputs. In Hawai‘i co-management, communities and their NGO partners have invested 
significant time, effort, and resources towards co-management planning and implementation, 
with relatively little investment or contribution by the State of Hawai‘i (see Chapter 4). Until 
recently, the cost-benefit incongruence can be partly explained by a State government that was 
reluctant to cede any authority to or investment in communities. The lack of State Government 
investment notwithstanding, perhaps the biggest explanation for the imbalance between inputs 
and benefits has been transaction costs (see Chapter 4). Transaction costs are a large barrier to 
co-management implementation in Hawai‘i, but as of yet, they have not deterred communities 
from pursuing co-management partnerships. Depending on how benefits are defined, common 
pool resource theory (cost-benefit accounting) would say that resource users would not labor to 
change operational rules if the costs of their efforts exceed the potential returns. In Hawai‘i, this 
perceived imbalance (in traditional cost-benefit accounting) may in part be explained by a deep 
kuleana or responsibility to take care of their local areas. Although the benefits to these efforts 
may not be measured in an economic sense, clearly perceptions of increased local authority are 
one benefit. These efforts may have cultural and spiritual benefits, since many individuals view 
themselves and their ancestors as an integral component of the health of that system. 
 
To date, the design principle most likely responsible for slowing co-management transitions in 
Hawai‘i has been the right to devise institutions that are not challenged by outside groups or 
government officials. In Hawai‘i, rights to organize and develop rules are vigorously challenged 
by organized interests and governments alike. This opposition occurs regardless of the marine 
management designation. With four or five opportunities for public comment on any rules 
changes, the rulemaking process itself presents challenges to local rights to organize and devise 
rules. Some communities have overcome this significant obstacle, but it has taken up to ten years 
to do so (Vaughan & Caldwell, 2015). Likewise, outside of the court system, formal conflict 
resolution mechanisms are absent in all eight cases analyzed.  
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Many of the rural communities involved in co-management planning (for example, Mo‘omomi, 
Miloli‘i, Hā‘ena, Ho‘okena, Honaunau) fall under the group size threshold (500-600 individuals) 
thought to be the upper bound for collective action in co-management (Agrawal, 2001; Agrawal 
& Goyal, 2001; Cinner et al., 2007). Yet with the addition of multiple stakeholder interests, that 
number is substantially increased. Add in the overall population size of the islands within which 
the co-management areas reside and planning becomes much more complicated. In addition, the 
island-level populations do not include tourists (that also visit and access areas) and public 
meeting processes substantially increase the complexity of public planning and rulemaking 
processes. Due to these factors, the number of relevant users or stakeholders can be exceedingly 
difficult to assess (on the state side) or engage (on the community side). This may be further 
complicated by the heterogeneity of ethnic groups, cultures, interests, and worldviews in Hawai‘i 
(Umemoto, 2001).  
 
5.5.4 Additional ways forward for co-management 
Co-management is most often described as a partnership between community of resource users 
and a resource management agency. In Hawai‘i however, additional institutional complexity via 
overlapping state and federal rules and private property rights considerably complicates this 
arrangement. Co-management in Hawai‘i is more akin to ‘multi-party co-management’ that are 
typified by multiple competing interests and multi-party agreements (Brown, 2003; Pinkerton, 
1994). In this way, co-management in Hawai‘i may more closely resemble watershed or large 
landscape partnerships present on the U.S. mainland (Imperial, 2005). In these commons 
situations, scholars have posited that conflict management mechanisms may be necessary to 
increase the likelihood of successful collaboration (Kauneckis & Imperial, 2007). In Lake Tahoe, 
California,  regional plan development and a problem-solving coalition helped usher in 
collaborations that encouraged cooperation from groups that were once at odds. As a result of 
this process, participants were able to identify new funding sources for their work, and move 
away from regulatory approaches that were ineffective (Imperial & Kauneckis, 2003). Land 
acquisition and upland habitat restoration were two specific cooperative approaches that were 
effective in improving environmental quality in Lake Tahoe. Neither of these projects involved 
new regulation, but instead focused on creative problem solving. Perhaps cultural and ecological 
restoration projects could help address disputes inherent to differing perceptions of natural 
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resource uses, values, and ways of knowing in Hawai‘i. Cooperative approaches such as 
restoration projects could identify funding sources and build trust to help overcome the inertia 
often present in early collaborative efforts.  
 
Given the scale of interests, institutions, and complexity present in Hawai‘i coral reef fisheries 
management, perhaps network governance might be an alternative or supplement to co-
management (Bixler, McKinney, & Scarlett, 2016). Network governance can take a variety of 
forms so it is important to define and distinguish between them. For this case, I use the definition 
provided by Provan and Kenis (2008). They define network governance as “groups of three or 
more legally autonomous organizations that work together to achieve not only their own goals 
but also a collective goal” (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 3). Network governance may be necessary 
in situations where existing problem-solving capacity is low, collective action or collaborations 
may be necessary, and opportunities for mutual benefit exist (Scarlett & McKinney, 2016). 
Hawai‘i marine management is hampered by low capacity (Levine & Richmond, 2015; Levine & 
Richmond, 2014). As described in Imperial & Kauneckis (2003), identifying mutually beneficial 
(win-win or at least no-lose) restoration projects among an organizational network could jump 
start collaboration, build trust, and help address many of the difficult capacity-related and cross-
jurisdictional issues identified by communities. The decision support tool could be a starting 
point for communities looking to partners for these collaborations. However, network 
governance, like any governance solution, is not a panacea for complex common pool resource 
issues (E. Ostrom, 2007). For network governance – or any collaborative governance – to be 
successful, it must support existing institutions, find mutual interests, share power, and devise 
new creative solutions to complex problems (Kauneckis & Imperial, 2007).  
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5.6. CONCLUSION 
 
Co-management has emerged as a novel natural resources governance arrangement in response 
to ineffective or nonexistent centralized management. Yet many early co-management transitions 
have been stymied by a reluctance on the part of the state or governance network to adequately 
cede rights or decentralize authority (Cinner, Daw, et al., 2012; Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997). For 
progress to be made in state-centric or multi-party co-management, there must be spaces for 
dialogue, communication, and learning (Plummer & Armitage, 2007). This is particularly in 
areas such as Hawai‘i, where local authority is vigorously challenged and government authority 
is rarely ceded. While communities or resource users may have longer term goals of increased 
management authority, working within the rules and pursuing different pathways to co-
management can be a viable option for communities so long as their goals remain simple and 
solely focused on fisheries or marine resources. More ambitious, integrated co-management 
initiatives will likely require longer time commitments, collaboration across multiple 
government agencies and the private sector, and strategies to manage conflict in order to ensure 
the likelihood of a fruitful collaborative process. Even if the scope of community goals remains 
small and focused on fisheries, networked governance may be a viable option in Hawai‘i and 
other geographies with diverse and complex actors, institutions, organizations, jurisdictions, and 
values are present.  
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Chapter 6. 
Reexamining leadership in fisheries co-management 
 
Thus far throughout the dissertation, the chapters have utilized a number of institutional 
frameworks to better understand governance transitions to co-management. Previous chapters 
examined how rights to fisheries have changed over time (Chapter 2); the emergence of co-
management governance (Chapter 3); the barriers to co-management planning and 
implementation (Chapter 4); and some potential alternative co-management pathways (Chapter 
5). Leadership is one aspect of co-management planning and implementation that is often 
described to be important for planning, governance transitions, and for driving positive social-
ecological outcomes. Scholars have posited that leadership may enhance trust and cooperation, 
help guide collective processes, and lower the costs of governance transitions. Viewed in this 
way, leadership could have been a continuous thread throughout this dissertation. Other chapters 
have referenced it or alluded to it, but it has not been explored in depth. In conducting this 
dissertation research, it became apparent that leadership in Hawai‘i co-management deserved its 
own distinct chapter separate from the others. In this chapter I will take a deeper look into the 
role of leadership in Hawai‘i co-management planning and implementation. I will examine the 
role of leadership in Hawai‘i co-management transitions by presenting the results of semi-
structured interviews (N=41) with community members, practitioners, planners, and government 
employees involved in co-management. Then I will identify which leadership types are effective 
for co-management. I will also examine which aspects or dimensions of leadership are most 
important in the context of co-management planning and implementation in Hawai‘i. This 
chapter will conclude by relating the findings back to theories about leadership in co-
management and considering the significance of the findings for practice.  
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Many societal and environmental problems such as large marine ecosystems and watersheds are 
exceedingly complex or exist at a scale that necessitates collaboration or collective action 
(Imperial, 2005; Kauneckis & Imperial, 2007; E. Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard, & 
Policansky, 1999). The ineffectiveness of bureaucracy-based, command and control approaches 
in many resource settings has led to several governance innovations to increase collaboration 
(Parlee & Wiber, 2014). Co-management is one of the most promising collaborative governance 
innovations for global fisheries because it offers the possibility of adapting institutions to local 
contexts, enhancing rule compliance, improving stakeholder engagement, and empowering 
participants to participate in the regulatory process (Acheson, 2003; Carlsson & Berkes, 2005; 
Jentoft, 2005; Jentoft et al., 1998). Much research has examined how co-management emerges 
(Ayers & Kittinger, 2014; Basurto et al., 2012) and transitions or ‘transforms’ from the existing 
governance regime into co-management (Gelcich et al., 2010; Olsson et al., 2006; Olsson, Folke, 
& Hahn, 2004; Westley et al., 2011). Other research has focused on understanding the conditions 
associated with successful governance transformations and management outcomes (Cinner, 
McClanahan, et al., 2012a; Olsson et al., 2006; Pomeroy et al., 2001).  
 
In a global review of co-managed fisheries, the presence of leadership was considered to be the 
largest driver of successful co-management governance (Gutierrez et al., 2011). Leadership or 
leaders are sometimes conceptualized as policy entrepreneurs that can anticipate windows of 
opportunity (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Kingdon, 1995). Leaders may also be conceptualized 
as social entrepreneurs or change agents (Purdue, 2001). There is a line of scholarship that 
describes leadership in terms of institutional entrepreneurs that change existing institutions 
(Rosen & Olsson, 2013; Westley et al., 2011). From a structural perspective, leaders are 
sometimes described as brokers or key individuals with access to large social networks (Bodin, 
Crona, & Ernstson, 2006; Bodin & Crona, 2008). Leadership is thought to lower the strategic 
costs associated with governance transformations (E. Ostrom et al., 1993) and is highly 
associated with self-organization activities (E. Ostrom, 2009), which is a precursor to collective 
action and institutional change (E. Ostrom, 1990). Leaders are thought to give credibility to 
agreements (Cudney-Bueno & Basurto, 2009), create shared thought structures (Westley & 
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Vredenburg, 1997), and provide access to information flows and networks of relationships 
(Bodin et al., 2006). In large collaborative settings such as watersheds, leaders may play different 
roles or multiple leaders may exist that drive processes, coordinate events, or facilitate meetings 
(Born & Genskow, 2001). Due to their ability to increase trust, local leaders are thought to 
decrease the transformation costs associated with institutional change (E. Ostrom et al., 1999). 
The credibility of leaders is also increased when they exhibit knowledge of resource dynamics or 
social-ecological systems (Berkes, Colding, et al., 2000; E. Ostrom, 2009). Leadership is often 
described as an essential component of successful co-management processes and outcomes 
(Berkes, 2009).  
 
In summary, the academic literature on leadership in co-management and collective action 
describes leaders in three major categories. The first is sometimes referred to as charismatic or 
transformative leadership, where leaders may inspire or influence participants to act (Bass & 
Riggio, 2006). This form of leadership follows more a traditional leader-follower archetype. 
Institutional entrepreneurs, policy entrepreneurs or social entrepreneurs/change agents can be 
placed in this category. The second type is collaborative leadership, which is notable for its 
absence of a single leader. In collaborative leadership, participants take turns leading and 
following to reach a shared vision, goals, and decisions (Imperial et al., 2016). This type of 
leadership focuses more on process skills such as coordinating events, facilitating meetings, and 
emphasizing the credibility of processes. The third leadership category in co-management or 
collective action focuses on the structural or personal attributes necessary for effective leadership 
(Bodin et al., 2006; E. Ostrom, 2009). The attributes may include trust-building, providing 
access to information or possessing networks of relationships.  
 
To define leadership in the context of co-management, I choose the broader definition offered by 
Evans et al. (2015) that examined the role of leadership in the environmental sciences. The 
authors conceived of leadership as: “…people, e.g., leaders, entrepreneurs, champions, brokers, 
and organizations or groups, and associated characteristics, roles, and actions that affect 
environmental outcomes” (Evans et al., 2015). Although there seems to be wide agreement that 
leadership is beneficial in much of the academic literature, leadership studies in the 
environmental sciences primarily focuses on the presence of leadership in one individual (Case 
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et al., 2015; Evans et al., 2015). This may be conceptualized as the heroic individual or ‘great 
man’ (Case, French, & Simpson, 2011). Scholars rarely capture the complex and evolving role of 
leadership in collaborative governance settings (Imperial et al., 2016). Likewise, the nuance of 
leadership is rarely captured in the context of social movements and collective action, which is 
the origin of many community-based co-management efforts (Melucci, 1996). Moreover, there is 
a lack of inquiry into how leadership “emerges, evolves, or practically achieves results such as 
knowledge building, trust-building, and conflict management” (Case et al., 2015, p. 14). Many of 
the same questions have plagued leadership scholarship for decades (Pfeffer, 1977).  
 
I intend to contribute to the understanding of leadership in collaborative settings by examining a 
case study of co-management transitions in Hawai‘i coral reef fisheries. In Hawai‘i, an 
institutional pathway exists that allows communities to partner with the State of Hawai‘i to co-
manage coral reef fisheries via community-based subsistence fishing areas (CBSFAs) or co-
management. CBSFAs allow communities to collaborate with the State of Hawai‘i to develop 
rules and management plans for nearshore coral reef fisheries for the purpose of “subsistence,” 
or “the customary and traditional Native Hawaiian uses of renewable ocean resources for direct 
personal or family consumption or sharing” (Higuchi, 2008; Levine & Richmond, 2014). 
However, few successful co-management partnerships have emerged in the past 25 years despite 
enabling legislation, a set of highly motivated communities, significant NGO and foundation 
support, and a multitude of individuals widely identified as excellent local leaders. Outside of 
CBSFAs, 21 Hawai‘i communities have developed partnerships analogous to co-management 
outside of the defined CBSFA (co-management) pathway (see Chapter 5).  
 
In the resilience literature, tranformability refers to the ability of a complex social, ecological or 
economic system to ‘transform’ the existing system (Folke et al., 2010). In Hawai‘i, a 
transformation pathway was opened in the early 1990s when a few loosely organized 
communities self-organized in response to resource depletion and increasing conflict over 
increasingly scarce marine resources (see Chapter 3). Since then, the transformation has 
transitioned into an increasingly coordinated purposive social movement of about 30 Hawai‘i 
communities seeking a larger role in marine resource management (Berkhout et al., 2004; 
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Pinkerton, 1993). I will explore the role of leadership in these governance transformations and 
over the past 25 years and in the context of increasing coordination in this past decade.  
 
In a review of global fisheries, Gutierrez et al (2011) found that leadership was the biggest driver 
of successful management. However, the study has been criticized because it coded cases based 
upon the presence or absence of leadership, thus removing any context from analysis. This 
research intends to provide greater clarity regarding the role of leadership in collaborative 
fisheries management at the community level through a case study of co-management transitions 
in the Hawaiian Islands. The three guiding research questions are:  
 
1) What is the role of leadership in facilitating shared management authority in Hawai‘i co-
management transitions? 
2) What types of leadership are effective in Hawai‘i communities in the context of fisheries 
co-management? 
3) What are the personal attributes that contribute to successful leadership in community 
based management? 
 
The findings should contribute to better understanding of effective leadership in fisheries co-
management and which types of leadership are more effective in collaborative resource 
management settings.  
 
6.2 METHODS 
 
6.2.1 Research approach 
This research utilized a qualitative approach. A total of 41 interviews were conducted over four 
years from 2012-2015 with individuals from fishing communities, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), foundations, state and federal governments, environmental consulting, 
and academia. The fieldwork was conducted in two stages. First, several key individuals were 
identified during informal conversations over a two year period between May 2010 and March 
2012. The informal conversations informed a purposive sampling approach, whereby individuals 
were selected based upon their topical expertise in fisheries co-management planning across 
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Hawai‘i. Purposive sampling involves selecting and studying information rich cases that directly 
relate to the purpose of the research (Patton, 2002, p. 46). In this case, information rich cases 
were communities achieving some degree of success in partnering with the state of Hawai‘i to 
co-manage marine resources. The individuals purposefully identified for interviews included 
community leaders, fishermen involved in community-level rulemaking, state- and federal-level 
planners and administration, and NGO employees involved in Hawai‘i co-management 
processes. Purposive sampling is useful in case study research, where phenomena are studied in 
depth, in context, and other sampling methods are not appropriate or feasible (Patton, 2002). 
Following initial interviews, chain or network sampling was used to identify additional 
knowledgeable individuals until theoretical saturation was reached, in other words, no new 
themes or categories were noted during data collection (Bernard, 2013, p. 533). A total of 18 
interviews were conducted in this first phase between March and December 2013.  
 
The second stage of fieldwork entailed in depth interviews with 23 individuals from six 
communities purposively selected for the amount and quality of community involvement in co-
managing nearshore marine resources with the State of Hawai‘i (see Table 6.1). Out of a possible 
22 communities currently actively involved in co-managing nearshore marine resources in some 
capacity with the state of Hawai‘i, a total of six communities were selected for fieldwork due to 
the durability and quality of their relationship with the state. Put another way, their partner 
relationship is ongoing and has lasted several years; variation in terms of the marine management 
designations currently in use and the island(s) in which they are situated; and some level of 
social-ecological success. Early informal conversations with individuals in these communities 
led to identification of key informants and specialized informants with specific expertise related 
to durable fisheries co-management implementation across Hawai‘i (Bernard, 2013, p. 171). 
Similar to the first phase of fieldwork, these individuals identified additional respondents for 
interviews via chain or network sampling until themes collected in the interviews converged. 
These interviews were conducted over one year from July 2014 and June 2015. Interview 
questions remained the same for both stages of fieldwork.  
 
The interview questions utilized an inductive approach. Respondents were asked to describe 
what leadership meant to them and which types of leadership were most effective. These 
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questions were asked without presenting them with any constrained choices. The responses to the 
questions were analyzed inductively, using a grounded theory approach (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008). Next, interview respondents were asked about six different attributes or dimensions of 
leadership. Specifically, they were asked to describe whether they were important in the context 
of Hawai‘i co-management. These questions focused on the dimensions of leadership developed 
from a literature review of relevant academic publications describing leadership. The dimensions 
included: access to resources, knowledge of social-ecological resource system dynamics, trust-
building capability, ability to guide collective choice processes, ability to navigate the 
bureaucratic and policy process; and access to networks of relationships (Born & Genskow, 
2001; Chaskin, 2001; Leach & Pelkey, 2001; Olsson et al., 2006; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). 
Full interview questions can be found in the Appendix.  
 
Table 6.1. Interview respondents by sector 
Phase One Phase Two 
Interviewee sector Total 
interviews 
Field site Total interviews 
State government 6 Ka‘anapali/Kahekili (Maui) 10 
 
NGO/Foundation 
 
4 
 
Pūpūkea-Waimea (O‘ahu) 
 
6 
(via focus group) 
 
Community 
 
3 
 
‘Ahihi-Kina‘u (Maui) 
 
4 
 
Federal government 
 
2 
 
Miloli‘i, Ho‘okena, Honaunau 
(Hawai‘i Island) 
 
3 
 
Academia 
 
2 
 
Consulting 
 
1 
 
6.2.2 Data analysis 
With informed consent, all interviews were audio recorded and transcribed, then analyzed using 
NVivo 9 qualitative data analysis software. Data analysis followed an iterative process whereby 
interview transcripts were first coded by question type then later by patterns and themes (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994). Next, responses for each leadership dimension were flagged based upon 
whether the respondent identified them to be important for co-management planning and 
implementation. Themes created during the coding were categorized and counted to provide a 
general idea of commonality or disparity among themes. These themes are only generalizable to 
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theory or theoretical propositions (Bernard & Ryan, 2009). However, findings reported from 
these Hawai‘i case studies selected for their durable and successful partnership with the state can 
generate some important insights that can expand and generalize to theory (Yin, 2009) or better 
contextualize the role of leadership in co-management transitions. Likewise, the findings may 
help add context to tools such as the social-ecological systems (SES) framework (Epstein et al., 
2013; E. Ostrom, 2009).  
 
6.3 RESULTS 
 
The findings are presented below in two parts. First, some respondent quotes are presented 
regarding leadership and of leadership types in co-management. The interview quotes are 
presented along with some explanation to provide context to the raw responses. The next section, 
leadership dimensions, displays findings to interview questions on the various dimensions of 
leadership from the academic literature. The leadership dimensions section displays findings 
from coding based upon six leadership types deemed to be important components of leadership 
in the context of co-management transitions.  
 
6.3.1 Leadership and leadership types in co-management 
Many interview respondents explained that leadership was an important component of successful 
co-management. However, a majority of these individuals stated that co-management worked 
best when leadership responsibilities are shared by the group and not exclusive to just one 
individual. Respondents often cited the importance of process-based skills such as building 
capacity and support; ensuring community members are engaged, with an emphasis on outreach 
and developing a shared vision at the community level. Although a majority of individuals cited 
the importance of collective leadership, others still highlighted a more mainstream view of what 
most people think of when they hear leadership in the U.S. I’m calling this type of leadership 
‘western-based leadership’ since it closely resembles the conventional leader-follower archetype. 
Responses in this group typically described leaders that exhibited authority and used it to 
influence others to follow their lead. Although community or local level leadership was the focus 
of this study, co-management involves a partnership between two entities: communities or user 
groups and the government. Several respondents noted this and described the need for leadership 
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in government to be successful. Below, I present some findings organized into the general 
themes of collective leadership, western-based leadership, and leadership in government. The 
quoted responses are followed with some context and a short interpretation of their meaning 
relative to leadership in Hawai‘i co-management transitions.  
 
A. Collective leadership 
The following quote outlined many of the issues facing communities engaged in co-management 
planning. This individual emphasized some leadership pitfalls followed by a description of a 
process in which a diversity of values must be considered in order to avoid stakeholder 
marginalization. The individual highlighted how overreliance on one individual can be 
detrimental and that co-management works best when all voices are heard: 
 
I think that you run the risk when you pin too much on individuals, you do two things: 
you run the risk of placing too much responsibility and dependence on an individual, 
which is really dangerous; and secondly, this is what I feel sort of in my na‘au, my gut: 
you go against the tenets of what collaborative management is about. Collaborative 
management, where it works, is essentially a democratic process…When the folks who 
would otherwise be ignored are able to raise an idea or are heard – I mean not listened to, 
but heard – those smallest voices resonate in a management decision making framework. 
Any voice. Whether it be a youth, a young fisherman, a woman, where those voices are 
often marginalized and disenfranchised from decision making, even traditionally are 
heard…by relying too much on our kūpuna or our community leaders we actually hold 
back what I believe – in my limited life experience – is one of the most potent aspects of 
co-management. This is a very unpopular opinion to have here in these islands, or in any 
island community. We keep trying to remind people that leadership is important but you 
cannot view it as a necessary condition nor can you really allow leadership voices to 
override fishermen – even the younger, less experienced fishermen. What we’ve seen is 
where leadership is focused on increasing participation and bringing a diversity of voices 
to the table, that’s effective. Where leadership is focused on providing its own voice and 
serving as a consistent voice and a source of knowledge, which essentially becoming a 
bottleneck, it does the opposite. It has the reverse.  
 
This first part of this quote illustrates the risk that communities face when they allow influential, 
respected members within their community to do too much – even kūpuna or elders that are 
honored and respected across Hawai‘i. The respondent went on to describe how leadership in co-
management was overvalued; that the process was the most important part. The respondent also 
explained how co-management planning processes are most effective when they value all voices, 
and not just respected elders or experienced fishermen.  
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Another interviewee felt that leadership was important, but not in the traditional sense that most 
citizens, environmental scholars, NGOs, or even community members may typically view it. In 
somewhat of the same vein as the previous interviewee, when asked about the importance of 
leadership, the person replied: 
 
…it is. I think it absolutely is, but it’s not how you typically view it. It’s one leader? That 
won’t work here. That’s a big problem here in fact. And that’s a big…it’s been a big 
limiting factor, a big cause of a lot of problems…A good leader is willing to step off their 
platform to get a shared platform. That’s true leadership. And get shared leadership with 
other members of the community. That to me is more important…I think what’s 
happening in Hawai‘i is people have tried to step up as almost like I’m diffusing the 
Western system too much. I’m the leader. And it’s not, I don’t think it has a chance of 
working. I mean, I’ve seen it fail two, three times in two, three communities. Leadership I 
think is extremely important, but they need a different word other than leadership. 
Collective. It’s the collective that’s got to be more important. And that’s why you have to 
be willing to come around, consensus around shared objectives – and these are people 
who may hate each other – but if they can agree, they can you know, on these things that 
might help bring them together. 
 
Similar to the first quote presented, this individual also cites how overreliance on one person or 
leader has been problematic in Hawai‘i co-management transitions. However, this person takes a 
step further by describing how overreliance on one individual typically identified as a ‘leader’ 
was a major reason why two or three communities were successful. The respondent clarified the 
comment by introducing the concept of a collective leadership. This runs counter to how 
leadership may be viewed in the western sense in terms of transferring authority to one 
individual. Although the previous quote went into detail to describe the pitfalls of more western-
based leadership and its connection to the outcomes of co-management processes, it is important 
to note that the distinction between western-based leadership and collective leadership is one 
being drawn by these interview respondents. There is a large academic literature on 
collaboration, collectives, and collective action that is largely ‘western’ in origin. To these 
respondents, western-based leadership may be viewed more in the traditional or bureaucratic 
sense in which leaders are individuals who try to influence their followers to follow their chosen 
or preferred path. This stands in contrast to a collective or shared leadership that emerges 
organically from a process that includes diverse participants and considers multiple viewpoints in 
order to find common ground together.  
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Similar to the first two respondents another individual simply explained the risk of overreliance 
on one individual: “…you know…. sometimes you get into a position of power and you get 
blinded.” So there was a perception among several interviewees that overreliance on one 
individual could jeopardize a community process and the opportunity to solidify a partnership 
with the State of Hawai‘i. 
 
In terms of the how leadership can be shared effectively, one individual explained the different 
roles individuals played by leaders in their community:  
 
No, we get strong leaders. But within that family, to go and talk in front of the legislature 
or public hearing is hard for them. Whereas that guy is already experienced and he has 
knowledge, it's natural to him. That's his asset, his skill, whereas yours is doing this 
[fishing, knowledge of marine resources]. So everybody get their place, their part. 
 
This above quote describes how leadership tasks are delineated or shared within a community: 
knowledge of bureaucratic and policy processes, public speaking, and knowledge of resource 
dynamics. Then the individual explains how the distribution of tasks plays to the strengths of 
different individuals and contributes to the level of collective leadership in the community. This 
type of specialization allows individuals to assume the role(s) in which they are most 
comfortable. 
 
In terms of leadership and institutional change, another individual described the importance of 
organizing a group to work collectively on changing gear-based fishing rules for an entire 
Hawaiian island:  
 
When [named two elected state officials] came to [names Hawaiian Island] and they had 
the bright idea of closing 20% of the main island shorelines to fishing [in 2005, 2006] 
and that pissed me off…because they…never tried a whole bunch of conservation rules, 
but all they wanted to do was shut down fishing… So we made a community group. We 
went to the Governor’s advisory council. We asked the Governor to have DLNR ban lay 
nets and that’s how the lay net ban got started and that’s how I became more active. 
 
In this case, the individual highlighted the importance of organizing fishermen and developing a 
shared goal: to enhance conservation without shutting down fishing areas. Fishing is an 
important cultural, non-commercial, and subsistence activity for many island residents (Glazier, 
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Carothers, Milne, & Iwamoto, 2013; Glazier, 2006). To add some context, the process described 
in the above quote to ban lay gill nets on one Hawaiian Island took six years. The group pushing 
for institutional change had to demonstrate the number and diversity of voices behind the policy 
– and sustain it for nearly six years – in order to pass rules that improved stewardship.  
 
Following the collective or group theme, another community member described the role of 
leadership in terms of the role of the state and community level participation:  
 
Yeah, [the state’s role should be scaled back]. I can see the whole process of it. [Another 
community member], he's a more diplomatic guy than I am…you got to get the people 
that live here to participate. And we did that. We had meetings with the community. [But] 
when you go approach DLNR [the resource management agency], ‘okay you can have 
that, but it has to be this way, not how you like it. It got to be constitutional. It has to be 
legal.’ This changed a lot. 
 
The importance of leadership in the context of a community-driven process was apparent in this 
quote. However, in this person’s opinion it may have been less important than an understanding 
of larger legal and institutional issues. Likewise, leadership and community participation may 
not be sufficient if the state is unwilling to cede greater co-management rulemaking authority to 
the community (see Chapter 2). 
 
Several individuals explained the importance of what are described as ‘brokers’ in the social 
network literature. These are individuals that possess a large network of relationships that are 
beneficial for collective action and institutional change. One respondent described the 
importance of possessing a network of relationships in order to build trust at the community 
level: 
 
I think it’s critical [having a network of relationships]. That’s how you build trust. Move 
things forward. And it’s somewhat unfortunate, but in Hawai‘i and I imagine all of the 
world, it’s not really what you know, it’s who you know a lot of times. And it makes a 
huge difference. If you go out to a community somewhere and start talking about 
resource management, generally you don’t know shit, who the hell are you to tell us, you 
know, this and that, but suddenly it’s like their nephew who is out there talking all about 
it…It’s just, ‘oh, yeah, no, this boy, he knows, you know, he grew up here, et cetera, et 
cetera.’ 
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This quote illustrates the significance of relationships. As this quote highlights, accessing a large 
network of relationships may increase the credibility of individuals involved in a process and 
open communication lines that may lead to the collective action often necessary for co-
management transitions. Also, being local matters in Hawai‘i. A meeting among locals can 
reference shared events and cultural norms.  
 
B. Western-based leadership 
Although many individuals described the importance of collective leadership and the pitfalls of 
overreliance on one person to fulfill leadership needs, several interview respondents still 
highlighted the importance of western-based leadership. Western-based leadership may be best 
thought of as a person in charge that sets an agenda and uses their authority to influence or rally 
others to follow behind them. This type of leadership is most often focused on the individuals in 
leadership positions, often describing ‘strong’ leaders. One respondent highlighted this point:  
 
Given that we don’t have mayors, given that we don’t have village councils, given that 
we don’t have that, what you end up with is that it’s only going to succeed if you have 
strong leaders at the community level that the community understands, respects, will 
listen to, and line up behind.  
 
This individual shared an important perspective. The respondent described some different 
administrative structures that are missing at the local level in many areas of Hawai‘i. Local or 
municipal governments in Hawai‘i are organized at the County level through a Mayor-Council 
system. O‘ahu has neighborhood boards, but neighboring islands do not. Maui County includes 
the islands of Lāna‘i and Moloka‘i. Although these islands are small, they do not have a mayor. 
Municipal representation for both islands is limited to a single seat on the Maui County Council. 
In their view, the absence of these village or neighborhood level administrative structures has 
resulted in a paucity of local leadership. To this individual, leadership is about respect, leading 
from example, and authority. Community members will follow a leader in a position that they 
respect, whether their official position is formal or informal. Described in this manner, leadership 
to this person is more about organization and management than leadership. 
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Another respondent emphasized the significance of leadership at the informal level, in terms of 
respected local fishers. These fishers were integral to the designation of new marine management 
area on one island:  
 
[Name of respected local fisher] agreed almost immediately to stop fishing there while 
we worked on the process of designating it. He was really supportive and because he’s 
such a prominent figure in commercial fishing on that [side of the island] in particular, I 
think it was helpful having him aboard. 
 
This quote presents the concept of key individuals leading by example. To this respondent, the 
behavior of a well-respected fisherman was integral to the designation of a particular area. 
Although this fisherman may have been important for the process, it seems that the leader in this 
case may have been the interviewee and not the fisher that is being described. After all, this 
person gained the support of the fisherman in the process. 
 
Other respondents described leadership in terms of a visionary individual. In this vein, effective 
leadership is that which is focused on accomplishing a goal or ensuring an outcome is met. One 
interview quote indicative of this described a leader as a visionary, committed to achieving a set 
purpose: 
 
But if you talk to me, the leader is usually someone with vision. He is visionary and has 
passion. And the leader…comes from a person having a vision and having a passion to do 
something for the better good. And with that, you'll have commitment, persistence, 
determination, all of that will fall into place with the leader, with someone that believes. 
 
Again, this quote describes the importance of one specific individual – a man – exhibiting 
leadership qualities. However, it highlights a different aspect of western-based leadership, 
namely the role that one person can play in defining goals and a new vision for a place. Through 
this vision and passion, others are inspired to follow behind them. Although this version of 
leadership may well be significant, another respondent made an important point about relying too 
heavily on one individual: 
 
Without [names noted Hawai‘i community leader] – I think about this all the time – 
what’s going to happen to [names Hawai‘i community] when [leader’s name] is not there 
anymore? Because out of the two community-based organizations that are working in 
partnership there, they have all said to him that he’s the fishery guy. He’s the marine guy. 
And he’s responsible for anything under the sun that has to do with marine resources. So 
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when he’s gone, what the heck are they going to do? There’s nobody that’s been 
shadowing him, there’s nobody…maybe one of students he had will step into place, but I 
don’t know. It scares the hell out of me. 
 
Certain individuals possess skillsets that uniquely position them to be community leaders. But, as 
this interviewee mentioned, investing the success of a process on one individual can place 
community efforts and co-management processes at risk.  
 
C. Leadership in government 
The individuals interviewed were asked about the role of leadership at the community level. Yet 
several of them asserted that co-management is a partnership and leadership was also needed in 
government. So in contrast – or in addition – to the collective leadership described in the 
previous section, the quotes in this section highlight the need for leadership in government. As 
important as community-level leadership may be to many of those interviewed, in theory, co-
management is a partnership involving shared management authority. One respondent cited the 
lack of leadership at the state government agency as an impediment to co-management:  
 
I think we could do more with what we have, but it takes leadership. And that’s the key. 
Right now there’s none so people are off doing their own little thing. There’s no 
concerted effort to focus on various things. If we had an administrator that said “hey, 
Hā‘ena is moving a long ways, they’ve got to get this going, you and you and you need to 
go over there and work with the community [prior to Hā‘ena’s CBSFA designation] and 
help come up with some drafts and let’s move forward with creating those rules, then it 
would get done right? But nobody is doing that right now and as far as I can tell, there’s 
no light at the end of tunnel, not in the near term anyway. 
 
Even though the above quote may describe a special situation where the agency went without an 
administrator for nearly three years, it illustrates the importance of leadership both at the top of 
the agency and leadership devolved to agency employees on other islands. The individuals in 
these island-level offices exhibited leadership, but only because some agency-level decision-
making authority had been devolved to them. Another individual brought up a similar point:  
 
Government, especially our agency, we don’t really have a real solid chain of command 
and levels of leadership. You know, it’s basically, right now in particular, completely lax 
leadership [the Division of Aquatic Resources went almost three years without hiring an 
administrator]…So it wasn’t like somebody said, all right, let’s rearrange our priorities 
and focus in on this. It was more an internal decision on [names outer Hawaiian island] 
among ourselves to go this route with some support from administration. 
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It appears that the absence of leadership at the top of the agency may have unintentionally 
opened spaces for co-management via unintentional devolution of authority to island-level 
employees. Without specific direction from higher levels, the island-level agency officials 
worked with communities on their own to allow co-management initiatives to flourish in a few 
specific areas. While this devolution of authority to outer islands enabled some communities to 
be successful, it likely also prevented community partnerships and co-management transitions at 
a larger scale. According to one individual, a potential remedy of this may have been found in 
the organizational structure present in ‘Āhihi-Kīna‘u, a natural area reserve on the island of 
Maui. This individual explained that leadership there was needed at multiple levels:  
 
But with the NARS, there was an advisory group and there’s a commission who was 
appointed by the governor. So that commission had the ability to push that department 
hard, hard, hard. And the advisory group to push the department hard, hard, hard. So you 
had two outside forces pushing the department. Without those two things going on, not a 
lot of things are going to happen. 
 
Although just one individual made this statement, it suggests that leadership at multiple levels – 
within a government-appointed decision-making commission and a stakeholder advisory group – 
were instrumental in revamping the management plan for a culturally and ecologically important 
marine area. The government-appointed decision making commission was composed of 
members from across the state, including the chairperson of the DLNR. The stakeholder advisory 
group was comprised of individuals from multiple sectors with vested interests. This individual 
reported that it took all these individuals and multiple levels of leadership to secure passage of 
new regulations. 
 
6.3.2 Leadership Dimensions 
In addition to the importance of leadership and the effectiveness of different leadership types, 
respondents were also asked about specific aspects of leadership practice or leadership 
dimensions. These six different leadership dimensions were identified from a review of the 
academic literature and are thought to be integral in common pool resource settings. The 
dimensions included: capacity to guide collective choice processes; trust building; access to 
resources; access to networks of relationships; knowledge of resource dynamics; and, ability to 
navigate the bureaucratic and policy processes. Findings on these dimensions derived from the 
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literature are provided below. A summary of their responses is provided below in Table 6.2. It is 
important to note some variance in the findings between the first and second set of interviews. 
The first set of interviews interviewed key respondents knowledgeable about co-management on 
a macro level. Some were specific to certain communities but many were familiar with the 
community dynamics influencing multiple processes and outcomes. The second set of interviews 
focused almost entirely on community members and community-level practitioners. Perhaps due 
to a more macro-level view of co-management transitions, individuals from the first set of 
interviews were more likely to report that access to resources, access to networks of 
relationships, and knowledge of resource dynamics were important than those interviewed during 
the second set of interviews. Otherwise levels of support for the other dimensions were similar 
between the two sets of interviews.  
 
A. Capacity to guide collective choice processes 
Capacity to guide collective choice decision-making processes is considered to be a key 
component of leadership in the context of self-organization at the community level (E. Ostrom, 
2009). Collective choice processes are an indication of inclusive or democratic natural resource 
planning processes (Olsson et al., 2006). This leadership dimension was the most frequently 
noted code in the transcribed interviews and was mentioned 31 times by respondents.  
 
B. Trust-building 
Trust-building is thought to be a key component of leadership in addition to overcoming conflict-
ridden processes, and building consensus (Gruber, 2010). Trust-building garnered the second 
highest frequency of leadership dimensions, with 22 interviewee mentions.  
 
C. Access to resources 
In this study, access to resources can be defined as access to human or financial resources 
integral to co-management planning, collective action, and institutional change (R. S. Pomeroy et 
al., 2001). Interview respondents mentioned access to resources 19 times. 
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D. Access to networks of relationships 
Scholars have demonstrated how access to networks of relationships, sometimes described as 
‘brokers’ in the social network literature, are important to connect together various groups that 
may be necessary in collective action and co-management transitions (Bodin et al., 2006). 
Individuals cited the importance of access to networks of resources 17 times during interviews. 
 
E. Knowledge of resource dynamics 
Knowledge of resource dynamics refers to an understanding of ecological processes and marine 
resource dynamics; this may also be called mental models of the ecosystem (E. Ostrom, 2009). 
Respondents mentioned knowledge of resource dynamics 15 times during coded interviews.   
 
F. Ability to navigate bureaucratic and policy processes 
Ability to navigate bureaucratic and policy processes is thought to be an important part of 
leadership practice in co-management (Olsson, Folke, & Berkes, 2004). Understanding policy 
processes, including public testimony, legislative committee hearings, and the overall 
rulemaking process are practical skills that leaders may need in this arena (Baumgartner & Jones, 
2009; Kingdon, 1995). Interview respondents described ability to navigate bureaucratic and 
policy processes 15 times during interviews.  
 
Table 6.2. Counts of thematically coded participant responses regarding various dimensions of 
leadership (N=41) 
 Number of mentions 
Leadership dimension 
First set of 
interviews 
(N=18) 
Second set of 
interviews 
(N=23) Total 
Capacity to guide collective choice processes 13 18 31 
Trust-building 12 10 22 
Access to resources 13 6 19 
Access to networks of relationships 12 5 17 
Knowledge of resource dynamics 10 5 15 
Navigating the bureaucracy and policy process 6 9 15 
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6.4 DISCUSSION 
 
With the advent of the social-ecological system framework (E. Ostrom, 2007, 2009), 
documentation of conditions associated with success (Cinner, McClanahan, et al., 2012a; 
Pomeroy et al., 2001), and meta analyses that have examined the importance of multiple 
variables in co-management regimes around the world (Gutierrez et al., 2011), leadership has 
emerged as an increasingly salient variable associated with success. However, much scholarship 
describing leadership operates under the assumption that leadership is well understood. 
Likewise, there is a lack of understanding about which leadership types are most effective for co-
management, which types of leadership practice or competencies are essential, or how leadership 
functions in different cultural and sociopolitical settings (Evans et al., 2015). This study 
attempted to address some of these deficiencies by examining the importance of leadership, 
which types of leadership are effective, and by asking practitioners, managers, planners, and 
community members to describe the significance of various leadership dimensions. The 
implications of these findings are considered in the remainder of this section. First the findings 
on leadership types and co-management are presented. Then, the leadership dimensions are 
considered in the context of co-management planning and implementation. This section 
concludes by considering the overall importance of leadership in collective action and co-
management transitions. 
 
6.4.1 Leadership types and co-management 
Nearly all respondents stated that leadership was necessary for co-management to be effective. 
However, this case study emphasizes some important nuance in the role of leadership in co-
management transitions. A majority of individuals interviewed described the need for collective 
leadership. This type of leadership puts the group ahead of the individual, with leadership being 
shared among multiple individuals. Several others, although not as many, highlighted the 
importance of western-based leadership. This is more akin to what most of the environmental 
sciences literature describes when considering leadership, for example, an influential individual 
that employs their charisma, vision, or authority to drive along a process (Evans et al., 2015). 
Conversely, a number of others described the need for leadership in government, at multiple 
levels. Since many of the barriers to co-management in Hawai‘i reside within government (see 
	171 
Chapter 4), it makes sense that interviewees would call for more leadership at different levels of 
government. Below, I consider some of the different themes that emerged from analyzing the 
interview quotes and assess their meaning in the context of coral reef fisheries co-management in 
Hawai‘i. 
 
A. Collective leadership 
A majority of interviewees reported some variation of collective leadership being the most 
effective type of leadership in Hawai‘i co-management. These individuals even described 
instances where dependence on one individual had derailed a co-management process. 
Individuals describing successful co-management partnerships cited successes where collective 
leadership was present, where community members did not try to do too much.  
This type of finding is rarely found in the co-management literature. Scholars often call for the 
need for strong leadership without considering that co-management may also be diffused within 
a collective or a group. Data gathered in this study suggest that leadership works best in Hawai‘i 
coral reef fisheries co-management when individuals are able to put aside their own interests in 
favor of a collective approach where mutual shared interests are developed. This finding is 
consistent with other studies on collaboration, which suggest that collaborative skills and 
approaches are necessary to be successful (Imperial et al., 2016).  
 
B. Western-based leadership 
Even though a majority of individuals interviewed mentioned the importance of the collective, 
several still conceived of leadership in terms of traditional leader-follower model. In this study, 
this is called western-based leadership. Despite the shortcomings of this type of leadership 
described in the previous section, interviewees offered some reasons why western-based 
leadership is effective. Respondents described how the support of a single respected individual 
can help mobilize support behind a process. Another highlighted the need for strong, recognized 
community leaders that can build broad-based support. Other individuals stressed the importance 
of specific, influential individuals to lead by example or visionary leaders that are able to 
communicate a vision and rally people to get behind them.  
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Clearly there is value in individuals that possess and practice leadership skills. In rare instances, 
an individual may possess knowledge of resource dynamics, have access to resources, retain a 
large network of relationships, the organizing skills to build trust and initiate collective 
processes, and ability to navigate bureaucratic and policy processes. Even if a person possesses 
and practices these skills, community members may not feel as inclined to get involved and view 
a co-management process if it is framed as one person’s pet project. Likewise, the process could 
collapse if that person were no longer involved. The problem with this leader-follower model for 
co-management is that co-management efforts must be sustained over time. What if something 
happens to that individual? Can the community weather the loss of their skills? That is why this 
type of leadership is often unsuccessful without an accompanying social movement. Western-
based leadership may work for the short-term in co-management but it is more likely to lose its 
effectiveness over time (Doubleday, 1989; Pinkerton, 1993).  
 
C. Leadership in Government 
Co-management can be conceived as an iterative, collaborative process between communities or 
user groups and the government (Pomeroy & Rivera-Guieb, 2006). For collaborative processes 
to be effective, participants on both sides must possess process-related skills (Wondolleck & 
Yaffee, 2000, p. 64). It stands to reason that the current staff on the government side at the 
resource management agency – staff with biological and ecological expertise – may lack some of 
the skills necessary for collaboration and co-management. According to interviewees, the 
leadership missing in Hawai‘i co-management transitions was often related to this concept. 
Where leadership in government was deemed to be effective, there were individuals at multiple 
levels that engaged in collaborative activities with communities. For co-management to be 
effective, the resource management agency must develop process-related skills within their 
current staff as well as hire individuals with these skills when new positions come available. This 
will ensure that partnerships do not lag on the government side of the process.  
 
6.4.2 Leadership dimensions and co-management 
Findings from this study provided evidence for all leadership dimensions deemed important in 
the academic literature. Among the six leadership dimensions respondents were queried about, 
initiating collective choice processes received the strongest support (31/41 respondents). Trust 
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building was also mentioned by more than half of all interviewees (22/41). Each of the six 
dimensions was referenced at least 15 times, providing evidence in favor of their inclusion and 
importance. Most of the individuals interviewed were involved in what could be considered 
successful collective action and co-management transitions. Although many identified multiple 
leadership dimensions they felt were necessary, many also spoke in terms of what did not work. 
Mainly, these individuals cited a lack of collaborative skills. Similarly, some described the 
leadership dimensions they felt were missing either in the communities in which they live or 
work. 
 
To address deficiencies in leadership practice collaboration scholars called for the development 
of process skills that facilitate the leadership dimensions described in this study. These process 
skills include conflict resolution, communication and facilitation, negotiation, participatory 
decision-making, and adaptive management (Gruber, 2010, p. 8; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000, p. 
65). Since collaboration, participatory processes and decision-making, conflict, and negotiation 
are such a key component of co-management in this system and elsewhere, it is not surprising 
many of the individuals interviewed in this study highlighted some of the same skills and 
qualities. No single leadership dimension was mentioned less than 15 times or more than 31 
times, perhaps emphasizing the importance of multiple skills needed for effective leadership 
practice. A focus on practical skill development through workshops or outreach courses could 
help build leadership practice in Hawai‘i communities. Internships or camps could assist the 
younger generation to build these skills. There is a strong tradition of teaching fishing skills to 
keiki (children) in Hawai‘i during lawai‘i (fishing) camps. If leadership is indeed as important as 
most respondents reported, then perhaps leadership skills building could be included in these 
camps. These and other creative ways that help foster leadership skills and practice should be 
explored for community members of all ages (Mehana Blaich Vaughan & Caldwell, 2015).  
 
Perhaps viewing leadership dimensions as a portfolio investment strategy could help manage 
transaction costs and ease co-management transitions. A portfolio strategy often looks to manage 
risk throughout an investment portfolio. Overinvestment in the leadership dimensions practiced 
by one individual could expose a community or a co-management process to higher risk if 
interpersonal conflicts exist between them and other community members or the state. Likewise, 
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work, health, or family obligations could also impact a single individual’s time and commitment 
to leadership practice. If leadership is indeed something that is practiced (Evans et al., 2015) then 
training and skill-building opportunities in resource management, legal and policy analysis, and 
networking could help develop new leaders in communities. Communities could potentially self-
assess their current leadership dimensions and identify areas in which they are proficient and 
others where they need to build capacity. Communities could even look to outsource some 
leadership dimensions such as understanding of bureaucratic or policy processes to NGOs or 
other specialists. Viewing and practicing leadership in this way could help shorten co-
management transitions in Hawai‘i and elsewhere. Lastly, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, co-
management transitions in Hawai‘i are not happening without a core group within a community 
or a community organization (and potentially their NGO partners) that is willing to absorb 
significant transaction and transformation costs. Theoretically, leadership is thought to help 
lower or manage transaction costs through community-level proficiency in the leadership 
dimensions examined in this study (E. Ostrom et al., 1993). Proficiency in the leadership 
dimensions described in this study lower the time and expenditures needed to gather information 
as well as convey it saliently to policymakers, stakeholders, and the general public.  
 
6.4.3 Leadership, collective action, and co-management transitions 
Similar to recent leadership scholarship, findings from this research indicate that the views of 
leadership, its role, and relative importance may be different than those found in much of the co-
management and environmental sciences literature (Case et al., 2015; Evans et al., 2015). This 
could be because practitioners and others deeply involved in co-management planning were 
queried about leadership directly instead of coded by research teams after the fact (Gutierrez et 
al., 2011). Gruber, (2010) found a marked difference in the relative importance of leadership 
when practitioners were asked about it versus research teams in case studies of community-based 
natural resource management. Researchers that ask about the presence of leadership rather than 
the practice of leadership skills may help explain this difference. Likewise, many researchers or 
community members may not consider process skills to be leadership practice. Another 
explanation for the discrepancy is the publication bias present in the academic literature. 
Scientific journal articles tend to be biased towards positive results in social science or 
biomedical fields, particularly those with a quantitative focus; negative or null results are rarely 
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published (Franco, Malhotra, & Simonovits, 2014). Although there is no evidence at this time, it 
is possible that authors did not publish instances where strong leadership was present but co-
management transitions were not successful. In these cases, the focus of the study may instead be 
institutional barriers rather than the absence of collective leadership practice. 
 
Although more critical views of leadership discourse may suggest leadership is described in 
excessively positive frames (Case et al., 2015), interview data gathered and analyzed in this 
study provides evidence that leadership is indeed worthy of a positive narrative and important for 
collective action and co-management transitions – just important in a manner not often explicitly 
described in the published literature. Some recent leadership scholarship has highlighted the 
importance of collaborative leadership (Evans et al., 2015; Imperial et al., 2016), but other 
studies have defined the specific dimensions of leadership practice while leaving the term 
leadership unqualified and nebulous for other to disentangle. Future case studies examining 
leadership in some capacity should describe the leadership type present and ideally, the types of 
leadership dimensions. This would ease coding in meta-analyses that could eventually parse out, 
quantitatively, which types of leadership and which leadership dimensions are most important in 
certain resource systems and contexts.  
 
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
Common pool resources such as fisheries remain challenging to manage effectively, but 
innovations such as co-management have demonstrated great promise where centralized 
management is ineffective. Leadership is considered to be a fundamental component of 
successful co-management and affecting institutional change, but its role in improving co-
management outcomes is not well understood. This study provides evidence that collective 
leadership and leadership practice that emphasizes process skills may be more reliable and 
effective than other leadership types for co-management transitions. In order to improve 
leadership practice, investments should be made to develop and improve leadership skills and 
practice in both communities and in the government. Future scholarship examining leadership 
should be careful to include more nuance by displaying a better understanding of leadership 
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dimensions and concepts to develop a more thorough understanding of leadership and its role in 
improving environmental management. 
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Appendix 6A: Interview questions 
 
1. (Leadership, collective action) Who helped to lead the community through this process? 
What strategies were employed by this leader(s)?  
If yes, who were they and what sort of things did they do to lead and motivate the 
community to come together? Could the community have made it this far in the 
process/completed the process without this leader(s)? Why or why not? Can you 
highlight the qualities that compel you to identify this individual as a leader? 
 
2. (Trust) Were the leader/leaders able to increase the community’s trust in: 
a) the community? 
b) the community organization or group? 
c) The process?  
d) What about trust in working with the government or other organizations, if they 
assisted towards the designation?  
e) What about government trust in the community? 
  
3. (Understanding of the resource) How well did the leader(s) understand the 
ecology/environment in your area? How well did they understand of community 
dynamics? How did this help the community to develop a process that would benefit both 
people and their resources? 
  
4. (Access to resources, network) Did this leader or these leaders have relationships 
outside the community that helped support the community through the process? Did the 
leader(s) have access to financial support or have relationships with those with financial 
resources (e.g., to perform scientific studies, hold community meetings and events, and 
travel to meet with, testify, and lobby legislators)?  
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Chapter 7. 
Improving ocean governance 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation research merged multiple theoretical frameworks to examine the key factors 
affecting collaborative coral reef fisheries management emergence and evolution over time. The 
purpose of this dissertation research has been to investigate and better understand the practical 
and theoretical issues associated with co-management governance transitions via an embedded 
case study approach in the main Hawaiian Islands. The mixed methods approach allowed 
multiple data sources and theoretical frameworks to complement one another and triangulate 
research findings.  
 
7.1.1 Summary of dissertation chapters 
Chapter 2 sought to examine how rights to manage and administrative structure have changed 
from Hawaiian Kingdom times to present day. This chapter compared three resource 
management regimes across two time periods in Hawai‘i. During the first time period, I 
examined historical marine tenure. In the second time period, I analyzed two contemporary 
management regimes: centralized management at the state level and shared management 
authority via co-management. Chapter 3 examined which events drove co-management 
emergence as an alternative management paradigm across the state by drawing upon examples 
from three Hawai‘i co-management processes. Chapter 4 characterized the barriers faced by 
communities and government partners at different stages of the policy process over the past 
twenty years. This chapter also described which transaction costs were incurred by co-
management partners at different stages of the policy process. Chapter 5 examined the possibility 
of co-management alternatives outside of the typical co-management pathway by analyzing legal 
statutes and administrative rules in areas where communities were significantly involved. This 
chapter also analyzed eight different marine management cases using Ostrom’s design principles 
and a property rights framework. Chapter 6 investigated the role of leadership in co-management 
transitions, by investigating the effectiveness of different leadership types and dimensions of 
leadership practice across Hawai‘i. 
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The research described in the chapters above was driven by five general research questions, each 
of which was addressed in its own chapter. The major findings of these chapters are presented in 
the sections below.  
 
7.1.2 Who has the right to manage? Distribution of property rights affects equity and power 
dynamics in co-management 
This chapter was driven by the question: How have the rules hierarchy and property rights for 
small-scale fisheries in Hawai‘i changed over time in Hawai‘i, and given the historical change in 
these institutions, what limitations and opportunities exist for incorporating rights-based 
approaches in co-management? The findings from this chapter indicate that administrative 
complexity has persisted throughout two centuries of social and political turmoil and institutional 
change. However, local level property rights for marine resources have changed significantly. 
Property rights and resource management decisions once devolved to the local or ahupua‘a level 
are now mostly concentrated in an administrative bureaucracy, even in co-management. The 
concentration of property rights in a centralized bureaucracy has coincided with coral reef 
ecosystem declines across Hawai‘i. This chapter demonstrates the importance of increasing 
participation in resource management and devolving rights to the local level, where appropriate, 
to improve coral reef fisheries management. The findings from the Hawaiian Kingdom time 
period are consistent with recent social-ecological systems research that discovered that many 
successful coral reef management regimes (areas with higher biomass than predicted) were found 
to have strong local property rights, greater participation in management, and a higher 
dependence on resources (Cinner et al., 2016). Although coral reef ecosystems across the main 
Hawaiian Islands may be degraded up to 50% compared to pristine areas, many communities 
across Hawai‘i view elements of the past as a viable path forward for their adjacent marine areas.  
 
7.1.3 Emergence of co-management governance for Hawai‘i coral reefs 
This chapter examined the question: How does co-management emerge at the community-level 
in Hawai‘i? Findings from multiple methods of inquiry pointed to social-ecological drivers that 
led to the emergence of co-management at the community level. Resource depletion in marine 
areas adjacent to subsistence fishing communities resulted in disputes and protracted conflict 
over harvesting and access rights. This conflict drove community members to self-organize, 
	180 
build consensus on actionable objectives, and collectively act to pursue institutional change via 
co-management. Understanding the creation story behind co-management transitions like this 
case in Hawai‘i may help uncover how planning processes affect social-ecological outcomes.  
 
7.1.4 Making the Transition to Co-Management Governance Arrangements in Hawai‘i: A 
Framework for Understanding Transaction and Transformation Costs 
This chapter focused on the question: What are the barriers to implementation when 
communities attempt to change institutions and authority from a centralized bureaucracy? This 
chapter revealed four general barriers faced during co-management transitions in Hawai‘i, which 
were further supported by an institutional analysis of transaction and transformation costs. The 
framework can help communities and government partners to anticipate and plan for which costs 
occur at different stages of the policy process, from planning through policy design, 
implementation, and evaluation. The analysis revealed that communities and their NGO partners 
have absorbed most of the transaction costs in Hawai‘i co-management with little tangible 
benefits. This goes against theories of institutional change that state resource users will not work 
to change rules if the costs exceed the benefits. Many Hawai‘i communities have deep cultural, 
spiritual, and religious connections to place. This deep kuleana (responsibility or accountability) 
to care for their area may be why Hawai‘i communities have been willing to give up so much in 
time, effort, and resources with seemingly little in return.  
 
7.1.5 Many paths, one destination: developing community guidance in state-centric co-
management 
This chapter addressed the question: What types of co-management partnership opportunities 
exist for communities outside of the defined community-based subsistence fishing area co-
management pathway? The communities and management designations examined in this study 
exhibited a diversity of goals for their marine areas. This chapter demonstrated the potential to 
pursue co-management via marine management designations other than community-based 
subsistence fishing areas. However, four of the eight communities analyzed in this study that are 
partnering with the state through these alternative designations are currently pursuing 
community-based subsistence fishing areas. Also, eight different areas were compared using 
Ostrom’s design principles and an analysis of property rights. Similar to the findings of the 
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property rights analysis in Chapter 2, very few rights were devolved to communities. Similar to 
the findings in Chapter 4, the design principles analysis uncovered that community claims to 
marine resources are contested by outside groups and the government, which substantially 
increases the transaction costs of co-management transitions.  
 
7.1.6 Reexamining leadership in fisheries co-management 
This chapter addressed the question: What is the role of leadership in co-management planning 
and implementation? Findings from this chapter indicated that leadership in co-management 
worked best when it was about the collective and less about the individual. Similarly, an 
overreliance on one person may place community efforts at risk or even stunt co-management 
transitions. Solid support was found for six leadership dimensions of practice identified to be 
positively associated with co-management. Since it may be rare for one individual to possess all 
six qualities and risky to place a co-management proposal on the shoulders of one person, this 
finding may signal a need to view leadership differently in the context of co-management. 
Leadership that emphasizes process skills may work best for co-management transitions. 
Developing process skills within communities may help speed up co-management transitions in 
Hawai‘i.  
 
7.2 KEY INSIGHTS  
 
The specific theoretical contributions from this dissertation research from each chapter are 
presented below. Some of the key theoretical contributions include the administrative complexity 
of Hawaiian Kingdom resource governance; the planning process model for co-management 
emergence; a framework for understanding transaction and transformation costs; the exclusive 
focus of exclusion and withdrawal rights in Hawai‘i co-management, independent of community 
goals; and leadership as a temporally dependent portfolio strategy. These findings are described 
in more detail in the following sections. 
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7.2.1 Administrative complexity of Hawaiian Kingdom resource governance 
Scholars describing Hawaiian resource management often describe the kapu system that existed 
before Kamehameha I passed away in 1819, focusing on social stratification and the stiff 
penalties for breaking resource rules that often included death. Likewise, much research explains 
how resource decisions after 1819 were left to wise resource managers or konohiki at the local 
level. However, the academic literature describing this governance system rarely acknowledges 
how a konohiki would devise operational rules to manage a fishery by making decisions in 
consultation with hoa‘āina (ahupua‘a residents) or kilo (master fishers) at the collective choice 
level or how resource coordination and trade between ahupua‘a might affect resource rules. 
Likewise, the konohiki position could also be tenuous and subject to changes in the larger 
political landscape. As political appointees, konohiki were accountable to both the hoa‘āina and 
the ali‘i ‘ai ahupua‘a (ahupua‘a-level chief) and the ali‘i ‘ai moku (moku or district-level chief). 
The findings from the institutional analysis of historical marine tenure in Chapter 2 reveal the 
administrative complexity and the polycentric institutional structure that was present in Hawaiian 
Kingdom governance.  
 
7.2.2 Planning process model for co-management emergence 
The planning process model described in Chapter 3 is a novel attempt to explain how co-
management emerges at the community level. Much of the academic literature on social-
ecological systems or common pool resources begin their analysis with community-level self-
organization, in other words, a community has already sufficiently coordinated to begin planning 
for collective action. Analyzing commons or social-ecological systems in this manner ignores the 
drivers that precede the community-level self-organization process. The research presented in 
Chapter 3 is a first attempt to describe how this process unfolds. Through a simply typology, I 
describe how resource depletion led to conflict and eventually, self-organization, consensus-
building, and collective action at the community level. Although this process may be implied in 
other studies, this dissertation research is novel in that it attempts to characterize the specific 
events in this process, using a grounded theory approach and mixed research methods.  
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7.2.3 A framework for examining transaction and transformation costs 
Previous scholarly research has described which costs are associated with different governance 
arrangements (Imperial, 1999; E. Ostrom et al., 1993). Yet there is no description of which costs 
occur at different stages of the policy process. The framework presented in Chapter 4 provides a 
novel attempt to illustrate the transaction and transformation costs incurred during co-
management governance transitions. Academics and practitioners can use this framework to 
better understand and anticipate different costs at different times. This framework could also be 
used to determine which costs co-management partners shared or incurred. Chapter 4 utilizes this 
framework to show how Hawai‘i communities and their NGO partners are subsidizing most of 
the costs associated with co-management transitions. This finding may help explain the co-
management implementation gap that exists in this system.  
 
7.2.4 Fragmented authority complicates integrated Hawai‘i co-management  
An analysis of community-level goals for co-management uncovered as many as eight State and 
Federal agencies that communities may need to partner with to address these goals. The 
complexity of rules and fragmented management authority complicates integrated ahupua‘a 
management. Multi-party co-management or network governance may be necessary to address 
threats such as land-based impacts to marine resources. However, increasing the number of 
parties involved in co-management will likely also increase the transaction costs associated with 
co-management transitions.  
 
7.2.5 Collective leadership and the dimensions of leadership practice  
In the academic literature on co-management, leadership is often viewed through a traditional 
leader-follower frame. Viewed this way, leaders may exert their authority to rally others behind a 
vision. Some scholarship focuses on the desirable qualities or skills that were found to be 
effective (Olsson et al., 2006; Westley et al., 2013). Little scholarship views leadership in terms 
of a collective, where groups share leadership responsibilities and practices. Chapter 6 found 
support for collective leadership in Hawai‘i co-management. Likewise, support was found for all 
six leadership dimensions of practice found to be important in previous studies, with the 
strongest support for ‘capacity to guide collective choice processes.’ Many community members 
explained that community members played different leadership roles at different times. This 
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finding may suggest the need to view leadership as a portfolio. It may be rare to find a resource 
user or community member that possesses all six leadership dimensions, which indicates that 
leadership in co-management may necessitate multiple leaders, whose skills may be most useful 
at different times. If these dimensions are indeed important for co-management as the data in 
Chapter 6 suggest, then perhaps a collective leadership model may be a better lens through which 
to view and understand leadership in co-management.  
 
7.3 PLANNING AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This dissertation research raised several planning and policy implications important for co-
management transitions. The most relevant of which include: devolution of management 
authority; sharing costs during co-management transitions; network governance for integrated 
co-management; process legitimacy; and developing process skills to facilitate co-management 
transitions. These planning and policy relevant finding are discussed below.  
 
7.3.1 Devolution of management authority 
Institutional analysis of historical marine tenure confirmed that management authority was 
devolved to the local level during Hawaiian Kingdom times. In theory, co-management involves 
shared management authority between communities or user groups. However, in Hawai‘i co-
management, communities are only allowed to devise place-based rules subject to government 
approval. Communities are not allowed to exclude others from entering, accessing, or harvesting 
in their adjacent marine areas. This is a major issue complicating co-management 
implementation in Hawai‘i. Communities and NGO partners have invested a tremendous amount 
of resources to organize, plan, and change local level resource rules.  
 
7.3.2 Sharing costs during co-management transitions 
Much research frames co-management in terms of reducing transaction costs after initial startup 
costs are incurred due to increasing levels of trust, improved regulatory compliance, and sharing 
of management tasks. However, Hawai‘i has taken 22 years to implement just a handful of co-
management areas, likely due to the significant transaction and transformation costs. Up until 
this point, communities and their NGO partners have seemingly contributed much more than 
what they have received back in terms of resource benefits. This contradicts existing theories of 
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institutional change which state resource users should receive benefits that are proportional to 
incurred costs (Basurto & Ostrom, 2009; E. Ostrom, 1990). Why do communities persist when 
theory says they should quit? Ethnographic and interview evidence suggest that a cultural, 
spiritual, and social connection may be a wellspring from which, no matter the barrier or the 
cost, people will continue to care for their areas. For these communities, connection to the land 
and sea reproduces a sense of cultural identity and provides a purpose for action that is guided by 
kuleana or a deep responsibility to care for place. Fortunately, a wellspring of dedicated 
community effort is available in many areas, along with strong support from foundations and 
NGOs. The combination of dedicated community effort and outside support help offset the 
asymmetric cost allocation at this time. However, not all communities may share this cultural 
wellspring or NGO/Foundation support. If other communities are going to be successful in 
partnering with the state, these uncompensated costs must be reduced or redistributed to create 
stronger incentives for community participation. 
 
7.3.3 Network governance for integrated co-management 
A focus group of community members identified goals for their areas that stretched beyond the 
purview of coral reef fisheries regulations. There was a wide recognition of the connection 
between land-based impacts and coral reef ecosystem health. However, multiple government 
agencies and private landowners may need to collaborate in order to holistically manage impacts 
facing coral reef ecosystems. Network governance may be one solution. In network governance, 
multiple parties collaborate to solve complex, shared problems that they cannot address alone. 
The challenge however, will be to incentivize and sustain cooperation among multiple parties 
until agreements and solutions can be reached (Imperial et al., 2016).   
 
7.3.4 Process legitimacy  
Data presented in this dissertation supports the notion that legitimate processes lead to successful 
co-management initiatives. Processes perceived to be illegitimate, such as Miloli‘i in the mid-
2000s, were dominated by a few individuals, lacked widespread community support, and as a 
result, stalled for many years. Alternatively, processes like Hā‘ena – and more recently, 
Ka‘ūpūlehu – were successful because the community reached out to stakeholders and the 
broader community and meticulously documented their efforts. Their process has become a 
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roadmap for other Hawai‘i communities to follow and an example of how a legitimate planning 
process can lead to a successful co-management initiative. 
 
7.3.5 Developing process skills to facilitate co-management transitions 
The findings from Chapter 6 indicated that leadership in co-management may be best viewed 
collective in order to manage risk from overinvesting in one person, facilitate wider community 
involvement, and to identify areas for leadership skill development. Co-management may be best 
viewed as a collaborative planning process where process skills such as negotiation, mediation, 
conflict resolution, and participatory decision-making may be most useful. Investments in 
building these skills or even determining if certain skills could be outsourced to NGO partners 
could enhance leadership within communities and the government to better facilitate co-
management transitions.  
 
7.4 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
 
Like most scholarly research, this dissertation has its limitations, the biggest of which include the 
generalizability of research findings and the lack of outcome data to measure co-management 
transitions. These two issues are examined in greater detail below.  
 
7.4.1 Generalizability of research findings 
The snowball or network sampling approach employed in this research to identify individuals for 
semi-structured interviews is not statistically representative. Similarly, its findings may not 
necessarily be generalizable to other contexts, but are consistent with existing propositions in 
dealing with open access property regimes. However, a statistically significant sampling protocol 
that treated all respondents equally would have run the risk of omitting some information rich 
perspectives, including other individuals whose perspectives may not have been as valuable. 
Moreover, good qualitative or mixed method research is not concerned with representativeness; 
instead it is concerned with increasing its analytical power and overall persuasiveness (Creswell 
& Clark, 2007; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). An unrelated but also important issue with small-N 
comparative case study research is the method for dealing with rival explanations or 
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counterfactuals. Each of the chapters could have devoted more time to address rival explanations 
that challenge or run counter to the research findings.  
 
7.4.2 Lack of outcome data to measure co-management transitions  
This dissertation research was conducted over four years from 2012-2015. Since most of the co-
management areas across Hawai‘i are still in the planning stages or early in their transition to co-
management, this research approach was limited to formative (process-based) assessments. For 
the co-management areas early in their transition, the biological or ecological data was either 
unavailable or it was too early to definitively examine management impacts. So, most of this 
research examined the rules governing resources, which rights were shared, or the administrative 
hierarchy, without being able to assess their attendant social-ecological effects.  
 
7.5 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Findings from any research may lead to as many questions as they answer. Below, I will describe 
what I consider to be some of the most fruitful areas of future inquiry that have emerged while 
conducting this dissertation research. Among them are: integrating planning theory into social-
ecological systems and institutional analysis frameworks; testing the planning process model and 
collective leadership practice in other resource systems; and using the transaction and 
transformation costs framework to measure the costs associated with co-management transitions.  
 
7.5.1 Integrating planning theory into social-ecological systems and institutional analysis 
frameworks 
Currently the social-ecological systems framework does not include any variables associated 
with planning for co-management transitions. Additional variables such as community-level 
consensus-building and decision making structures, level of community engagement, and 
procedural or process fairness could help compare the effects of different processes on 
governance structures and, eventually, resource outcomes.  
 
7.5.2 Testing the planning process model and collective leadership model in other settings 
The planning process model and the collective leadership practice approach could be empirically 
tested in other settings, perhaps through a medium- or large-N meta-analysis (where data is 
	188 
available). This could help determine if the planning process model has any explanatory power 
beyond the cases examined in this resource system and whether a collective leadership approach 
is an effective leadership strategy in co-management transitions.  
 
 
7.5.3 Using the transaction and transformation costs framework to measure costs of co-
management transitions 
The transaction and transformation costs framework could be used to: a) assess how costs are 
shared by different partners in co-management; and b) quantify the costs associated with 
governance transitions in different settings. Comparative work could examine how costs vary 
across the development spectrum or how different cost configurations affected incentives to 
participate throughout the policy process. Additionally, evaluative criteria (such as economic 
efficiency, fiscal equivalence, redistributional equity, accountability, and sustainability) could be 
used to assess how different cost configurations may lead to tradeoffs among these criteria.  
 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation research attempted to answer some broad questions associated with transitions 
to co-management in Hawai‘i. Different analytical methods and theoretical frameworks were 
combined to increase its analytical and explanatory power and overall persuasiveness. This 
research has shown the role of history in shaping contemporary co-management solutions in 
Hawai‘i. Specifically, the administrative complexity and coordination present during Hawaiian 
Kingdom fisheries governance may be surprising to scholars unfamiliar with the Institutional 
Analysis and Design Framework. Contemporary co-management strategies could be improved 
by employing many broad principles uncovered during historical marine tenure, including 
devolving decision making to the local level, and increasing coordination but still allowing for 
multiple, overlapping centers of authority. This research also developed a planning process 
model for co-management emergence, which describes the drivers for emergence and the social 
responses through a linked typology. The nature of the social responses – self-organization, 
consensus-building, collective action – only account for emergence at the community level. 
More planning, collaboration, and design must still occur for a co-management transition to be 
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complete. Thus it is important for communities and their state partners to be realistic about the 
lengthy timelines that accompany co-management transitions. Two of the most significant 
factors contributing to lengthier timelines during co-management transitions are transaction and 
transformation costs. Many of these costs occur throughout the policy process and extend 
through implementation and evaluation. Many public policy proposals do not adequately 
consider or forecast implementation costs, which may further stall co-management transitions. 
Although there has been much scholarly attention devoted to community-based subsistence 
fishing areas as co-management pathways in Hawai‘i, less attention has been focused on multi-
party co-management or network governance to accomplish integrated ahupua‘a management. 
These fragmented authority present in Hawai‘i highlight the need for greater collaboration across 
government and private landowners to enhance co-management transitions.  
 
Analysis of the rights sought by communities pursuing co-management across all co-
management areas examined in this study reveals that relatively little authority is currently being 
devolved to Hawai‘i communities. Exploration of leadership across all cases examined in this 
study indicates that co-management may require a different leadership paradigm. In Hawai‘i co-
management, effective leadership is about the group, not the individual. Similarly, solid support 
for six different leadership dimensions shows that it would be exceedingly difficult for one 
individual to be proficient in all of these dimensions simultaneously. This finding backs up an 
alternative leadership strategy that shares authority among the group and focuses on process 
skills. Developing a collective leadership portfolio may help shelter a community from the risk 
of overinvesting in one person and could help identify points of weakness to improve upon.  
 
Independent of any theoretical contribution, I hope that the findings presented in this dissertation 
have some practical value to practitioners, community members, and government planners or 
managers, particularly in easing co-management transitions that hold much promise to improve 
social-ecological outcomes.  
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